The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, has sounded a strong alarm that Russia is preparing ‘an unprecedented interference’ in the parliamentary elections on September 28, for which ‘financing of over 100 million euros’ is planned. The head of state from Eastern Europe listed several methods by which this Russian interference in the elections in the Republic of Moldova would take place, as well as the enormous sums of money that groups affiliated with Ilan Shor will invest.
Strict measures
‘Today at the CSS (Supreme Security Council) we discussed measures to combat manipulation in electoral processes. There are risks to our security and to democratic processes. The Russian Federation wants to control the Republic of Moldova from the fall and is preparing an unprecedented interference. The risks are high and all institutions and society must be aware of this. The Kremlin is investing in political vehicles to control the processes in the Republic of Moldova,’ said Maia Sandu after the CSS meeting in Chisinau. According to Maia Sandu, at the meeting of the Supreme Security Council, ten instruments of involvement of Moscow structures in the electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova were analyzed. The first of these instruments would be electoral corruption, identified as a main threat. According to Maia Sandu, this would take place through payments in cryptocurrencies, networks of carriers, transfers to people who have accounts at Promsveazbank or illicit financing of destabilization campaigns. ‘About 100 million euros are planned to be financed through cryptocurrencies alone,’ Maia Sandu specified. A second instrument would be microcrediting and hidden financing. President Sandu claims that many citizens of the Republic of Moldova have microcredit accounts opened in Russia. In this regard, Maia Sandu warned people not to provide personal data, because they may find themselves in debt to Russian banks without knowing it. Maia Sandu also reminded that selling votes or buying voters is punishable by heavy fines.
Hybrid instruments
Another tool that Russia intends to use is the organization of paid protests, which aim to create a false perception of discontent among the masses. ‘We have seen such protests with paid people, with organized coordination and logistics. The police have imposed hundreds of fines. According to the law, financial remuneration for participating in protests is punishable,’ Maia Sandu also declared. Among the identified tools are ‘cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, including on systems that ensure the smooth conduct of elections but also those that ensure the provision of essential services to citizens,’ a statement from the presidency in Chisinau mentions. The instrumentalization of the church, through the involvement of foundations affiliated with the Kremlin and clergy paid to manipulate public opinion, is another tool of Russian interference identified by the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. ‘I remind the priests that – selling your neighbor is not only illegal, but also a great sin,’ said the head of state. Social networks will also play a role in Russia’s interference plan. ‘Corruption schemes, the organization of protest groups and all vote-buying processes are organized on Telegram. Unfortunately, there is no response from Telegram when state institutions report forgeries or actions to corrupt voters on this platform. Anti-EU groups are also being created on TikTok, but there is some communication with TikTok, as well as with Facebook,’ said Maia Sandu. At the same time, another tool would be the involvement of organized crime groups in destabilizing actions such as those in ‘penitentiary institutions, but also outside them’. Sabotaging the election process in the diaspora would be another tool of Russia. “We see attempts to compromise the participation of citizens from the Diaspora in voting, obstruction of polling stations, attempts to corrupt voters. We see narratives that divide society into ‘who has the right to decide the future and who does not’. I want to mention that all citizens, wherever they are, have the right to vote,” Maia Sandu also said.
Radicalization actions
Hybrid influences in relation to the electorate in Gagauzia and the left bank of the Nistru River, such as ‘actions to radicalize the Chisinau-Comrat relationship, possible provocations in the Security Zone, demonstrations of force, energy crises on the eve of election day’, are another tool of Russia about which Maia Sandu warned. According to the President of the Republic of Moldova, in both regions there are groups that provoke citizens to hatred, discrimination and radicalization, whether they organize paid protests or provocations in the Security Zone. Last but not least, mobilization and radicalization in the online environment is mentioned as a vehicle of Russian influence. The President warned that in the online environment the development of groups that promote extremism, provoke hatred and aggression is observed. ‘Influencers paid by the Kremlin are also used here,’ added Maia Sandu.
Kremlin denial
The Kremlin immediately denied that Russia was seeking to interfere in Moldova’s parliamentary elections in September, after Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Moscow of planning “unprecedented interference.” President Maia Sandu’s statement that Russia was preparing to intervene in Moldova’s parliamentary elections did not correspond to reality, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said at his daily press conference, according to the official Russian news agency TASS. “This does not correspond to reality, Russia does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,” Peskov said. At the same time, the Kremlin spokesman claims that the authorities in Chisinau are violating the electoral rights of many Moldovans, especially those living on the territory of the Russian Federation. “We regret to note that the electoral rights of many Moldovans are being ‘restricted’ and violated. And, no matter what those in Chisinau say, the rights of Moldovans living in other countries, including on the territory of the Russian Federation, of course, must be ensured, from our point of view. Which is not the case today,’ said Peskov. ‘We do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,’ insisted the Kremlin spokesman, quoted by TASS. According to Maia Sandu, the Kremlin is planning ‘financing worth about 100 million euros’ only through cryptocurrencies. Among the mechanisms used are ‘carrier networks’, ‘microcredit for hidden financing’, ‘transfers through accounts opened in Promsvyazbank’ and ‘money laundering schemes with the aim of corrupting the electoral process’.
Romanian support
President Nicușor Dan stated that there is a Russian hybrid war in Europe, noting that, in view of the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova, Romania can offer the neighboring country technical expertise on many components, such as cybersecurity. ‘Again I go back to those statements from July 18 from NATO, the European Union and the Government of Great Britain, which say that there is Russian interference in Europe, there is a Russian hybrid war in Europe, with a cyber component and a disinformation component. So, these are facts. For the Republic of Moldova, the facts are even clearer and more intense, because there, beyond these two components, there was another component, which was vote buying, which is proven in several thousand cases investigated by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Moldova,’ said Nicușor Dan, when asked about the fact that the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, warned that Russia was preparing to interfere in the parliamentary elections this fall.
He mentioned that the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova on September 28 will be very important for Europe. ‘What Romania can do, without, obviously, interfering with the electoral process, is to provide technical expertise on many components. For example, on the cybersecurity component, we are obviously better than the Republic of Moldova and, at the request of our counterparts, we can help them,’ added Nicușor Dan. Asked if he had spoken to Maia Sandu in this regard, the president mentioned that he had discussed this during his visit to Chișinău.
Eastern threats
The Republic of Moldova is facing increasing threats from the Russian Federation in 2024-2025, amid the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28, 2025. These elections, crucial for the political future and geopolitical orientation of the country, are taking place in a tense regional context, marked by the war in Ukraine and Chisinau’s efforts to integrate into the European Union.
The Republic of Moldova is located at the crossroads of the spheres of influence of the East and the West, and its pro-European orientation in recent years has caused a sharp deterioration in relations with Moscow. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Chisinau accelerated its efforts to break away from the Russian orbit, firmly condemned the aggression against the neighboring state, requested and obtained the status of a candidate country for the EU (in June 2022), and initiated reforms aimed at aligning the country with European standards. These developments have been viewed with hostility by the Kremlin, which considers the Republic of Moldova part of its traditional sphere of influence and opposes the expansion of the EU and NATO into the ex-Soviet space.
The tensions were reflected in official discourse and concrete actions. President Maia Sandu became a favorite target of Russian rhetoric, accused of seeking to destroy relations with Moscow at the behest of the West. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in 2023 that “Moldova is prepared to be the next victim in the hybrid war launched by the West against Russia,” implying that Chisinau was a pawn of the West. At the same time, the spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, accused the Moldovan authorities of abandoning neutrality under the influence of Western donors, of “transforming Moldova into a logistical base for supplying the Ukrainian armed forces,” and of wanting the country to join NATO, which Moscow interpreted as a direct threat.
On the other hand, leaders in Chisinau complain that Russia is trying to destabilize the country in order to stop its European path. President Sandu has stated bluntly that Russian interference represents a direct threat to the national security, sovereignty and European future of the Republic of Moldova. Moldovan authorities claim that Moscow is using a whole arsenal of “hybrid warfare”, from the manipulation of public opinion to energy blackmail, to keep the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence and prevent it from getting closer to the EU. For example, in October 2024, the Parliament in Chisinau organized a referendum on introducing the objective of European integration into the Constitution, a consultation that passed with just over 50% popular support. Moldovan officials have accused Russia of trying to delegitimize both that referendum and the presidential elections held simultaneously, through propaganda and false messages intended to sow distrust. In response, the Kremlin denied any involvement, calling the accusations “anti-Russian.”
New and old threats
This deaf geopolitical confrontation is also taking place against the backdrop of the presence of Russian troops in the separatist region of Transnistria and the constitutional neutrality of the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau has become increasingly vocal in demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the left bank of the Dniester, declaring itself open to an international civilian mission in their place, but Moscow refuses, claiming that their role is that of peacekeepers. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly warned that any attempt by Moldova to resolve the Transnistrian issue by force will be considered an attack on Russia.
In December 2024, Zakharova stressed that Russia “will adequately respond to challenges and protect its citizens, peacekeeping contingent, servicemen of the Russian operational force and military depots in Cobasna in Transnistria”, any action that threatens their security will be treated as an attack against the Russian Federation. This represents an explicit military threat, intended to deter Chisinau or other actors (such as Ukraine) from any intervention aimed at eliminating the Russian presence in the region.
The Republic of Moldova finds itself in a delicate balance. On the one hand, it is strengthening its partnerships with the EU, the US and neighboring states (Romania, Ukraine) to ensure economic, energy and security support. On the other hand, it is facing hostile reactions from Russia, which considers Chisinau’s change of direction as a strategic loss. The following sections will detail how these geopolitical tensions translate into concrete threats related to the 2025 electoral process and the internal stability of the Republic of Moldova.
Electoral interference and foreign interference
The parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025, are seen as a turning point for Moldova’s direction, and multiple indications suggest that Russia is trying to influence the outcome of the vote in favor of pro-Russian political forces. Moldovan authorities have reported that approximately 100 million euros were made available in cryptocurrencies to corrupt the electoral process, a colossal sum that highlights the magnitude of the anticipated interference. (Sandu did not present public evidence for this claim at the time, but the information aligns with a broader pattern of occult financing observed in Moldovan politics in the past.
On the other side, pro-Russian opposition parties have reorganized and formed a coalition precisely to maximize their chances of overthrowing the pro-European government at the ballot box. The main objective stated by this coalition is to replace the current government (the Action and Solidarity Party, PAS, founded by Maia Sandu) with an executive that would review the rapprochement with the EU and repair relations with Moscow. In essence, the message of these forces is aligned with the Kremlin’s rhetoric: they accuse the Sandu government of involving Moldova in “a war that is not ours”, subordinating it to the West’s agenda, and promise to bring “peace” through non-alignment and close relations with Russia.
The Moldovan authorities’ measures to counter foreign interference intensified in 2024. The Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office investigated and reported numerous cases of illegal financing of political actors from obscure sources (allegedly linked to Russia), especially through vote-buying schemes. In fact, after the presidential elections in October-November 2024, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Police publicly revealed that they had documented a large network of voter corruption orchestrated by circles associated with fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor.
Shor is accused by the authorities and Western sanctions of having generously financed parallel protests and electoral campaigns to undermine the pro-European government. In June 2023, the Constitutional Court declared the Shor Party illegal, arguing that the party posed a threat to the constitutional order and state security through its destabilizing actions. Even after the ban, Shor’s loyalists sought to continue under other political entities, for example, the so-called “Victory electoral bloc” was created in 2024, which was said to be supported by Shor in the shadows. However, the Central Election Commission refused to register this bloc in the 2025 elections, citing violations of electoral financing rules. The decision was contested by the group’s exponents, but it highlights the authorities’ increased vigilance towards money from opaque Russian sources that could influence the electoral competition.
Coup d’état?
A relevant episode regarding externally orchestrated coup attempts took place in early 2023, foreshadowing the methods that Russia could use. In February 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky revealed that his services had intercepted a detailed plan by Russian services to “destroy Moldova.” Shortly after, Maia Sandu confirmed the existence of the plot, accusing Moscow of preparing to involve foreign saboteurs (from Russia, Belarus, Serbia, and Montenegro) infiltrated among the protesters in Chisinau, with the aim of “changing the legitimate government with an illegitimate one, controlled by the Russian Federation.” According to the information presented by Sandu, these groups were to provoke violence during opposition demonstrations, in order to generate chaos and force the fall of the pro-Western leadership. “The Kremlin’s attempts to bring violence to Moldova will not succeed. Our main target is the security of citizens and the state,” the president declared at the time, underlining Chisinau’s determination to prevent a scenario similar to Maidan or other orchestrated uprisings.
Moscow denied the allegations, and the US National Security Council spokesman called them “extremely concerning, but certainly in line with Russian behavior.” Although these events preceded the strict 2024-2025 period, they opened the eyes of Moldovan society and institutions to the vulnerability of the democratic process to foreign interference. Subsequently, Moldovan authorities took measures such as limiting the presence of foreign citizens at protests, strengthening security at key institutions, and closer cooperation with Western intelligence partners to thwart such plots.
International observers have confirmed that the recent elections in Moldova were conducted in an environment marked by significant external interference. OSCE and other monitoring missions assessed the technical organization of the elections as fair and competitive, but highlighted “active attempts to undermine the integrity” of the elections through disinformation and illicit money from outside the country. In their preliminary statement following the presidential and referendum elections on 20 October 2024, observers noted that “the Republic of Moldova is subject to an ongoing hybrid war orchestrated from abroad, which includes illegal financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.” Although the electoral processes were well-administered, these elements affected the level playing field of political competition, favoring certain candidates and disadvantaging others.
In the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections, the stakes remain just as high. PAS, the ruling party, started the polls with a lead (27.4% voting intention in July 2025) over the main socialist opposition force (around 10%). However, the coalescence of pro-Russian blocs and the massive mobilization of external resources could diminish this advantage. In fact, the Kremlin explicitly wants PAS and Maia Sandu to lose legislative and executive control, which would represent a strategic change of camp for Chisinau. The risk for Moldovan democracy lies in the fact that the election result could be distorted by external factors, instead of reflecting the freely expressed will of the citizens. The Moldovan authorities, aware of this danger, are urging the population to be vigilant and trust in institutions. “The greatest danger of Russia’s interference in our internal affairs is that it represents a direct threat to the country’s national security, sovereignty and European future,” Maia Sandu stressed. At the same time, Moscow claims that it “has no interest in interfering, and Chisinau’s accusations are just Russophobic rhetoric meant to distract from the government’s failures” – according to spokesman Dmitry Peskov and other Russian officials who responded to Maia Sandu’s statements (official denials came promptly after each accusation launched by Chisinau).
Pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation
One of the main “weapons” used by Russia in the Republic of Moldova is propaganda, massive disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion and undermining citizens’ trust in the pro-Western government. In 2024 and 2025, the Moldovan information space was simply bombarded with false narratives, conspiracy theories, and fabricated news, disseminated through Kremlin-affiliated television and websites, social media, and even local politicians influenced by Moscow. The purpose of these messages is both to discredit pro-EU leaders (especially Maia Sandu and the PAS party) and to promote the pro-Russian agenda – presenting rapprochement with Russia as beneficial and European/NATO integration as dangerous for Moldova.
A recent investigation by the international organization NewsGuard has uncovered a complex pro-Russian propaganda operation, suggestively called “Matryoshka,” that has intensified its efforts in Moldova as the 2025 elections approach. This coordinated campaign has flooded the online environment with fake news that imitated the style of credible publications, precisely to mislead the public. Thus, in just three months after the announcement of the elections (April–June 2025), no less than 39 fabricated articles about Moldova were identified, compared to zero in the same period the previous year. The manufacturers of this disinformation have gone so far as to use the visual identity of reputable media institutions, the BBC, The Economist, Euronews, and others, to publish so-called scandalous “reports” about Moldovan leaders.
For example, a video released in April 2025, bearing a fake BBC logo, claimed that the Bellingcat investigative group had revealed that Maia Sandu had a “secret mistress” who, with her complicity, had embezzled $24 million in government funds. Obviously, neither the BBC nor Bellingcat have ever published anything like this, and NewsGuard has found no evidence to support these claims; they are pure fiction, designed to compromise the president’s image.
The false narratives launched within Operation Matryoshka are varied, but converge on a few main themes. A recurring lie is that Maia Sandu and her team are deeply corrupt, with allegations of embezzlement and onerous business dealings, in effect attempting to destroy their credibility as honest reformers. An example is the accusation that Maia Sandu stole $24 million (the case of the aforementioned “lover”), or that she is “addicted to psychotropic drugs” – a slander amplified by the Russian Pravda network, which published an article attributing a false addiction to the president, also using the logo of the American Psychological Association to give the appearance of legitimacy.
Another strand of propaganda claims that the PAS government is preparing to rig the elections or resort to undemocratic methods to remain in power, fueling public distrust in institutions (for example, it was falsely reported that “the diaspora votes from the West will be stolen” or that “the electoral lists are being falsified” – narratives later debunked by observers, who found that the election was fair).
A study by the WatchDog.md organization, which specializes in debunking fake news, highlighted in 2024 “the growing impact of Russian disinformation and public opinion campaigns on the geopolitical perceptions of Moldovans.” According to polls, popular support for EU integration had fallen from 54% in April 2024 to 52% in August, while nostalgia for the Eurasian Union (a structure dominated by Russia) had risen from 25% to 28%. This modest but significant change in opinion was attributed to intensive propaganda promising illusory benefits of closer ties with Russia (“cheap gas, a market for exports,” etc.), although in reality Moldova had received nothing concrete from the Kremlin other than resource blackmail and economic embargoes, as analysts noted.
Similarly, propaganda has managed to significantly reduce public appetite for NATO membership: the percentage of NATO supporters in Moldova fell from 34% to 29.5% in 2024, amid the exploitation of fears related to the loss of neutrality and the country being drawn into a conflict. Ironically, during the same period, Russia repeatedly violated Moldova’s neutrality, sending missiles and drones that flew over or even fell on Moldovan territory during attacks on Ukraine (Chisinau officially protested these incidents, and Moscow denied responsibility, claiming that it did not extend its attacks into the airspace of neighboring countries). However, the fears induced by pro-Kremlin propaganda – such as the specter of military mobilization and involvement in war, or of “forced union with Romania and loss of statehood” – have taken root in segments of the population, especially where access to alternative information is limited.
The architecture of disinformation
The channels for disseminating Russian propaganda in Moldova are diverse. Until 2022, some audiovisual media directly rebroadcast Russian news and political channels, but the authorities suspended or revoked the licenses of at least 6 local TV channels known for broadcasting Kremlin war propaganda (such as Prime, RTR Moldova, NTV Moldova, etc.). This decision came in response to the flow of disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine, which was presented distortedly on these channels. Following the suspensions, Russian propaganda moved predominantly online, where the state has limited leverage for intervention. Platforms such as Odnoklassniki, VKontakte (popular among Russian speakers), but also Facebook, YouTube or the messaging app Telegram have become vehicles for the massive dissemination of pro-Kremlin messages. A Moscow-based network, suggestively called “Pravda,” coordinates the publication of content in multiple languages, including Romanian, amplifying material produced by Matrioshka and other troll factories. For example, the Romanian-language Pravda service distributed the fake story about Maia Sandu’s alleged drug addiction, recycled from the Matrioshka campaign, a sign that the disinformation ecosystem is interconnected and well-funded.
Local politicians and influencers affiliated with the pro-Russian camp also play an important role in spreading fake news. In 2024, the media organization StopFals.md designated a number of figures as “champions of fake news”: fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, socialist ideologists Bogdan Țîrdea and Igor Dodon, the Bashkan of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul, as well as the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova. They were responsible for numerous misleading statements with impact.
Ilan Shor, for example, ran “automatically launched disinformation campaigns” throughout most of 2024. He began the year by falsely claiming that “the EU destroyed jobs in Moldova,” that energy prices in Moldova “are higher than in Europe,” and continued with lies about gas and electricity tariffs, inflation, and pensions.
In March 2024, in an interview with Russian journalist Alexei Venediktov, Shor launched eight different falsehoods, including that “the EU needs Moldova only to fight Russia and steal its workforce”. Later, he spread panic by stating, based on a misinterpretation of a Moldovan-Romanian military agreement, that “the Sandu government is handing over the Romanian national army”. This falsehood was followed by another, that “NATO is building a military hub in Ungheni” and that the government had already reached an agreement with NATO and the EU to involve Moldova in the war in Ukraine. Of course, investigations by independent journalists dismantled these fabrications, for example, it was shown that the military radar purchased by Moldova, which Shor and Dodon called “second-hand and useless”, was in fact new and high-performance equipment purchased from France, and rumors about NATO bases were officially denied by both Chisinau and Bucharest.
The political champions of disinformation
Igor Dodon, the former pro-Russian president, remained a faithful spokesman for Kremlin propaganda in 2024. In June, in an interview for the Russian channel Current Time (Настоящее Время), Dodon resumed his theses: he called the pro-EU referendum “illegal”, said that joining the EU would be done “to the detriment of sovereignty”, accused “election fraud with the help of Moldovans from the USA and Canada” and claimed that the Sandu government was following the “Ukrainian scenario”, that is, it would provoke Russia as Ukraine did. Dodon also speculated that “the country’s agricultural lands are being sold to foreigners”, arousing unfounded fears among landowners. After the 2024 presidential elections, Dodon promoted the narrative that “Maia Sandu is not the legitimate president of Moldova”, questioning the validity of her victory.
All these claims were disproven by the facts (international observers confirmed the legitimacy of the elections, and state institutions ensured the fairness of the process), but they reinforced the convictions of a segment of the public predisposed to believe that the West was “manipulating” the political scene in Chisinau. Dodon was also directly involved in contesting the constitutional referendum of October 20, 2024, calling on people to boycott it, in line with the Kremlin’s objective to invalidate that crucial consultation on the country’s geopolitical future.
Evghenia Guțul, the governor (başkan) of the Gagauz autonomy elected in 2023 with the direct support of the Shor Party, has become another voice of disinformation. In April 2024, invited to the show of Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov (“Solovyov LIVE” on YouTube), Guțul launched a tirade about the “Romanization of Moldova”, claiming that the central authorities would violate Gagauzia’s rights and impose the Romanian language everywhere, and accused Chisinau of depriving the region of “cheap natural gas” offered by Russia. She also promised the Gagauz public phantasmagorical benefits: she stated that, “thanks to Russia”, pensioners and state employees in the autonomy would receive MIR cards loaded with 2,000 lei each – a clearly unrealistic promise, which experts described as “new empty promises” aimed at maintaining the loyalty of the local population.
When the Moldovan authorities conducted searches on members of the “Victory Bloc” (supported by Shor) in April 2024, Guțul told the Russian press (TASS agency) that “the entire political leadership in Gagauzia is feeling pressure from Chisinau”, a statement considered false by analysts, as there is no evidence of political persecution of the autonomy. The rhetoric of “discriminated Gagauzia” is another strand of pro-Russian propaganda, designed to cultivate separatist resentment and present Russia as the protector of minorities in Moldova. In reality, Chisinau continued to allocate significant funds to the Gagauz Autonomous Region and to include Gagauz representatives in decision-making mechanisms, but these aspects are ignored by the propaganda apparatus.
Not only political figures contributed to the disinformation, but also a number of pro-Kremlin online influencers played an active role. StopFals.md identified several content creators on social networks, such as Tudor ȘoIlița, Tatiana “Costa Moldovanca” Costachi, Veaceslav Valico, Dmitri BuiMistru, Gabriel Călin, Vitalie Florea and others, who disseminated dozens or even hundreds of false or manipulative messages in 2024, reaching a considerable audience. This phenomenon also reflects the fact that, in the digital age, propaganda no longer comes exclusively “from the top down” (from televisions and politicians), but also “from the side”, through people who appear to be independent voices but who repeat the Kremlin narrative and adapt it to the understanding of local communities.
Faced with this wave of disinformation, Moldovan authorities and civil society have tried to react. In addition to the aforementioned suspension of propaganda TV stations, the government has initiated information campaigns and strengthened fact-checking capacities. Platforms such as StopFals.md, Moldova.org, EuroPress or Disinfo.md have constantly dismantled the falsehoods appearing in the press and on the internet, bringing factual counterarguments.
For example, the myth of “Moldova’s involvement in the war on NATO’s orders” was countered by recalling its neutrality status and official statements that no Moldovan citizen is being sent to fight in Ukraine. Rumors of “unification with Romania” were countered by the clarification that such a decision would be up to the population anyway (through a referendum) and that there is no hidden plan in this regard. Western embassies in Chisinau have also increased their presence on social media in Romanian and Russian, to dismantle anti-Western propaganda and explain the benefits of assistance provided to Moldova. In July 2025, NATO, the EU and the British government issued joint statements on “Russian hybrid warfare in Europe”, explicitly recognizing that Moldova is on the front lines of this invisible war and needs help to cope with it. As a practical response, Romania announced that it is offering its neighboring country technical expertise in cybersecurity and combating disinformation in anticipation of the parliamentary elections, a gesture of support that underscores the importance of protecting the democratic process from external interference.
Military and security threats
In addition to information warfare and political subversion, Russia also exerts direct or indirect military and security pressures on the Republic of Moldova, which have intensified in the context of the war in Ukraine. Although Moldova is a neutral state by Constitution and does not wish to be a party to any conflict, the geographical proximity of the war and the presence of Russian troops on its territory (in Transnistria) make the security risks significant.
The separatist region of Transnistria remains Russia’s main military and strategic lever in Moldova. In this strip of territory on the left bank of the Dniester River, which broke away from Chisinau’s control in 1992, about 1,500 Russian soldiers are stationed there (officially as peacekeepers and part of a Russian Task Force). There is also a huge weapons depot in Cobasna, inherited from the Soviet era. Moscow has always offered political and military protection to the Tiraspol regime and has used Transnistria as a means of blackmailing Chisinau. In February 2024, for example, Kremlin officials openly warned that any attempt by the Moldovan government to reintegrate Transnistria by force would trigger a “military scenario,” “any actions that threaten the security of our compatriots and peacekeepers will be considered an attack on Russia,” Maria Zakharova said in a briefing. This red line drawn by Moscow practically amounts to a threat of direct military intervention if the situation in Transnistria were to evolve contrary to Russian interests.
Another aspect of Russian hybrid warfare is the creation of security incidents designed to intimidate or destabilize Moldova. In the spring of 2022, a series of mysterious explosions in Transnistria (at the headquarters of the “Ministry of Security” in Tiraspol, at radio towers and at airfields) raised concerns about provocations orchestrated by the special services, possibly as a pretext for military involvement. The pro-Russian Transnistrian authorities then accused Ukraine of the alleged attacks, while Kyiv warned that they could be Russian “false flags” intended to justify the expansion of aggression. However, no clear “casus belli” has materialized, and the front in southwestern Ukraine (the Odessa region, on the border with Moldova) has so far not registered any direct involvement of Transnistria. However, the scenario remains a fearful one: if Russian forces had captured Odessa, they might have attempted to connect it with Transnistria, thus jeopardizing the de facto existence of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state. Ukrainian resistance prevented such an outcome, but the presence of Russian troops only ~100 km from Chisinau means that the military factor cannot be ignored by Moldovan planners.
The war in Ukraine has been felt in Moldova through multiple airspace violations and incidents with stray Russian missiles. Since the beginning of the invasion, cruise missiles launched by Russia against Ukraine have sometimes crossed Moldovan skies, prompting Chisinau to protest diplomatically. Missile debris or drones have also crashed on Moldovan territory several times. A notorious case occurred on December 5, 2022, when fragments of an S-300 missile fell in northern Moldova (at Briceni), after a massive attack on Ukraine. Other cases followed in 2023 and 2024. For example, in November 2024, two Russian decoy drones were found crashed in the village of Borosenii Noi (Rîșcani district, north) and in the village of Fîrlădeni (Căușeni district, south), most likely part of a Russian air strike against Ukraine, as announced by the Moldovan government. No one was injured, but the incident demonstrated Moldova’s vulnerability to collateral risk from the conflict in the neighboring country.
The Foreign Ministry in Chisinau summoned the Russian ambassador and handed him a note of protest for the violation of airspace, demanding an end to these provocative actions. Ambassador Oleg Ozerov refused to admit any guilt, stating that “there is no evidence that the drones are Russian” and that Russia “does not fly drones over Ukraine’s neighboring countries.” Obviously, this denial contradicts numerous records. and Russia regularly attacks Ukraine with drones and missiles from its territory or from the Black Sea, and the trajectory of some inevitably intersects the space of Moldova or Romania. The situation led the authorities in Chisinau to maintain a state of heightened air alert along the eastern border and to publicly ask Russia to respect the country’s neutrality. Although such incidents have not caused any casualties or major damage in Moldova to date, they create a climate of insecurity and anxiety among the population – exactly what Russia would like, taking advantage of the Moldovans’ sense of vulnerability.
Spy War
Another sensitive front is that of internal security and counterintelligence. Moldovan law enforcement institutions (Information and Security Service, Prosecutor’s Office for Combating Organized Crime, Ministry of Interior) have uncovered several espionage and influence networks linked to Russia in the past two years. In 2023 and 2024, dozens of Russian and other citizens were declared persona non grata and expelled from the country for subversive activities. A high-profile case occurred in the summer of 2023, when the government decided to drastically reduce the staff of the Russian embassy in Chisinau after evidence of espionage operations emerged. The press reported on an unusually large number of communications antennas on the Russian embassy building, suggesting their use for illegal interceptions. As a result, in August 2023, Moldova expelled 45 Russian diplomats and technical employees, a radical measure aimed at diminishing Russia’s intelligence capacity on the ground.
Moscow reacted angrily, accusing Chisinau of “anti-Russian passion” and promising reciprocal measures. Further, in August 2024, two Moldovan officials (including a former deputy) were arrested for treason after being caught providing secret information to a member of the Russian embassy. The government immediately expelled a Russian diplomat involved and summoned Ambassador Oleg Ozerov for explanations, again provoking formal protests from Moscow, which called the gesture “an unfriendly step” and accused the Moldovan leadership of pursuing an “aggressive anti-Russian” course.
These episodes show that Russia maintains an active network of agents and influencers inside Moldova, with the mission of collecting sensitive data and influencing political decisions. Preferred targets include the energy sector (to obtain leverage for blackmail), the National Army (to assess Moldova’s defense capabilities and possible cooperation with NATO), government officials with access to information about negotiations with the EU or internal security. The fact that the Moldovan authorities exposed these operations and took countermeasures indicates a maturation of Moldovan counterintelligence, probably supported by Western partners. In fact, NATO and the EU have offered increased assistance to Moldova in the area of security & intelligence after 2022, including by seconding experts and delivering secure communications equipment. Romania, for example, cooperates closely with SIS to identify cross-border threats. All these efforts aim to minimize threats of sabotage or internal coups orchestrated by Moscow.
From a strictly military perspective, the Republic of Moldova remains vulnerable, with a low level of equipment and personnel (under 6,000 active military personnel, outdated equipment). In the past year, Chisinau has accepted for the first time donations of lethal military equipment from the West (tactical vehicles, drones, encrypted radio stations, etc.), albeit cautiously, precisely so as not to fuel Russian propaganda about “arming Moldova against Transnistria”. However, the modernization of the army is a slow process, and guaranteeing the country’s security depends to a large extent on the evolution of the war in Ukraine. If Ukraine maintains control in Odessa and repels Russian forces, the direct military threat to Moldova remains limited to the level of isolated challenges.
But if the situation were to deteriorate, Chisinau could become extremely exposed. The Kremlin has periodically issued messages aimed at maintaining this anxiety, and for example, former President Dmitry Medvedev insinuated in 2022 that “Moldova could unite with Romania and cease to exist as a state,” suggesting that this would be the only way to avoid a Ukrainian scenario—a comment interpreted as a veiled threat to Moldova’s territorial integrity.
Russian position
From the perspective of the Russian Federation, official rhetoric vehemently denies any unauthorized involvement in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, instead accusing Chisinau and the West of provocations and discrimination against Russian interests. Moscow rejects accusations of electoral interference, subversion or blackmail, claiming that these are inventions of the Sandu government to discredit its opposition. “There is no interference from us, we do not deal with such things,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has repeatedly stated when asked about Maia Sandu’s claims regarding Russian interference plans. The Russian Foreign Ministry, through Maria Zakharova, has labeled Chisinau’s statements as “empty anti-Russian rhetoric” designed to distract attention from “the internal failures of Maia Sandu’s regime.” According to Moscow, the PAS government would use the “bau-bau of Russian interference” as a pretext to repress the opposition and distract the population from economic problems. Sergei Lavrov even stated, at the end of 2023, that “Moldova is being transformed by the West into the next piece on the chessboard of the hybrid war against Russia”, suggesting that Chisinau is acting not as an autonomous agent, but on the orders of Washington and Brussels.
Senior Russian officials, such as President Vladimir Putin and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, have not spoken publicly about Moldova very often recently, focusing on the war in Ukraine. However, when they have, they have maintained a hard line: accusing the Moldovan authorities of “Russophobia” and “violation of the rights of Russian speakers.”
A favorite topic is the Romanian language and its status in Chisinau. Moscow criticized the law adopted in Moldova by which the state language is officially called “Romanian” instead of “Moldovan” (thus aligning the name with linguistic and historical reality). Russian diplomacy reacted virulently, calling this “forced Romanianization” and “an attack on Moldovan identity”, insinuating that it is part of a plan for unification with Romania, an idea that arouses strong opposition among some Russian speakers.
Similarly, the Kremlin has invoked “discrimination against the canonical Orthodox Church” (subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate) in favor of an alleged influence of “Western sects” – although in reality the overwhelming majority of churches in Moldova belong to the Chisinau Metropolis (Moscow Patriarchate). Such propaganda themes are intended to portray the Moldovan leadership as anti-traditional and anti-national, presumably with the aim of eroding popular support.
As for Russia’s concrete actions in response to Chisinau’s measures, they have been diplomatic and rhetorical, without (yet) direct military escalations. After the expulsions of Russian diplomats, Moscow reacted symmetrically (by expelling Moldovan diplomats) and veiledly threatened to reduce its bilateral relations to a minimum. Already, the Russian ambassador to Chisinau, Oleg Vasnetsov (until 2022), has been replaced by a tougher envoy, Oleg Ozerov, a sign that Russia has recalibrated its diplomatic presence to manage the “crisis” in relations. Ozerov has adopted a combative position, publicly contesting each accusation. At the meeting where he was handed the protest note regarding election interference (November 2024), he replied to the press that he had “clarified the acute and complex issues” and that Chisinau’s accusations were unfounded. In other words, Russia refuses to recognize the legitimacy of Moldova’s concerns and tries to present itself as the injured party.
Another example of Russian reaction was related to the gas crisis: in December 2024, in the context of Transnistria’s appeal for help, the Russian Foreign Ministry made a rare statement regarding Moldova, in which it promised to “protect its citizens and peacekeepers in Transnistria and respond adequately to provocations”, reiterating that any threat to them would be considered an attack on Russia. Although this phrase was apparently aimed at Ukraine (which had refused to extend the transit contract), the implication was also for Chisinau: not to touch the Russian contingent or the regime in Tiraspol. At the same time, Russian diplomacy sought to “pass the blame” for the gas shutdown – Zakharova stated that “due to the pro-Western government in Chisinau and the regime in Kyiv, the people of Transnistria are suffering from the cold”.
In January 2025, when the EU offered energy support to Moldova, Russia remained silent, letting its actions speak for themselves: shortly after the EU’s involvement, Gazprom suddenly announced the partial resumption of gas supplies as “humanitarian aid” to Transnistria. It was interpreted as a gesture intended to preempt the image capital that the EU and Chisinau would have gained by resolving the crisis. In addition, the Russians probably did not want to completely lose leverage in Transnistria, so they gave some gas – but, as Prime Minister Recean predicted, “in insufficient volume to produce energy for the right bank as well, which will put pressure and push us towards conflict, which is exactly what the Kremlin wants.” So Moscow is playing a dual game, namely creating problems, then offering “limited solutions” so that the tension continues and can be exploited politically.
Political involvement
A central element of the Russian position is the open support for the pro-Russian opposition in Moldova. Although the Kremlin officially does not admit that it favors any party, the facts indicate otherwise. Ilan Shor, for example, who fled the country and is wanted by the Moldovan justice system, was generously hosted on the main Russian state television channels (Pervîi Kanal, Rossia-24) to convey his messages to Moldovans. Russia protected him from sanctions (it refused to include him on the CIS sanctions lists, although the West penalizes him) and allowed him to conduct a proxy campaign in absentia. Also, Igor Dodon, after a period of decline, was given the green light to re-enter politics with force (although he was being investigated in corruption cases), frequently reappearing in the Russian press with interviews and comments about the “bright future” of the relationship with Russia if the opposition returns to power. The Kremlin clearly sees these political figures as investments to regain influence in Chisinau. Dodon traveled to Moscow several times unofficially in 2022-2023 (ostensibly for personal or religious matters), and analysts believe that he received guidelines and perhaps resources there. In addition, it is worth noting that Moscow has granted Russian citizenship to a large number of Transnistrian leaders and friendly Moldovan politicians – which makes them directly accountable to Russia and vulnerable to influence.
When it comes to bellicose reactions, it is remarkable that Russia has not resorted to explicit military threats against Moldova (beyond the indirect ones related to Transnistria). The situation on the Ukrainian front probably does not allow it to open another conflict. However, it has maintained a level of psychological pressure: periodically, the Russian media broadcasts comments by obscure military analysts who “predict” that “Moldova will enter the war” or “Romania will occupy Moldova”, in order to scare Moldovan public opinion. The Ministry of Defense in Chisinau has repeatedly had to deny rumors (also spread by pro-Russian sources) according to which “young Moldovans will be mobilized and sent to the front in Ukraine”. This type of disinformation has created such panic that some citizens were even preparing to leave the country, a sign of the effectiveness of the intimidation tactic.
Support from Western and regional partners
Faced with these multiple challenges, the Republic of Moldova is not alone, but benefits from increasing support from its Western (European Union, United States, individual European countries) and regional (especially Romania and Ukraine) partners. International solidarity has proven essential in 2022-2025 to help Chisinau resist Russian pressure and continue its democratic path.
The European Union, a bloc that Moldova aspires to join, has acted decisively on several occasions. Beyond the rhetoric of support, the EU has mobilized substantial financial resources to mitigate Moldova’s vulnerabilities. One example is the €600 million Economic Recovery Plan announced in 2021, of which hundreds of millions have already been released for energy projects, infrastructure and budget support.
A significant part of these funds was directed at helping Moldova cope with the energy shock created by Russia: around €240 million went directly to offset the energy bills of the vulnerable population in the last two winters. The EU also delivered equipment to Moldova such as generators, energy-saving light bulbs (to save electricity during the crisis) and facilitated agreements for Romania and Ukraine to export electricity to Moldova. The defining moment was January 2025, when the EU proposed that €30 million emergency package for Transnistria, showing that Brussels is willing to help all Moldovan citizens, regardless of region, to counter Russian blackmail. Ursula von der Leyen and other European leaders visited Chisinau or met Maia Sandu in Brussels numerous times in 2022-2023, transmitting messages of firm political support.
The EU has also sanctioned those involved in the destabilization of Moldova, and the EU Council introduced in 2022 a framework of sanctions targeting corrupt oligarchs and pro-Russian agents (Ilan Shor and Vlad Plahotniuc being included on the list, with travel bans and asset freezes in the EU). This was an important action, complementary to the US sanctions, aimed at cutting off the resources of the Kremlin’s influence networks in Moldova. In June 2023, at the European Political Community summit hosted in Moldova itself, all EU and partner country leaders stressed “the commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova” and “the condemnation of attempts to destabilize its democratic order”. In effect, Moldova has become a key topic on the European agenda, perceived as an important front in the broader confrontation with Russian revisionism.
American support
The United States has been equally involved. The US considers Moldova a vulnerable democratic country that must be supported against Russia’s malign influence. Washington has allocated additional funds for security and combating corruption in Moldova. For example, USAID runs programs to strengthen independent media and Moldovan civil society, as an antidote to disinformation. The State Department has sent experts to advise the government on countering disinformation and cyberattacks. In terms of sanctions, since the fall of 2022, the US Treasury has issued sanctions against Ilan Shor, his wife and other individuals and entities (including the Shor Party), accusing them of involvement in Russia’s plan to undermine Moldova’s democracy. In 2023, new names were added, explicitly stating that they are part of Russia’s effort to re-establish a puppet government in Chisinau. American officials – such as Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland, Presidential Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, or NSC spokesman John Kirby – have publicly referred to Moldova as being in the “Kremlin’s sights” and have praised the Moldovan leadership for its courage in staying on the European path. The US has also increased direct economic assistance: in 2022, Congress approved $320 million in support for Moldova (an unprecedented amount), partly intended to offset energy costs and diversify sources. Non-lethal equipment has also been donated to the Moldovan army (trucks, 4×4 vehicles, communication systems).
A notable moment was Maia Sandu’s visit to Washington in December 2023, where she met with President Joe Biden. He reconfirmed US support for Moldova’s sovereignty and announced a new $45 million security assistance package to “develop defense capabilities and combat hybrid threats.” At the same time, the White House warned Russia not to attempt a destabilizing scenario, stating that “any such attempt is unacceptable.” The US therefore functions as an external guarantor of Moldovan democracy, similar to the role it played in supporting Ukraine, obviously on a smaller scale given the country’s size.
Romania, strategic partnership
Romania deserves special mention as Chisinau’s main ally. As an EU and NATO country and with historical and cultural ties to Moldova, Romania acted as an unconditional advocate and supporter. Beyond the fraternal rhetoric (the Romanian president has always declared that “Moldova’s place is in the European family”), the practical support has been enormous: Romania has been providing almost all of Moldova’s electricity imports since the beginning of the war (including free emergency deliveries when needed), donated fuel oil in the winter of 2022 when Gazprom had reduced gas, and provided over 130,000 tons of fuel (diesel) to Moldovan farmers hit by drought and price increases. Romania has also directly financed interconnection projects: the Iași-Chisinau gas pipeline (operational since 2021, which allowed the import of non-Russian gas) was built with Romanian support. Likewise, new power lines (from Isaccea and Suceava to northern Moldova) are planned to further integrate the networks.
Politically, Bucharest has reacted to every hostile gesture by Russia. For example, when the gas contract was unilaterally canceled, Romania accelerated electricity deliveries and offered gas storage space in its warehouses, and when Russian propaganda intensified hybrid warfare, Romanian experts were sent to help the CCA (media authority) of Moldova with monitoring. The interim president of Romania (Nicușor Dan) declared in July 2025 that “the parliamentary elections on September 28 in the Republic of Moldova will be very important for Europe”, confirming that Romania treats the stakes of these elections not only as an internal Moldovan issue, but also as a strategic regional one. Bucharest has announced that it will send a large number of electoral observers and will provide logistical support to Moldova in organizing polling stations for the diaspora. This involvement is intended to ensure a fair democratic process, knowing that the Western diaspora (predominantly pro-European) is a decisive factor.
Ukraine, the war-torn eastern neighbor, is another key partner. Kyiv’s interests coincide with Chisinau’s in limiting Russian influence. Ukraine made a significant gesture in February 2023, when President Zelensky passed on vital information about the Russian plot against Moldova. This intelligence cooperation helped prevent a dangerous scenario. Ukraine has also been extremely cooperative on the energy front, including Moldova in regional energy procurement platforms, offering it electricity at preferential prices when the Transnistrian power plant stopped supplying in 2022, and in 2023 when Russian missiles disconnected Ukraine from the grid, the priority was to maintain the connection with Moldova. Ukraine has effectively become a strategic ally of Moldova, much to Moscow’s dismay. The two governments have initiated discussions on military cooperation, limited by Moldova’s constitutional neutrality, but projects such as training Moldovan sappers for demining (given that many mines can float down the Dniester from the war zone) have been agreed upon.
Kyiv has also been very vocal internationally in favor of Chisinau, and at the UN, OSCE, the need for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria and support for the integrity of Moldova is constantly emphasized. It is significant that Ukraine considers Transnistria a “risk factor” and keeps troops there on the border to prevent possible movements by the Russians; in fact, Transnistria is now completely isolated from Russia, having no direct border (all routes – road, rail – pass through Ukraine or Moldova, both of which are hostile to the unauthorized Russian presence).
Last but not least, international organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the UN have supported Moldova in principle. The OSCE mission in Moldova (the old peacekeeping mission) remained limited in terms of Transnistria, with talks blocked by Russia, but the OSCE monitored the 2024 elections and highlighted external interference in its reports, an important element for the legitimacy of Chisinau’s countermeasures. The Council of Europe has passed resolutions in support, and at its summit in Reykjavik (May 2023) it created a Register of Damage Caused by Russian Aggression, to which Moldova has joined – a symbolic sign of alignment against Russia. At the UN, Moldova co-sponsored resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited Chisinau in 2022, praising the pro-democracy efforts and the reception of Ukrainian refugees (Moldova has hosted over 80,000 refugees, a large number compared to its population).
Support from external partners has been vital for Moldova in confronting Russian threats. Without financial and political assistance from the EU, the US and neighboring countries, Chisinau would have been much more vulnerable to shocks from Moscow. Of course, external assistance comes with the expectation that Moldova will continue on the path of democratic and anti-corruption reforms, which in turn weakens the entry points of Russian influence (which relies on corrupt oligarchs and weak institutions). In essence, the West is banking on Moldova becoming an Eastern Partnership success story, to demonstrate that a European future is possible even under Russian pressure. If this effort succeeds, it would be a major strategic defeat for the Kremlin. That is why Western partners are taking the situation very seriously, considering investing in Moldova’s resilience as an integral part of the broader effort to maintain Eastern European stability.
The Russian military announced that it has captured the city of Chasiv Yar, a major stronghold of the Ukrainian army in the Donetsk region, in eastern Ukraine. The city of Chasiv Yar, which has been at the center of fighting for months, “has been liberated by Russian forces,” the Russian Defense Ministry announced in a statement. The advance represents a significant progress for Moscow’s forces and could allow them to move towards a series of fortress cities in the Donetsk region, such as Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Russia, which launched a large-scale offensive in Ukraine in February 2022, continues to gain ground little by little, at a time when US President Donald Trump gave his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin a ten-day deadline starting Tuesday to end the conflict, otherwise risking sanctions.
Russian pressures
Russia has been ramping up its massive strikes on Ukraine for weeks, often involving hundreds of drones and missiles, according to Kyiv. Russian President Vladimir Putin is demanding that Kyiv hand over the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, which Russia has claimed since September 2022, in addition to the Crimean peninsula annexed in 2014. Moscow is also demanding that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO. These conditions are unacceptable to Ukrainian leaders and their Western allies. Ukraine, in turn, is demanding that the Russian military withdraw completely from its territory, which is occupied by about 20 percent.
At least six people were killed in Kyiv, including a child, and dozens were injured in a combined Russian missile and drone attack overnight, local officials said. President Volodymyr Zelensky posted a picture of burning ruins, saying there were still people trapped under the rubble of a residential building.
Russia, which denies targeting civilians, has stepped up its airstrikes on Ukrainian cities far from the front line in recent months. US President Donald Trump, showing frustration with his Russian counterpart, this week reduced a deadline for Vladimir Putin to make peace with Ukraine. “President Trump has been very generous and very patient with Putin, trying to find a solution. Putin is doing it deliberately,” Sîbiga also posted.
Crime and Punishment
A major in the Ukrainian air force spied on the locations and deployment plans of several Western-made aircraft for the benefit of Russia, the Ukrainian Intelligence Service (SBU) announced, quoted by the Kyiv media. The major collected data on F-16 and Mirage aircraft, as well as on the Ukrainian Su-24 model. The senior officer, who had worked as a pilot instructor in the Ukrainian air force, is suspected of helping Russia plan drone and missile attacks on air bases in Ukraine. He was arrested for treason. “Anyone who chooses the side of the occupiers will feel the righteous power of Ukrainian justice,” said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Ukraine, which has been fighting against the invading forces of Russia for almost three and a half years, has several dozen Western-made fighter jets. In the case of the American F-16 model, the purchase of 42 aircraft, most of which were delivered by the Netherlands, is publicly known. The F-16 aircraft is used less by Ukraine to carry out attacks, but is used extensively to intercept drones and missiles launched by the Russians.
The war against corruption
Ukraine will “correct” a law revoking the independence of anti-corruption bodies, a law that has sparked outrage among many of Kyiv’s allies and protests in the country, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybikha said. The legislation, adopted on July 22 and then signed into law, would place the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) under the direct authority of the prosecutor general, who is appointed by President Zelensky. The law sparked outrage in civil society and the first large-scale street protests in Kyiv since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. It also drew strong criticism from the European Union, which Ukraine aspires to join. President Volodymyr Zelensky eventually proposed a new bill restoring the independence of anti-corruption structures, which is expected to be put to a vote in parliament. “We are correcting this,” the Ukrainian foreign minister said Wednesday in a comment sent to AFP. “Ukraine has a strong civil society and active young people. They have expressed their opinions. The Ukrainian authorities have heard their voices, as well as those of our partners,” said Andrii Sîbiha. He estimated that “adjustments” were necessary to protect anti-corruption agencies from political games, especially those of “Russia”. “A balance had to be found between the risks to security and reform, and this has been done,” he said. Faced with the first serious political crisis since the beginning of his mandate six years ago, Zelensky initially tried to defend the bill by accusing the targeted structures of inefficiency and being under “Russian influence.” Finally, he announced that he was proposing another bill to ensure their “independence” from the authorities again.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently had a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, after which she claimed on her X social media account that Ukraine, a candidate country for EU membership, has ‘achieved a lot on its European path’. The discussion comes in the context of the adoption by the Kyiv parliament of a law that places the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) under the direct authority of the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by Zelensky. This law, promulgated by the president immediately after a quick vote in parliament, provoked negative reactions from the European Union, a key supporter of Ukraine in the war with Russia, and the first large-scale demonstrations since this war began in 2022.
Western opposition
Taken by surprise by these developments, President Zelensky, who initially invoked ‘Russian interference’ as an argument for limiting the independence of the two institutions that he accused of inefficiency, now seems to have taken a step back and proposed a new law, which he promised would ‘guarantee the independence of NABU and SAP’. In a post after Sunday’s discussion with the Ukrainian president, Von der Leyen also mentioned that Ukraine ‘must build on these solid principles and maintain the independence of anti-corruption bodies, which are fundamental to the rule of law’. ‘Ukraine can count on our support to achieve this,’ added the European Commission President, referring to the accession criteria required by the EU. According to diplomatic sources, in this telephone conversation, Von der Leyen and Zelensky agreed that the new law proposed by the latter should be ‘adopted without delay, even next week’. According to the same sources, Von der Leyen also stressed that, once these legislative changes are made, Ukraine will make progress on the ‘relevant indicators’ that will allow it to receive new funds from the Mechanism for Ukraine. This mechanism, also called the Facility for Ukraine, is a fund established at the end of 2023 by EU states to provide financial assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia and which is provided with funding of 50 billion euros for the period 2024-2027. The European Commission has called for the allocation of another hundred billion euros to this fund, in its proposal for the EU’s multiannual budget for the period 2028-2035. The Ukrainian president also had a telephone conversation with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, in which they ‘reaffirmed the importance of the fight against corruption, carried out by independent and fully effective institutions’, according to a message from the French president. ‘We shared the conviction that what distinguishes it from Russia today is the fact that Ukraine remains, despite the war, a vibrant democracy and that it wants to continue progressing on its European path,’ Macron said. “I reaffirmed France’s support: we will continue to increase aid to Ukraine and pressure on Russia. It must finally accept a ceasefire that opens the way to talks for a solid and lasting peace, with the participation of Europeans,” the French president indicated.
Russian defiance
The Kremlin has been unimpressed by US President Donald Trump’s 10-day ultimatum to Russia to end the war in Ukraine or face new sanctions, with the Russian presidency saying the sanctions already imposed on Russia have helped it gain ‘a certain immunity’ to such measures. ‘We have been living under a huge number of sanctions for quite some time, our economy is operating under a huge number of restrictions,’ Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters. ‘Therefore, we have already developed a certain immunity in this regard and we continue to take note of all statements coming from President Trump, from other international representatives on this issue,’ added President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman. The latter has not yet commented on the ultimatum sent by her American counterpart. A comment came instead from the President of the Russian Senate, Valentina Matvienko, who warned that ultimatums ‘are not a very effective method of resolving conflicts’ and stressed that ‘we should address an ultimatum to the Ukrainian side, since they are the ones who are torpedoing the peace negotiations’. Donald Trump said on Tuesday that he was giving Putin a ten-day deadline to stop the war in Ukraine, thus shortening the 50-day ultimatum announced on July 14, and threatened Russia that, if it does not conclude a ceasefire agreement with Ukraine by August 8, it will be subject to new American sanctions and, in addition, the US will impose secondary customs duties on Russian oil imports. This ultimatum from the American president came two days after the meeting he had in Scotland with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, a meeting that materialized in an understanding regarding the framework of a trade agreement between the US and the EU, rather advantageous for the US.
Harsh measures
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed into law a law passed by the parliament in Kyiv this month that allows people over 60 to be drafted into the army, a measure aimed at mobilizing all possible human resources for the war effort. Ukrainian law previously did not allow military service for people over 60, although special permits were granted in some cases. Under the new law, those who wish to serve in the army can do so if they pass a medical examination and the commander of the unit to which they are assigned gives written consent for their integration into the unit. After signing a contract with the army, servicemen over 60 will have to go through a two-month probationary period. Their contracts will be terminated if they fail to prove they are fit for military service. Under martial law, imposed at the start of the Russian invasion, men aged 18 to 60 eligible for military service are banned from leaving Ukraine. Those over 25 can be drafted, so some are avoiding leaving their homes to avoid encountering military recruitment patrols. For those between the ages of 18 and 25, mandatory mobilization has not been decreed, but volunteers can join the army. The war launched by Russia in February 2022 through the invasion of Ukraine has the characteristics of a bloody conflict of attrition, in which both sides suffer great human losses that are difficult to replace. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the mobilization of about 300,000 reservists in September of the same year, but has not decreed any new mobilization since then, as that caused the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians who left their country for fear that they might be sent to the front. He claims that the number of those who volunteer and sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense would be sufficient to support the Russian army. In Ukraine, the first months of the war were marked by a patriotic fervor, with numerous volunteers joining the ranks of the Ukrainian army, but then Kyiv was forced to rely on compulsory mobilization, an unpopular measure that led to numerous attempts to flee the country, corruption of those responsible, desertions, and forced recruitment actions in which recruiting officers resorted to brutal methods.
US-UK axis
US President Donald Trump spoke warmly on Monday about the ‘special relationship’ with Britain, with words of praise for Prime Minister Keir Starmer, King Charles and Scotland, the leader’s home country. In a press conference alongside British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the American billionaire’s Turnberry golf club on the west coast of Scotland, the pair fielded questions from the media for more than an hour, taking a quick tour of global affairs, from setting a new deadline for Russia to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine to announcing food centers to alleviate hunger in Gaza. Among the compliments, Trump did not miss the opportunity to also launch warnings to Starmer on energy policy, immigration and taxes, as well as a direct attack on London Mayor Sadiq Khan, Starmer’s political ally. ‘The prime minister has been so supportive of us, he has been so strong and respected, and I respect him much more today than I did before, because I just met his wife and family. He has a perfect wife, and that’s never easy to get,” Trump said. Starmer, who spoke for only a small part of the 72 minutes the two spent in front of the world’s media, generously responded to the compliments in this new chapter of the friendship that seems to be blossoming between the two leaders, who come from opposite sides of the political spectrum. “It’s fantastic to be here – thank you for the hospitality – and to see this amazing golf course. I’ll invite you to a football pitch at some point and we can exchange sporting experiences,” Starmer joked. Keir Starmer listened to Donald Trump talk about reducing immigration, an area in which, according to the public perception, the British leader is failing, Reuters notes. Trump has stressed that this policy was essential to his victory in the 2024 US elections, along with his promises to cut taxes and stimulate the economy. Starmer’s government, just a year after winning a landslide victory, is facing a fiscal crisis caused by a stagnant economy, and many analysts expect tax increases later this year to cover the deficit. On energy, the two talked about the potential of small nuclear reactors, but they expressed opposing positions on other energy sources. Trump gently urged Starmer to exploit more of Britain’s oil and gas resources and renewed his criticism of the offshore wind turbines that dot the coast near his golf course and are a key part of Starmer’s plans for a carbon-free energy system. Putting aside their differences of opinion, the two expressed enthusiasm for Trump’s upcoming visit in September,when the White House leader will be hosted by King Charles for a state visit. “I hate to say it, but nobody knows more about pomp and ceremony than you,” Trump said. “I’m a big fan of King Charles. I’ve known him for a while. A great guy, a great person,” he insisted. Trump, who accepted an invitation during Starmer’s visit to the White House in February, will become the first world leader in modern times to make two state visits to the UK. “It will be a historic occasion and we’re all looking forward to it,” Starmer said.
Anti-Russian agreement?
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Monday that the trade deal reached between the United States and the European Union was “anti-Russian,” comparing it to a de facto ban on the purchase of Russian oil and gas. The United States recently reached a deal with Brussels that imposes 15 percent tariffs on most EU imports. In a subsequent statement, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the deal would help the EU completely abandon fossil fuels from Russia in favor of American alternatives. “Purchases of energy products from the United States will diversify our sources of supply and contribute to Europe’s energy security. We will replace Russian gas and oil with significant purchases of LNG, oil and nuclear fuel from the United States,” the European Commission chief said. Russia has repeatedly pointed out that American LNG is much more expensive than Russian. The EU, which imposed massive sanctions against Moscow over its war in Ukraine, has been trying for some time to buy less Russian hydrocarbons. According to Medvedev, Trump has ‘wiped the floor’ with the EU, but the agreement is not good for Russia either. ‘Of course, the ‘agreement’ is clearly anti-Russian in nature, prohibiting the purchase of our oil and gas,’ the former president wrote on Telegram. He predicted that for the EU and its citizens, the consequences will be disastrous, because they will have to pay more for energy. ‘We can only feel sorry for ordinary Europeans,’ Medvedev added.
Unchanged conditions
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently praised US President Donald Trump’s pragmatism on Ukraine, but insisted on Moscow’s conditions for ending the war, in particular recognition of the annexed territories and Kyiv’s non-admission to NATO, while he said of Europe that it had “gone crazy”. “President Trump is a pragmatic leader, he does not want any war and, unlike his predecessor in office (Joe) Biden, unlike the current European elites, he is open to dialogue,” Lavrov said in a speech at a youth forum in Solnechnogorsk, a satellite city of Moscow, located northwest of the Russian capital. The current dialogue between Moscow and Washington “shows that there are still reasonable people in the West,” the Russian minister said, adding that “these people enjoy considerable (popular) support, which is demonstrated by developments in the United States.” Lavrov claims that Russia “has always advocated dialogue, even in the most difficult times more difficult’, recalling that the dialogue between Moscow and the West was not interrupted even during the Cold War. ‘It seems very important to me to emphasize today that during the Cold War there was mutual respect. Now this no longer exists. Europe has simply gone crazy, I cannot say otherwise,’ said the Russian foreign minister. Such a position carries the risk of ‘a big war’ for Europe, the head of Russian diplomacy also warned, according to which even during the existence of the USSR ‘dialogue was developing and allowed the opposing camps to better understand each other’s intentions. ‘This instinct has been lost in Europe,’ Lavrov believes, quoted by The Moscow Times. In his opinion, this is largely related to the struggle of European elites to maintain their power, for which they do not hesitate to spend ‘hundreds of billions of euros’ to kill Russian soldiers and ‘promote attacks on journalists, energy facilities and critical infrastructure’. ‘Europe is doing all this with one goal, which is to use Ukrainians as cannon fodder so that Russia is no longer a competitor,’ the Russian minister said. At the same time, Lavrov insisted on what Moscow considers to be ‘legitimate demands’ regarding ensuring its security, in particular ‘Ukraine’s non-admission to NATO and no expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance in general’. ‘And, of course, the recognition of the realities established in our Constitution,’ the Russian minister added, referring to Russia’s sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula and the four Ukrainian regions annexed in 2022 (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia), noting that this is ‘a condition that admits no alternative’.
Historical fairy tales
In his speech, Lavrov lamented the fact that, for the first time in its history, Russia is fighting a war without any allies, according to The Moscow Times. This is despite Moscow benefiting directly from the support of North Korea, which, in addition to weapons and ammunition, also sent thousands of soldiers with the help of which it expelled Ukrainian forces from the Russian Kursk region, and currently various Russian officials claim that North Korean soldiers will also fight in the Donbas (eastern Ukraine). In addition, even if not directly, Russia is being helped in this war by China and Iran, the three countries being its main allies. ‘Russia is fighting alone against the entire West. In World War I, in World War II, we had allies. Now we no longer have allies on the battlefield. Therefore, we have to rely on ourselves. “We must not allow any weakness or negligence,” Lavrov told the young people gathered at the Solnechnogorsk forum. Regarding US President Donald Trump, who allegedly promised the Kremlin “a generous deal” including the easing of sanctions and the recognition of the annexation of Crimea, the Russian foreign minister said that the leader in the White House is acting guided by “common sense,” according to The Moscow Times. Trump’s intention to “cede” several Ukrainian regions to Russian President Vladimir Putin was also mentioned by Austrian Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger in an interview given to several international media outlets late last week, according to the Ukrainian news agency Ukrainski Nationalni Novini (UNN). As part of his “initial peace plan,” the US president proposed that “several regions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea” be ceded to Russia. At the same time, Trump made it clear to Putin that Ukraine “has no business” in NATO. However, despite all these proposals, Putin continues the war, Meinl-Reisinger stressed in the interview published on Saturday by Bild and taken over by the UNN news agency. Kyiv has long sought peace, but the Kremlin wants to continue military actions. If Putin really wanted to end this war, he would have sat down at the negotiating table long ago, the head of Austrian diplomacy said, according to quoted media.
The Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022 has caused many international reactions, especially from the United States of America, which, among other things, has supported Ukraine militarily. The incumbent US president began his presidential term with the phrase “I’ll get that done within 24 hours”. 6 months have passed since the Trump administration took office and the continuation of that phrase remains, ironically, suspended – as does the promised solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The relationship between the two leaders, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, is an enigma, as it oscillates from declarations of friendship and “cooperation” to threats and pressure from the United States on Moscow.
The Republican Party’s Dilemma
Recently, Donald Trump announced that if Russia does not make a ceasefire with Ukraine in the next 50 days, he will impose 100% tariffs on countries that import Russian oil such as China and India. This announcement comes in support of the new military aid package offered by Ukraine, although it was previously announced that the US would suspend all military aid to Ukraine. The duality of the Trump administration directly affects the decisions of the Republican party, which registered a majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the last elections. Republican lawmakers who had previously opposed the aid provided to Ukraine aligned themselves after the president’s announcement. “I call him a great peacemaker,” said Representative Derrick Van Orden (R-Wis.). It is clear that the Republican Party is in a domestic political dilemma, being focused at the same time on cutting funds and reducing domestic spending, but also on maintaining military and financial support for Ukraine, in a context in which part of the conservative base calls for isolationism and prioritizing domestic US interests.
Russia in the eyes of Americans
In an increasingly tense global context, Americans’ position towards Russia is undergoing a visible transition, marked by a reconfiguration of domestic political priorities and the influence of partisan discourse. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center between March 24 and 30, 2025, only 50% of Americans now consider Russia an enemy of the United States – a significant decrease compared to 61% in 2024 and 70% in 2022, immediately after the invasion of Ukraine. This change is not uniform. The most pronounced transformation occurs among Republicans: only 40% of them still see Russia as an adversary, compared to 58% a year ago. For the first time, more Republican voters classify Russia as a “competitor” than the traditional “enemy” of the post-Cold War discourse. A small percentage, but increasing by about 12%, even go so far as to consider it a possible occasional strategic partner. On the other hand, Democrats generally maintain their firm position: Russia remains a clear threat to them, and support for Ukraine is justified by both moral reasons and geopolitical calculations. The poll reflects more than just a simple opinion on foreign policy — it highlights a deep divide in the collective perception of America’s role in the world. For more and more conservatives, “America First” is no longer just an electoral slogan, but a filter through which the entire international security architecture is reinterpreted. The war in Ukraine is thus becoming a domestic issue, a mirror of ideological polarization in the US, not just a crisis thousands of miles away. This transformation of public opinion raises questions about the continuity of American support for Ukraine and, more broadly, about the coherence of foreign policy in a tense election year.
The United States and international uncertainty
The United States under the Trump administration does not offer a concrete scenario and a firm position on the war in Ukraine. Compared to the firm international position on the conflict in the East, in the case of Ukraine, one can rather observe an absolute bipolarity of the US. From threats and the scandal at the White House with Ukrainian President Vladim Zelensky, from pressure on Ukraine to conclude peace at any cost and statements regarding talks with Putin “My conversations with him are always very pleasant” to threats of sanctions against Russia and statements that “In a recent conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump allegedly launched the idea of Ukraine attacking Moscow and St. Petersburg, although this week he returned to this idea and said that Zelensky should not do this” It is certain that Trump launched statements that he will end this war, and the inability to reach a common denominator with Vladimir Putin affects his egomania and spoils his image as a peacemaker that he has built. Another thing that is certain is that for now Putin has not kept his promises regarding a temporary truce with Ukraine, although this was promised in all rounds of negotiations.
The war from the Kremlin’s perspective
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not just about territory, but about national identity. Vladimir Putin wants to abolish Ukrainian identity forever, the idea that Ukraine is a distinct nation, free to decide its own path in the world, independent of Moscow. Ukrainians, on the other hand, are fighting precisely to assert this national identity distinct from the Russian one and territorial and decision-making independence. Both sides treat the war as an existential, almost “holy” struggle, prepared to continue for the long term. For this reason, negotiations are unlikely to bring a lasting peace. Either Putin would have to accept the existence of Ukraine as an independent state, return territories, including Crimea, or Ukraine would have to recognize Russian domination. Moreover, no truce will last long. Both sides have major military and economic problems, and the fate of the war will depend on who resists these internal pressures the most. Although the Kremlin would have a direct interest in accepting a ceasefire, as this would give them time to consolidate the occupied territories and help them avoid sanctions from the United States, the war continues, and the main reason is that Putin believes that stopping the conflict without a clear victory would jeopardize his position in power. It is clear that he is in a game of Russian roulette, in which you either become the absolute winner or lose your position of power, both in domestic politics and internationally. Putin’s goals are clear: the subjugation of Ukraine and the recognition of Russian spheres of influence in the former Soviet states and the Warsaw Pact. For this, Russia has already sacrificed millions of people and seriously weakened the civilian economy. To maintain his domestic legitimacy, Putin must present a concrete success that justifies these losses. Any other outcome could destabilize his regime. The invasions of 2014 and 2022 have turned two once close peoples into an irreconcilable conflict. The occupation of about 20% of Ukraine’s territory has made the return of those territories the main national goal of Ukrainians, similar to France’s revenge after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Thus, to maintain a 600-km front line, Russia must maintain a large occupation army. Recruitment problems are, however, great: the Russian army has relied on exceptional measures, the release of prisoners, recruitment from poor areas and even North Korean mercenaries, and these sources of people are becoming increasingly limited. In the event of a ceasefire, it is hard to believe that Moscow will be able to maintain the same financial incentives for recruitment, and former soldiers will demand demobilization. For Putin, the only solution is to install a docile Ukrainian government that does not threaten Russia. Until then, the war must continue, and Russia must maintain a massive and expensive army for a long time.
Risks and uncertainties
In the short term, the Kremlin needs to find additional sources of financing for the war, for example by raising taxes or imposing the purchase of government bonds. This could lead to inflation and serious problems for the banking system, especially if defense companies cannot pay their debts. In addition, low oil prices threaten the state budget, and the Russian economy risks prolonged stagnation. Thus, Putin is in a race against time: he needs a victory to avoid a political and economic crisis that could fundamentally change his regime. The Russian-Ukrainian war is, in essence, a struggle for national identity and existence, where compromises are almost impossible. For Putin, the war is a stake of political survival. For Ukraine, it is a war to confirm its sovereignty. Short-term negotiations and truces will only be pauses in this conflict, which will likely drag on for years. But the economic and social crisis in Russia increases the risk of internal implosion if victory does not come soon. Thus, the geopolitical scene remains tense and uncertain, and the world is closely following the developments of a war that is redefining the borders and identities of Eastern Europe.
The risk for Ukraine
Ukraine is caught in a difficult game: it wants to recover its lost territories, but it knows that this will not happen overnight. After three years of war, no one with serious claims in Ukraine can come up with any other speech than that of the complete recovery of the country. The elections are unforgiving, and the population clearly demands this. So, no matter how difficult it is, there is no compromise on objectives. In parallel, Ukraine is struggling with many other problems: still endemic corruption, reforms that need to be made, and the need for a stable government, in which citizens can truly have a say through elections. On the military level, however, the situation is much more complicated. Its forces are limited, and cutting off American aid would be a disaster. The failed counteroffensive in 2023 and the offensive that stopped abruptly in 2024 towards Kursk clearly show that Ukraine no longer has the reserves necessary to continue the offensive or recover ground. This is happening for several essential reasons: a small population compared to Russia, enormous fronts to defend, and an important strategic decision: not to enlist young people under 25. The latter could be changed, but Kyiv prefers to keep its “resource” for a long conflict. The problem is that, precisely by doing so, it risks prolonging the fight even more. On the ground, Ukraine has compensated with immense motivation, good tactics, and technology. Drones, for example, have made a huge difference, they are responsible for 80% of Russian losses. Changing the armament from old Soviet to NATO weapons was a life-saving move. However, dependence on American aid remains a big “powder keg.” This aid ends this summer, and the future is uncertain. If the US decides to cut off support, Ukraine’s situation will quickly worsen, especially in the face of Russian air bombardments. The Kremlin knows that it cannot destroy the Ukrainian army without losing its own forces. In 2024, Russian losses exploded, but they failed to make significant progress, and major cities remain in Ukrainian hands. Russia has learned that it cannot afford to repeat bloody urban battles, as in Mariupol or Bakhmut. Unable to conquer major cities, Russia is playing for the long term: exhausting the Ukrainian army and civilian morale. This is a classic tactic from Chechnya to Syria or Afghanistan, where strikes on civilians have been a psychological weapon. Initially, Ukraine was counting on the rapid destruction of the Russian army, counting on logistical weaknesses and poor leadership of Russia. The counteroffensive of 2022 confirmed that it can be done. But in 2023, Russia adapted and fortified itself. Today, Ukraine’s strategy is twofold: it wants to deal strong blows in logistics and command to weaken the Russian army, but, at the same time, it seeks to force a political crisis in Russia. The Kursk offensive was a signal, but it was too short and without enough forces to have a major impact. Basically, Ukraine is fighting on two fronts: the military and the political,counting on Russia’s internal weaknesses, military exhaustion, economic and social tensions. That is why continuing sanctions and economic pressure is essential, and the minerals agreement with the US is part of this long-term strategy.
Why did the negotiation rounds fail?
Since the beginning of 2025, three rounds of negotiations have already taken place between Ukraine and Russia. Even though each meeting was announced with hopes and promises of progress, in reality, these talks have failed to produce a concrete agreement that would end the war. The answer to the question of why these negotiations failed is simple, because the fundamental differences between the two camps are so great that no real compromise seems possible at the moment. On the one hand, Ukraine cannot and does not want to accept any kind of cession of territories. For Kyiv, the recovery of territorial integrity is an unshakable goal, which depends both on the legitimacy of the state and on strong popular support within the country. No Ukrainian political force could win the elections if it accepted concessions on this front. On the other hand, Russia insists on recognizing the annexations made since 2014 and demands the maintenance of a special status for the separatist regions in eastern Ukraine. These demands are unacceptable to Kyiv. Putin has a clear order for diplomats to give them an absolute win, without any concessions or concessions for Ukraine. Moreover, the lack of mutual trust is huge. Both sides are convinced that the other will violate any agreement, and the history of the war and previous failed peace attempts only reinforce this suspicion. In addition, each camp must also take into account internal pressure: Ukrainian leaders cannot accept a peace that would be seen as a defeat, and Russia must maintain a tough position in order to justify the war and not lose domestic support. The geopolitical context further complicates matters. Western support for Ukraine is a decisive factor encouraging Kyiv to maintain firm positions, while Moscow, isolated internationally and affected by increasingly harsh sanctions, is trying to consolidate its positions gained on the ground. The military situation remains uncertain, and neither side is willing to accept a peace that would be perceived as a defeat. However, these negotiations have also had limited but important results. Maintaining an open channel of communication reduces the risk of a full-scale escalation and facilitates some specific cooperation, such as prisoner exchanges or avoiding major incidents on the front. The discussions have also helped to clarify positions and conditions for negotiations, which can serve as a basis for a more solid future dialogue. The dialogue has also addressed humanitarian issues, such as aid access and the protection of civilians in conflict zones, elements that do not solve the war, but help people on the ground. Negotiations remain a necessary step, even if currently rather symbolic, in a war that looks set to last a long time. For real change, both sides will have to rethink their positions, abandon unacceptable conditions, and accept that a viable solution requires concessions that are difficult to make at the moment.
Good Faith
On July 23, the third round of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia ended. The two delegations agreed on the exchange of at least 1,200 prisoners of war from each side. However, “the positions in the peace memoranda submitted by the parties are quite far from each other.” It is clear that this war cannot end soon, and Washington’s uncertain position further complicates relations between the two states. The question remains the same: what should be done to end this war?
Europe today stands at a crossroads between heightened geopolitical volatility and an unprecedented push for strategic autonomy. A new breed of leaders has emerged, tasked with navigating complex security threats, economic disruption, and a shifting global order. These figures—termed Europe’s “Saviours”—are not heroes in the mythic sense but pragmatic statespersons whose policies, alliances, and vision aim to safeguard the continent’s democratic values, economic resilience, and collective security. Their leadership is marked by coalition-building across diverse electorates and institutions, crisis response under great uncertainty, and innovative policy frameworks that seek both immediate relief and long-term stability.
The designation “Saviours of Europe” is an analytical construct rather than an official title. It reflects the belief that specific political figures can shape the trajectory of the European project during times of existential risk. This concept draws on classical notions of the extraordinariness of leadership in crisis—echoing Hobbesian ideas of the sovereign as protector of order—but is redefined for modern democratic norms. Rather than personalist or totalitarian saviours, these leaders must operate within constitutional constraints, securing public trust while coordinating complex multilevel governance structures.
Moreover, the label underscores a departure from technocratic management: it emphasizes strategic vision and moral authority to redirect Europe’s course amid challenges such as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, climate-induced instability, and transatlantic realignments. It also acknowledges the collective dimension of European leadership, where influence is as much exercised through informal networks—such as the Weimar Triangle or the Coalition of the Willing—as through formal EU bodies.
To qualify as a “Saviour,” a leader must meet rigorous criteria that go beyond electoral popularity. First, strategic vision: the capacity to articulate a coherent long-term roadmap for Europe’s political, economic, and security challenges, integrating national priorities with collective interests.
Second, crisis management acumen: demonstrated effectiveness in mobilizing resources and alliances during emergencies, from pandemic response to armed conflict, underscoring the leader’s ability to maintain legitimacy.
Third, institutional pragmatism: skill in navigating EU and NATO mechanisms, balancing national sovereignty with supranational cooperation, and forging consensus across diverse political cultures.
Fourth, normative credibility: a track record of defending democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—core European values—both domestically and on the global stage.
Finally, innovative capacity: willingness to champion novel policy instruments—be it a European Defense Fund, digital governance models, or green transition mechanisms—to enhance resilience and drive the continent’s future competitiveness.
Emmanuel Macron: The Strategic Modernizer
French President Emmanuel Macron navigates a paradoxical landscape: domestically weakened by a fragmented parliament yet internationally ascendant as a champion of European resilience. His leadership combines constitutional boldness at home with assertive defense diplomacy abroad, positioning France—and by extension the EU—at the heart of 21st‑century strategic debates.
Facing the loss of his parliamentary majority, Macron in May 2025 unveiled plans for a coordinated series of nationwide referendums on key policy areas—economic restructuring, social welfare, bioethics, and education—to reinvigorate citizen engagement and bypass legislative gridlock. The proposal came during a prime‑time televised debate, where Macron framed these plebiscites as a new “social contract” empowering voters to shape France’s future while countering perceptions of an out‑of‑touch executive. Critics warn of potential backlash if referendums fail or exacerbate social divisions, but Macron argues that direct democracy can restore the presidency’s legitimacy amid political fragmentation.
Macron has relentlessly advanced the European Commission’s €150 billion rearmament fund—renamed “SAFE” (Security Action for Europe)—seeking strict “Buy European” rules to cap non‑EU participation at 15 percent, a stance that risks friction with Germany and Italy. He underscores that strategic autonomy requires credible deterrence beyond mere financial commitments, advocating for joint development of advanced missiles and maritime capabilities under EU auspices. Simultaneously, Macron broke new ground by proposing discussions on stationing French nuclear‑armed aircraft in allied countries—echoing NATO’s U.S. “nuclear sharing”—while maintaining presidential control over any use of France’s force de frappe.
Despite his push for a more self‑reliant Europe, Macron sustains robust ties with Washington. During President Biden’s state visit to Paris in June 2024, the two leaders issued a joint statement reaffirming support for NATO’s eastern flank and commitment to channeling frozen Russian assets into Ukraine’s reconstruction. They also agreed to co‑chair the Artillery Coalition within the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, illustrating that Paris views transatlantic coordination as integral to EU strategic projects rather than as a competing paradigm.
As of mid‑May 2025, Kyiv’s counteroffensive has made incremental gains in the Donbas region, but Russian forces maintain pressure on critical supply lines and continue strikes on civilian infrastructure, producing a humanitarian crisis in urban centers like Kherson and Mariupol. Western envoys, under Macron’s convening, warn Moscow that refusal to enter an unconditional 30‑day ceasefire—slated for talks in Istanbul—will trigger an unprecedented 18th package of sanctions targeting Russia’s energy, banking, and defence sectors. Macron has hosted four bilateral and multilateral summit rounds in Paris since March 2025, bringing together Ukrainian, U.S., U.K., and German negotiators to draft a phased truce plan conditional on verifiable Russian troop withdrawals. He secured EU Council backing for the bloc’s 17th sanctions tranche—focused on secondary oil buyers and access to Western technology—and offered to deploy French and German observers along the front line to enforce compliance under a planned Franco‑German rapid‑reaction force. Additionally, Macron is coordinating with NATO Secretary‐General Stoltenberg to ensure allied air‐defence assets shield Ukraine’s civilian centers during any transition to peace talks. Macron’s dual strategy of maximal pressure and structured engagement embodies his vision of European leadership in crisis resolution.
Keir Starmer: The Pragmatic Rebuilder
Ascending to Downing Street with a narrow parliamentary majority, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has pursued a strategy of steady competence—seeking to restore public trust, recalibrate immigration policy, and reforge ties with Europe while positioning the UK as a reliable partner in Ukraine’s defense. His pragmatic leadership style emphasizes incremental reforms, coalition-building across party lines, and a no-nonsense approach to policy delivery.
Starmer’s government has prioritized transparency and accountability to rebuild faith in Westminster. In his 13 March 2025 speech on fundamental reform at Reckitt in Hull, he proposed a new public register of lobbying activities and an independent ethics commissioner with the power to sanction ministers deemed in breach of conduct rules. He also launched a cross-departmental review on civil service culture to root out politicization, reiterating that “public servants must serve Parliament and the public, not the party of the day”. Early polling indicates a modest uptick in perceived integrity for his administration, rising from 32% to 39% trust in government from March to May 2025.
Addressing a surge in net migration, Starmer unveiled a White Paper on 12 May 2025 to close visa loopholes and tighten family-reunification criteria—aiming to reduce annual inflows by approximately 100,000 without undermining critical sectors such as healthcare. His plan includes raising minimum salary thresholds for work visas and imposing stricter English-language requirements on long-term migrants to bolster social integration. While critics warn of potential labor shortages in care and education, Starmer argues that targeted skills development and better enforcement of employer sanctions will mitigate these risks and reinforce community cohesion.
Starmer has emphasized a “reset, not reversal” in UK–EU relations—asserting that improved cooperation can boost British economic growth without rejoining the single market. He moved responsibility for EU affairs to the Cabinet Office and appointed a Minister for EU Relations to signal a top-level commitment to dialogue. In April 2025, Downing Street published a strategic framework outlining practical collaboration areas: energy security, data-sharing on crime, and joint research programs, signaling a shift from ideological disputes to technocratic partnership.
Following his joint visit to Kyiv on 9 May 2025 alongside Macron, Merz, and Tusk, Starmer condemned Russia’s continued bombardment of civilian infrastructure and endorsed a unified push for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. He noted that Ukrainian forces have likely stabilized front lines around Bakhmut and Kherson after weeks of attritional fighting, but that winterized Russian artillery positions continue to inflict civilian casualties—underscoring the urgency of diplomatic intervention. Starmer convened an 18-nation summit in London in March 2025 to form a “coalition of the willing,” drawing up a four-point peace plan that includes sustained military aid, synchronized sanctions, a multilateral security guarantee framework, and post-conflict reconstruction funds. He followed this with an Al Jazeera-brokered meeting to refine the plan for presentation to U.S. decision-makers, highlighting the need for American security guarantees to anchor any ceasefire. In Kyiv on 10 May, he pledged increased British air-defense deployments and announced plans to dispatch civilian election observers to eastern Ukraine to support democratic resilience under a truce. Finally, Reuters reports he and allied leaders agreed to finalize a joint document for the U.S. National Security Council by June—a critical step toward securing transatlantic buy-in for the framework.
Friedrich Merz: The Transatlantic Conservative
Chancellor Friedrich Merz has emerged as a pivotal figure in reshaping Germany’s domestic and foreign policy landscape. His tenure is marked by a commitment to strengthening transatlantic ties, revitalizing the German economy, and asserting a robust stance on European security, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Merz has initiated a significant shift in Germany’s fiscal policy, advocating for increased investment in defense and infrastructure. He proposed a €500 billion special fund aimed at bolstering the Bundeswehr and modernizing national infrastructure. This move includes amending the Basic Law to exempt defense spending above 1% of GDP from the debt brake, allowing for greater fiscal flexibility in response to security challenges. While this approach has garnered support from coalition partners, including the SPD, it has also faced criticism. Economists warn of potential inflation and increased national debt, with projections indicating that Germany could pay approximately €71 billion in interest annually from 2035. Despite these concerns, Merz defends the strategy as essential for restoring Germany’s economic vitality and ensuring national security.
Under Merz’s leadership, Germany has reaffirmed its commitment to NATO, pledging to meet the alliance’s 2% defense spending target. He envisions transforming the Bundeswehr into Europe’s most formidable conventional army. Merz has also proposed discussions with France and the United Kingdom regarding the extension of their nuclear umbrellas to Germany, reflecting a proactive stance on national and European defense. These initiatives signal a departure from Germany’s traditionally cautious defense posture, positioning the country as a central player in European security affairs. Merz’s approach underscores the importance of a strong, unified Europe capable of responding to emerging threats independently and in coordination with transatlantic partners.
Merz’s ascent to the chancellorship followed the CDU/CSU’s victory in the February 2025 elections. He successfully formed a coalition government with the SPD, ending a prolonged period of political stalemate. This “Grand Coalition” has facilitated the implementation of Merz’s ambitious policy agenda, including significant investments in defense and infrastructure. However, Merz’s leadership has not been without controversy. His hardline stance on immigration and perceived erosion of the political firewall against the far-right AfD have sparked mass protests and criticism from various quarters. Despite these challenges, Merz remains focused on steering Germany through a period of transformation, emphasizing stability, security, and economic growth.
In the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Merz has taken a firm stance against Russian aggression. He has emphasized the necessity of Western unity and rejected any peace settlement that legitimizes Russia’s territorial gains. Merz’s approach underscores the importance of upholding international law and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Germany, under Merz’s leadership, has increased military assistance to Ukraine, including discussions on providing advanced weaponry. Merz has also engaged in diplomatic efforts, participating in high-level meetings with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to coordinate support and discuss pathways to a just peace. Chancellor Merz has been instrumental in European diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the Ukraine conflict. He has advocated for Ukraine’s inclusion in peace negotiations, emphasizing that a just and lasting peace requires the active participation of the nation under attack. Merz has also supported the formation of the “Weimar+” alliance, expanding the original Weimar Triangle to include the United Kingdom and other European powers. This coalition seeks to present a united European front in diplomatic efforts and reinforce the continent’s role in global security affairs. Through these initiatives, Merz aims to strengthen Europe’s capacity to act independently in defense matters while maintaining strong transatlantic ties. His leadership reflects a commitment to upholding democratic values, international law, and the sovereignty of nations in the face of aggression.
Donald Tusk: The Council’s Consensus‐Builder
Donald Tusk, serving as Poland’s Prime Minister and a prominent figure in European politics, has been instrumental in steering the European Council’s agenda, managing crises, and advocating for EU reform and enlargement. His leadership has been pivotal in addressing challenges such as Brexit, migration, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
During his tenure as President of the European Council, Tusk emphasized the importance of unity and strategic planning among EU member states. He introduced the “Leaders’ Agenda,” a work program aimed at addressing key political challenges, including migration, economic reform, and the EU’s long-term budget. This agenda facilitated structured discussions and decision-making processes within the Council, promoting cohesion and effective governance.
Tusk played a central role in managing the EU’s response to Brexit, ensuring a coordinated approach among member states during the negotiation process. He also addressed the migration crisis by advocating for a balanced approach that upholds European values while ensuring security. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, Tusk has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He has called for a just and lasting peace, emphasizing that only such an outcome can provide Europe with a sense of security.
Tusk’s commitment to EU reform and enlargement is evident in his efforts to restore judicial independence in Poland, which led to the unfreezing of €137 billion in EU funds. This move demonstrated his dedication to upholding the rule of law and aligning national policies with EU standards. Additionally, Tusk has supported the EU’s enlargement policy, recognizing the strategic importance of integrating Western Balkan countries and strengthening the EU’s geopolitical influence.
In May 2025, Tusk joined other European leaders in Kyiv to express solidarity with Ukraine amidst ongoing Russian aggression. The leaders collectively called for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, urging Russia to halt its military operations and engage in meaningful peace negotiations. This unified stance underscored the EU’s commitment to supporting Ukraine and maintaining regional stability. Tusk has been proactive in proposing initiatives to strengthen Ukraine and enhance European security. He outlined a three-point plan that includes utilizing frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine, reinforcing EU borders, and increasing defense spending. Furthermore, Tusk has advocated for Turkey to play a leading role in facilitating peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, highlighting the importance of inclusive diplomacy in resolving the conflict.
Through his strategic leadership and commitment to European unity, Donald Tusk continues to influence the EU’s approach to complex challenges, reinforcing the importance of consensus-building and collaborative governance.
Ursula von der Leyen: The Commission’s Trailblazer
Ursula von der Leyen, as President of the European Commission, has spearheaded transformative initiatives across climate policy, digital innovation, public health, and foreign affairs. Her leadership has positioned the EU as a proactive global actor, though not without facing scrutiny over transparency and governance.
At the core of von der Leyen’s agenda is the European Green Deal, an ambitious roadmap aiming to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. This strategy seeks to decouple economic growth from resource use, ensuring that no person or place is left behind in the transition to a sustainable economy. Complementing this is the EU’s Digital Decade policy, which outlines concrete targets for 2030 to guide Europe’s digital transformation. The initiative focuses on enhancing digital infrastructure, promoting digital skills, and ensuring that digital technologies serve people and businesses.
Von der Leyen played a pivotal role in the EU’s vaccine procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, securing contracts for 1.8 billion doses. However, the opacity surrounding these negotiations led to legal challenges. In May 2025, the EU’s General Court ruled that the Commission violated transparency rules by refusing to disclose text messages between von der Leyen and Pfizer’s CEO, criticizing the lack of credible explanations for their absence.
Under von der Leyen’s leadership, the European Commission has emphasized the EU’s role as a geopolitical actor. The Commission has worked to strengthen the EU’s position in global affairs, promoting freedom, democracy, and a rules-based international order.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, von der Leyen has been at the forefront of the EU’s support for Kyiv. The Commission activated the Temporary Protection Directive, granting rights to Ukrainians fleeing the war, and has provided €17 billion in additional financial support to Member States to assist communities receiving refugees. Furthermore, the EU has backed Ukraine’s EU accession process, with formal negotiations commencing in June 2024. Von der Leyen has consistently advocated for a just and sustainable peace in Ukraine. In her address to the European Parliament on May 7, 2025, she emphasized the EU’s commitment to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Commission has also proposed utilizing frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction and has coordinated with international partners to enhance Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
Through these initiatives, Ursula von der Leyen has reinforced the European Commission’s role in addressing global challenges, balancing ambitious policy goals with the complexities of international diplomacy and internal governance.
Kaja Kallas: The Baltic Vanguard
Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s first female Prime Minister and current High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has emerged as a formidable advocate for democratic resilience, digital innovation, and a robust European foreign policy. Her leadership reflects the Baltic region’s commitment to upholding democratic values and confronting authoritarian challenges.
Under Kallas’s leadership, Estonia has solidified its reputation as a pioneer in digital governance. The nation’s comprehensive e-governance infrastructure, encompassing services like e-residency, digital identity, and online voting, has positioned it as a model for digital democracies worldwide. Kallas has emphasized that this digital transformation enhances transparency, reduces bureaucracy, and fosters citizen engagement. She advocates for the EU to adopt similar digital strategies to strengthen democratic institutions and resilience against cyber threats.
Kallas is a staunch defender of democratic principles, often highlighting the importance of unity and vigilance in the face of authoritarianism. At the 2025 Copenhagen Democracy Summit, she asserted that “peace has never been free” and underscored the necessity of investing in defense during peacetime to protect democracy. She also announced a €1 billion allocation to support Ukraine’s defense industry, emphasizing the EU’s commitment to aiding nations resisting authoritarian aggression.
Since assuming her role as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in December 2024, Kallas has advocated for a more strategic and assertive EU foreign policy. She has prioritized strengthening Europe’s capacity to act, deepening partnerships, and promoting EU values globally. Her tenure has been marked by efforts to enhance the EU’s role in global affairs, including addressing challenges posed by authoritarian regimes and reinforcing the EU’s commitment to multilateralism.
Kallas has been at the forefront of the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On May 9, 2025, she joined other EU foreign ministers in Lviv to commemorate Europe Day and express solidarity with Ukraine. During this visit, the EU endorsed the creation of a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes, demonstrating a commitment to accountability and justice. Kallas has also been vocal in criticizing Russia’s actions, stating that continued aggression indicates a lack of genuine interest in peace. Kallas advocates for a peace framework that ensures Ukraine’s sovereignty and security. She emphasizes that any lasting peace must include robust security guarantees for Ukraine, unrestricted rights to self-defense, and a clear path toward EU integration. Kallas has also expressed skepticism about Russia’s commitment to peace talks, suggesting that Moscow’s actions are more about buying time than seeking genuine resolution.
Through her unwavering support for democratic values, digital innovation, and a principled foreign policy, Kaja Kallas exemplifies the leadership needed to navigate the EU through contemporary geopolitical challenges.
Mark Rutte: The Strategic Steward of NATO
Mark Rutte, appointed as the 14th Secretary General of NATO on October 1, 2024, brings a wealth of experience from his tenure as the Netherlands’ longest-serving Prime Minister. Known for his pragmatic leadership and commitment to transatlantic cooperation, Rutte has been instrumental in steering NATO through a period marked by heightened security challenges and evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Under Rutte’s leadership, NATO has prioritized strengthening its defense capabilities. Recognizing the multifaceted threats posed by state and non-state actors, Rutte has advocated for increased defense spending among member states. He emphasized the need for a “wartime mindset,” urging allies to boost defense production and allocate resources effectively to ensure collective security. This approach aligns with the alliance’s commitment to Article 5, reinforcing the principle of collective defense.
Rutte has played a pivotal role in maintaining strong transatlantic ties, especially amidst shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities. He has engaged in dialogues with U.S. leadership to ensure continued commitment to NATO’s objectives. Rutte’s diplomatic efforts have been crucial in addressing concerns over burden-sharing and ensuring that NATO remains a unified front against global threats.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has been a central focus of Rutte’s tenure. He has consistently supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, emphasizing the importance of providing military and humanitarian assistance. Rutte has also highlighted the need for a unified NATO response to deter further aggression and has called for increased support to bolster Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
Rutte has been actively involved in diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving the Ukraine crisis. He acknowledged Ukraine’s readiness to negotiate for peace and placed the onus on Russia to engage constructively. Rutte also praised Türkiye’s role as a mediator, recognizing its unique position in facilitating dialogue between conflicting parties. Looking ahead, Rutte is focused on adapting NATO’s strategic vision to address emerging challenges. This includes countering cyber threats, addressing the implications of climate change on security, and ensuring that NATO remains agile in the face of evolving global dynamics. Rutte’s leadership is characterized by a commitment to innovation and collaboration, ensuring that NATO continues to safeguard peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.
Through his strategic stewardship, Mark Rutte has reinforced NATO’s role as a cornerstone of international security, navigating complex challenges with a focus on unity, resilience, and proactive engagement.
Shared Strategic Priorities
Support for Ukraine
A unified commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity remains paramount. The European Union has mobilized approximately €50 billion in military support and trained over 73,000 Ukrainian troops, underscoring its dedication to bolstering Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Von der Leyen’s “steel porcupine” strategy aims to make Ukraine resilient against future aggression, integrating its defense industry with the European defense technological and industrial base.
European Defense Enhancement
The “Readiness 2030” initiative, formerly known as ReArm Europe, spearheaded by von der Leyen, seeks to mobilize up to €800 billion to enhance the EU’s defense infrastructure. This comprehensive plan includes activating the Stability and Growth Pact’s escape clause, allowing member states to increase defense spending without breaching fiscal rules, and introducing the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan instrument to fund joint defense projects.
Climate and Digital Transformation
Leaders like von der Leyen and Kallas champion the European Green Deal and digital innovation as pillars for sustainable and technologically advanced economies. The EU’s commitment to climate neutrality by 2050 and investments in digital infrastructure aim to position Europe at the forefront of global environmental and technological advancements.
Transatlantic Relations
Maintaining robust ties with the United States remains a cornerstone of European foreign policy. While leaders like Starmer advocate for balanced relations that respect European autonomy, the collective emphasis is on reinforcing the NATO alliance and ensuring cohesive transatlantic cooperation in defense and economic matters.
Potential Flashpoints and Divergences
Approach to Russia
Macron’s openness to negotiations with Russia contrasts with Kallas’s skepticism, rooted in Estonia’s historical experiences with Russian aggression. This divergence underscores varying threat perceptions and strategic approaches within the EU.
Defense Spending
Merz’s advocacy for increased defense budgets may face resistance from fiscally conservative EU members concerned about escalating debt levels. Balancing the need for enhanced defense capabilities with fiscal responsibility remains a contentious issue.
EU-UK Relations
Post-Brexit dynamics continue to strain EU-UK relations. Starmer faces pressure to improve mobility deals and regulatory alignment, with EU leaders urging enhanced access for young EU citizens to work and study in the UK. Concurrently, domestic opposition criticizes potential concessions, fearing compromises on UK sovereignty.
Institutional Transparency
Von der Leyen’s handling of vaccine procurement, particularly the undisclosed text messages with Pfizer’s CEO, has drawn criticism and legal challenges, raising concerns about transparency and governance within the European Commission.
In conclusion, Europe’s trajectory under its new leadership is characterized by a proactive approach to internal consolidation and external engagement. By embracing strategic reforms and fostering unity, the European Union is poised to navigate the complexities of the modern world with resilience and purpose.
NATO’s Ambitious Defense Spending Proposal: A Strategic Imperative or an Overreach?
At the Informal Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Antalya, Turkey, on May 14–15, 2025, a pivotal topic of discussion was the U.S. proposal to elevate NATO’s defense spending target from the current 2% to 5% of each member’s GDP by 2032. This ambitious proposal, championed by former U.S. President Donald Trump, aims to allocate 3.5% to direct defense budgets and 1.5% to broader security infrastructure, including cyber capabilities. Germany’s endorsement of this initiative marked a significant shift in its defense policy, reflecting a broader consensus within NATO on the necessity of increased military investment.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte underscored the urgency of this proposal, emphasizing that the alliance’s current defense spending is insufficient to address emerging threats. He noted, “We are not ready for what is coming our way in four or five years.” Rutte highlighted the need for a “wartime mindset” and the acceleration of defense production to counteract the rapid rearmament of adversaries like Russia and China.
The proposed increase in defense spending is seen as a strategic imperative to ensure NATO’s deterrence capabilities remain robust in the face of evolving global security challenges. The allocation of funds is intended to enhance traditional military capabilities and bolster critical infrastructure, including cyber defense, which has become increasingly vital in modern warfare.
Germany’s endorsement of the 5% defense spending target marks a significant policy shift. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul expressed support, stating, “The result is the 5% that President Trump has called for, and we will follow him in this respect.” This endorsement aligns with Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s commitment to transforming the Bundeswehr into Europe’s strongest conventional military. Merz has initiated constitutional amendments to remove borrowing caps on defense investments and established a €500 billion fund for military modernization.
This policy shift is expected to have significant implications for Germany’s defense industry and its role within NATO. The increased investment is anticipated to stimulate the defense sector, leading to advancements in technology and production capabilities. However, the challenge lies in the effective allocation of these resources to ensure that the increased spending translates into enhanced military readiness and deterrence capabilities.
While Germany’s endorsement signifies a move towards greater defense investment, other NATO members have expressed reservations about the 5% target. German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck described the 5% target as “unrealistic,” suggesting that a more attainable medium-term goal would be 3.5% . Similarly, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu emphasized the importance of addressing broader security concerns, such as cyber threats and terrorism, and cautioned against focusing solely on military spending.
These divergent perspectives highlight the challenges NATO faces in achieving consensus on defense spending. While the necessity for increased investment is broadly acknowledged, the specific targets and allocation of resources remain subjects of debate among member states.
The upcoming NATO summit in The Hague on June 25, 2025, is expected to be a critical juncture in determining the alliance’s defense spending trajectory. Discussions will likely focus on reconciling the varying positions within NATO and establishing a unified approach to defense investment. The outcome of these deliberations will have profound implications for NATO’s strategic posture and its ability to address emerging global security challenges effectively.
Ukraine Conflict and Peace Negotiations
The Informal Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs served as a pivotal platform for addressing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy criticized Russia’s approach to peace talks, highlighting the low-level composition of Moscow’s delegation and President Vladimir Putin’s absence. Zelenskyy emphasized Ukraine’s call for a 30-day ceasefire, while Russia reiterated its longstanding demands without agreeing to an unconditional truce.
President Zelenskyy expressed disappointment over Russia’s decision to send a lower-level delegation to the peace talks in Istanbul, interpreting it as a lack of seriousness in pursuing a resolution. He stated, “We see Russians are not serious about peace talks,” and called for increased international pressure and sanctions if Russia does not engage in meaningful negotiations.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte underscored the alliance’s commitment to supporting Ukraine in its efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. He emphasized the importance of ensuring that any peace agreement is enduring and prevents further Russian aggression. Rutte stated, “We need to continue the military support,” and highlighted the necessity of strengthening Ukraine’s position before entering negotiations.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s commitment to facilitating peace talks and emphasized the need for both parties to compromise to achieve a lasting resolution. He stated, “If the parties’ positions are harmonized and trust is established, a very important step towards peace will have been taken.”
U.S. President Donald Trump, while not present at the Antalya meeting, has indicated that substantial progress would require direct engagement with President Putin. He remarked, “Nothing’s going to happen” until he meets with Putin, suggesting that his involvement may be crucial to advancing peace efforts.
The divergence in the level of representation at the peace talks underscores the challenges in achieving a meaningful dialogue. Ukraine’s insistence on a 30-day ceasefire and its call for a comprehensive resolution contrast with Russia’s focus on its longstanding demands without offering concessions. The international community’s response, including potential sanctions and continued support for Ukraine, will play a critical role in shaping the trajectory of the peace process.
Sanctions Against Russia: A Strategic Lever in NATO’s Diplomatic Arsenal
U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 (S.1241), a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by at least 72 senators. The legislation proposes stringent sanctions, including a 500% tariff on imports from countries purchasing Russian energy and a ban on U.S. citizens buying Russian sovereign debt. Graham emphasized that these measures aim to “cripple” Russia’s economy and pressure President Vladimir Putin into serious peace negotiations. The bill has garnered significant bipartisan support in the Senate, with proponents arguing that escalating sanctions are necessary to deter Russia’s ongoing aggression and to incentivize a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed strong support for the proposed sanctions, aligning with President Donald Trump’s stance on increasing economic pressure on Russia. Rutte stated, “I was very, very happy with the position of Trump to put more sanctions on Russia. We know that the Russian economy is doing terribly bad[ly], and the sanctions will help”.
While the proposed sanctions are designed to exert significant economic pressure on Russia, their implementation raises several considerations:
The 500% tariff on imports from countries purchasing Russian energy could affect global energy markets, particularly impacting nations like China and India that maintain substantial trade relations with Russia.
The sanctions may strain relations with countries that continue to engage economically with Russia, potentially leading to diplomatic tensions within the international community.
The success of the sanctions hinges on Russia’s response. If President Putin perceives the measures as a threat to his regime’s stability, he may double down on his position rather than seek negotiation.
Turkey’s Strategic Mediation
In the evolving geopolitical landscape of 2025, Turkey has emerged as a pivotal mediator in the Ukraine conflict, leveraging its unique position within NATO and its balanced relations with both Kyiv and Moscow. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s diplomatic efforts have positioned Turkey as a central player in facilitating dialogue between adversarial parties, aiming to de-escalate tensions and foster a path toward peace.
President Erdoğan has actively engaged with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, underscoring Turkey’s commitment to supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a recent meeting, Erdoğan reiterated Turkey’s stance on Crimea, emphasizing that international law necessitates its return to Ukraine. This position aligns with Turkey’s broader foreign policy objectives and its role within NATO.
Turkey’s mediation efforts have been instrumental in facilitating dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. Erdoğan has hosted high-level talks, including the trilateral meeting in Antalya in March 2022, which marked the first significant diplomatic engagement since the invasion. These efforts have been complemented by Turkey’s involvement in humanitarian initiatives, such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which has alleviated global food security concerns.
Despite Turkey’s active role, challenges persist in achieving a lasting peace. The recent peace talks in Istanbul were marred by Russia’s decision to send a lower-level delegation, leading to skepticism about Moscow’s commitment to meaningful negotiations. President Zelenskyy criticized the move as a sign of disrespect, highlighting the difficulties in bridging the divide between the parties.
Moreover, Erdoğan’s balancing act between supporting Ukraine and maintaining dialogue with Russia has drawn criticism. Analysts argue that while Turkey’s neutrality allows it to serve as a mediator, it also limits its influence over Russia, which may perceive Turkey’s position as ambivalent.
Erdoğan’s mediation efforts serve multiple strategic objectives for Turkey. By positioning itself as a neutral facilitator, Turkey enhances its stature within NATO and the international community. Additionally, successful mediation could bolster Erdoğan’s domestic standing amid economic challenges and political unrest.
However, the effectiveness of Turkey’s mediation is contingent upon the willingness of all parties to engage in genuine dialogue. The absence of high-level representation from Russia and the complexities of the conflict underscore the limitations of Turkey’s influence in shaping the outcome of negotiations..
Looking Ahead
The discussions and proposals from the Antalya meeting are expected to influence the agenda of the upcoming NATO summit in The Hague, scheduled for June 2025. Key topics will likely include the feasibility of increased defense spending, strategies to address the Ukraine conflict, and measures to counter broader security threats.
A central topic at the Antalya meeting was the U.S. proposal to increase NATO’s defense spending target from 2% to 5% of each member’s GDP by 2032. This proposal includes 3.5% for direct defense budgets and 1.5% for broader security infrastructure, such as cyber capabilities. Germany has publicly endorsed this initiative, emphasizing its importance in reinforcing NATO’s collective defense commitments amid heightened security threats from Russia and other global actors.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has proposed a phased approach to meet this target, suggesting that 3.5% of GDP be allocated to direct defense spending, with an additional 1.5% for related areas like infrastructure and cybersecurity. This approach aims to balance the U.S. demand with the economic realities faced by European allies
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine remains a significant focus for NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy criticized Russia’s approach to peace talks, highlighting the low-level composition of Moscow’s delegation and President Vladimir Putin’s absence. Zelenskyy emphasized Ukraine’s call for a 30-day ceasefire, while Russia reiterated its longstanding demands without agreeing to an unconditional truce.
NATO’s position, as articulated by Secretary General Mark Rutte, underscores the alliance’s commitment to supporting Ukraine in its efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. Rutte emphasized the importance of ensuring that any peace agreement is enduring and prevents further Russian aggression.
Beyond the immediate concerns of defense spending and the Ukraine conflict, NATO is also focused on addressing broader security threats. The alliance is increasingly concerned about challenges posed by China, including its military expansion and cyber capabilities. NATO’s strategic direction is shifting to encompass a more global perspective, recognizing the interconnectedness of security issues across regions.
The upcoming summit in The Hague is expected to formalize NATO’s approach to these global security challenges, with discussions likely to include enhanced cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region and the development of strategies to counteract China’s growing influence.
Key Outcomes Expected from The Hague Summit
The NATO Summit in The Hague is anticipated to yield several key outcomes:
Formal adoption of the proposed 5% defense spending target, with a phased implementation plan.
Reaffirmation of NATO’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, along with continued military and economic support.
Development of a comprehensive strategy to address broader security threats, including those posed by China.
Strengthening of partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region to address shared security concerns.
As NATO prepares for the summit, the alliance faces the challenge of balancing the diverse interests and capabilities of its member states while addressing the evolving security landscape. The decisions made in The Hague will shape NATO’s strategic direction for years to come.
The Secretary General’s Annual Report for 2024, released on 24 April 2025, provides a concise overview of NATO’s main achievements and priorities over the past year. The report underscores the Alliance’s enduring commitment to collective defence and cohesion among its 32 member states. Against what the Secretary General, Mark Rutte describes as “the most dangerous security environment in generations,” the report highlights efforts to strengthen deterrence and defence across all domains.
Strategic Context in 2024
In 2024, NATO operated within what Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called “the most dangerous security environment in generations,” a statement grounded not in rhetoric but in the unprecedented convergence of crises and systemic threats across the Euro-Atlantic area. The enduring impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its third year, forced the Alliance to confront the re-emergence of high-intensity warfare on the European continent—a reality that shattered assumptions of post-Cold War stability and necessitated a fundamental reconfiguration of NATO’s strategic calculus.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine remained NATO’s foremost challenge. The Alliance’s support for Kyiv extended beyond symbolic gestures: it encompassed real-time delivery of military hardware (including air defence systems and artillery), coordination via the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, and reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank. The activation of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) in July 2024 represented a structural evolution in force posture—designed not only for deterrence but also for rapid, scalable crisis response. This force replaced the legacy NATO Response Force and included pre-assigned, mission-tailored formations under the new NATO Force Model. At the same time, eight multinational battlegroups—comprising troops from across the Alliance—remained stationed along the eastern frontier, providing a tripwire against further Russian expansionism.
Beyond traditional military threats, 2024 witnessed a marked intensification of hybrid warfare, particularly from Russia. GRU- and FSB-linked entities conducted cyberattacks on financial institutions and government systems in countries such as Estonia, Poland, and Germany, while coordinated disinformation campaigns sought to undermine public trust ahead of key elections. Notably, a cyber intrusion targeting Latvia’s energy grid in March 2024 briefly disrupted regional electricity distribution—a stark reminder that critical infrastructure is now a frontline in hybrid confrontation. NATO’s response involved bolstering its cyber rapid response teams, developing new threat-intelligence protocols, and integrating national cybersecurity centres into collective defence planning.
Geopolitically, NATO faced the added complication of growing Sino-Russian alignment. In August 2024, joint Russian-Chinese naval exercises in the Barents Sea—supported by coordinated diplomatic posturing at the UN—highlighted the challenge of two near-peer competitors seeking to undermine Western influence in both regional and global arenas. NATO’s strategic communication began to shift accordingly, with growing references to the “global implications of authoritarian coordination” and the need to extend deterrence and partnerships beyond the North Atlantic area.
Politically, the Vilnius Summit in December 2023 marked a turning point in NATO’s commitment to future readiness. Allied leaders endorsed a new generation of regional defence plans, prioritized interoperability and force mobility, and pledged more ambitious defence spending. European Allies and Canada increased real defence expenditures by 19.4% year-on-year, reaching $486 billion—a notable achievement but still short of the capability gap identified in key domains like strategic lift, integrated air-and-missile defence, and space-based surveillance. Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasized the urgency of these investments, warning that deterrence without readiness is “deterrence in name only.”
NATO also revitalized its global partnerships strategy. Cooperation with the European Union focused on military mobility, resilience, and joint situational awareness. Simultaneously, NATO deepened political dialogues with Indo-Pacific partners—notably Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—to align responses to shared challenges, such as coercive economic practices, cyber instability, and growing militarization of critical maritime routes. These actions reflect NATO’s acknowledgment that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is increasingly intertwined.
Collectively, the strategic context of 2024 revealed an Alliance in transition: grappling with multiple, layered threats, while recalibrating its defence architecture and diplomatic posture to meet the demands of an increasingly multipolar and contested world.
Strengthening Deterrence & Defence
In response to what NATO officially termed “the most dangerous security environment in generations,” the Alliance took decisive steps to expand and operationalize its deterrence capabilities in 2024. The pool of combat-capable, high-readiness personnel was expanded to approximately 500,000 troops, encompassing land, air, maritime, cyber, and space forces. These units were structured for rapid deployment at short or no notice, tailored for both territorial defence and out-of-area operations. A major milestone was the formal activation of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) in July 2024, which replaced the legacy NATO Response Force. Unlike its predecessor, the ARF integrated pre-assigned, scenario-specific formations designed under the new NATO Force Model, enabling scalable and flexible deployment based on threat geography. This transformation aimed to eliminate the previous delays in mobilization by embedding readiness at every echelon of command. Additionally, NATO sustained eight multinational battlegroups stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, serving as both symbolic and operational deterrents on the Alliance’s most exposed frontlines.
To validate its readiness posture and reinforce allied interoperability, NATO launched Steadfast Defender 24—the largest NATO exercise since the end of the Cold War. From January to May 2024, over 90,000 troops, 50 naval vessels, 80 air platforms, and more than 1,100 combat vehicles mobilized across Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. The exercise was not merely a show of strength, but a live demonstration of NATO’s transatlantic reinforcement concept, proving the Alliance’s capacity to move substantial forces from North America to Europe under time pressure. In a significant regional development, Steadfast Dart, a follow-on exercise involving 10,000 troops, was conducted in the vicinity of Ukraine’s western border. It simulated hybrid-crisis scenarios, including cyber interference and infrastructure attacks, under high-intensity combat conditions. These drills served dual purposes: reassuring Eastern European Allies and signaling to Russia that NATO’s Article 5 guarantees remain credible. Meanwhile, more focused operations such as Ramstein Flag 2025 tested NATO’s integrated air command-and-control capabilities under real-world stressors—such as GPS jamming, drone swarms, and simulated ballistic missile strikes—representing an important leap toward credible Multi-Domain deterrence.
Recognizing that the battlefields of tomorrow will be contested across multiple, overlapping spheres, NATO accelerated its shift toward fully integrated Multi-Domain Operations (MDOs). Cyber-defence preparedness saw particular advancement: simulated attacks attributed to state-sponsored groups—particularly those linked to Russian and Chinese actors—were used to train cross-border incident response, coordination between civilian and military CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams), and resilience of NATO’s digital command structure. In space, NATO’s Science and Technology Board initiated feasibility projects on space asset redundancy and satellite resilience, aiming to ensure uninterrupted command, navigation, and surveillance capabilities even under hostile conditions. To institutionalize rapid reaction across all environments, the NATO Readiness Process was restructured: Allies now adhere to common standards for declaring force availability and proving their deployability, which significantly reduced ambiguity in crisis response timelines.
Lastly, NATO military leaders stressed that deterrence is effective only when exercised jointly, across domains and with realism. The multi-theatre format of Ramstein Flag, conducted simultaneously in Central Europe and the Arctic, validated NATO’s capacity to execute integrated operations involving air policing, cyber disruption containment, naval interdiction, and ground force maneuver under contested, degraded communications environments. These exercises—conducted in coordination with national civilian agencies—offered critical proof that NATO is not only reactive but proactively adapting to hybrid and kinetic threats alike. Together, these strategic and operational developments helped anchor NATO’s 2024 deterrence posture as one that is agile, integrated, and demonstrably capable of responding to aggression from any vector, conventional or unconventional.
Burden-Sharing & Capability Development
In 2024, NATO intensified its focus on equitable burden-sharing and the expansion of its defense-industrial and technological base—responding to both the hard realities of Russia’s sustained aggression and the internal imperative for a credible collective defense posture. The year underscored not only increased military investment but also diverging national commitments and renewed political tensions around cost-sharing.
Collectively, NATO members raised their defense spending to approximately USD 1.506 trillion, comprising 55% of global military expenditures. This marked an 11% increase over 2023 and reflected a decisive shift among European Allies and Canada, who collectively accounted for a meaningful share of the growth. Nevertheless, structural asymmetries persisted: the United States contributed roughly 64% of NATO’s total defense expenditure—reigniting long-standing debates about transatlantic burden equity. U.S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense and Congressional leaders, publicly advocated for raising the 2% GDP benchmark, suggesting a new target of 2.5–3% to reflect modern capability requirements.
Among member states, Poland emerged as a standout contributor, increasing its defense spending from 2.7% of GDP in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with a projected increase to 4.7% in 2025. Warsaw’s investments included large-scale procurement of Abrams tanks, HIMARS systems, and South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks, signaling a strategic ambition to become the primary defense hub on NATO’s eastern flank. By contrast, Canada, Italy, and Spain remained below the 2% threshold, prompting diplomatic friction—particularly as Canadian defense spending hovered near 1.3% of GDP, despite mounting regional security concerns in the Arctic.
In parallel with these budgetary shifts, NATO focused on strengthening its defense-industrial capacity to sustain long-term support to Ukraine and replenish stockpiles depleted by over two years of high-tempo military assistance. The NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge, adopted in 2024, set concrete benchmarks for increasing domestic production of key munitions, such as 155mm artillery shells, air-defense interceptors, and armored vehicles. Yet implementation remained uneven. For example, the Czech Republic and Norway successfully ramped up shell production through public-private consortia, while larger states like Germany and France faced internal regulatory and procurement bottlenecks.
Technological innovation received institutional backing through the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which became fully operational in 2024. DIANA supported over 120 start-ups across 25 accelerator sites, including partnerships with institutions like the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. Funded prototypes ranged from AI-enabled surveillance drones to quantum-encrypted communication systems, with select technologies earmarked for NATO-wide deployment by 2026.
However, Europe’s fragmented defense industrial landscape continued to hamper efficiency. The European Defence Agency (EDA) estimated €25 billion in annual inefficiencies due to duplicative procurement and a lack of cross-border coordination. To mitigate this, the European Commission introduced the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), dedicating €1.5 billion for 2025–2027 to incentivize joint weapons production and unlock economies of scale. Despite this effort, national interests—particularly from major producers like France and Italy—remained a barrier to full industrial harmonization.
Amid this evolving ecosystem, NATO and the EU recognized the urgency of transitioning toward a “war economy mode.” This shift entailed scaling up production, establishing common stockpiling standards, and accelerating interoperability frameworks across the Alliance. Ukraine’s integration into European defense structures was a key political priority: 2024 saw the launch of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum and the opening of the EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv, creating institutional pathways for joint procurement and defense R&D between Ukrainian firms and EU partners.
Together, these developments signaled NATO’s commitment not only to spend more—but to spend smarter—while reinforcing the alliance’s resilience in an era of protracted strategic competition and high-intensity conflict.
Resilience and Crisis Response
In 2024, NATO reinforced the strategic centrality of resilience as a core pillar of deterrence, recognizing that robust civil-military preparedness is essential not only for crisis response but for ensuring continuity of governance and societal function under stress. The Alliance elevated resilience from a supporting function to a strategic enabler, formalizing a cross-domain agenda to safeguard critical infrastructures, supply chains, and civilian support systems underpinning military operations.
A key milestone was the adoption of integrated resilience objectives, offering a framework for member states to develop tailored national implementation plans. These objectives encompassed seven baseline requirements, ranging from assured continuity of government and essential services to the protection of civil telecommunications and transport networks. For the first time, all Allies designated national-level resilience coordinators, tasked with synchronizing domestic policies and facilitating direct consultation with NATO structures, particularly within the Resilience Committee and the Civil Emergency Planning Committee.
The operationalization of these frameworks was tested through large-scale civil-military exercises, notably Exercise BULGARIA 2025, designed to simulate multi-sector crisis response, including natural disasters, cyberattacks on infrastructure, and mass displacement scenarios. This exercise included participants from ten NATO and partner countries, and highlighted best practices in interagency coordination, civilian logistics mobilization, and dual-use infrastructure utilization.
The NATO Resilience Symposium, held in Brussels in late 2024, convened over 200 participants from across the civil and defense spectrum. The event served as a strategic convergence point for civil protection agencies, military planners, academic researchers, and private sector stakeholders. Discussions focused on the integration of civilian resilience into NATO’s deterrence-by-denial strategy, emphasizing the growing relevance of whole-of-society defense models in light of hybrid and gray zone threats.
Early warning and situational awareness also received significant operational emphasis. The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) conducted enhanced Vigilance Activities across NATO’s eastern borders, particularly in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. These missions—combining AWACS platforms, ISR drones, and ground-based sensor networks—sought to close strategic warning gaps, provide persistent surveillance, and reduce decision-making timelines for Allied commanders. These efforts contributed to a more credible and transparent deterrent posture, in alignment with Article 5 responsibilities.
Moreover, NATO linked resilience to climate security, releasing the Secretary General’s Annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment. The 2024 edition underscored threats posed by climate-induced migration, water scarcity, and extreme weather events to infrastructure integrity and operational planning. For instance, simulations conducted by NATO’s Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence projected a 30% increase in climate-related disruptions to key logistics hubs in Southeastern Europe by 2035. The findings catalyzed efforts to “climate-proof” both civilian and military infrastructure, including through the deployment of modular, energy-resilient command facilities.
The culmination of these initiatives was the Strengthened Resilience Commitment, endorsed at the 2024 Washington Summit. This political declaration mandated the integration of civilian planning into NATO’s defense posture across peacetime, crisis, and conflict scenarios. It also expanded the scope of resilience beyond conventional threats to include irregular warfare, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and terrorism—institutionalizing resilience as a multi-domain defense concept.
In sum, NATO’s 2024 civil-military preparedness agenda represents a paradigm shift from reactive crisis management to proactive societal defense, ensuring that the Alliance remains not only militarily potent but structurally robust and socially resilient against 21st-century threats.
Partnerships and Outreach
In 2024, NATO deepened its global engagement strategy, advancing a networked approach to security by strengthening political and operational ties with partners across the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. These partnerships, rooted in shared democratic values and a commitment to the rules-based international order, are central to NATO’s strategic objective of projecting stability and countering systemic threats beyond its traditional area of responsibility.
The most prominent development was the consolidation of NATO’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, reflecting a growing recognition of the interdependence between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. For the third consecutive year, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea participated in the NATO Summit, reinforcing their status as de facto strategic partners. Dialogue during the summit emphasized convergence on key priorities: continued support for Ukraine, cybersecurity cooperation, counter-disinformation campaigns, and governance of emerging and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence. In operational terms, Indo-Pacific partners contributed to joint research initiatives within DIANA and engaged in NATO cyber defense exercises and information-sharing protocols.
In parallel, NATO advanced tailored partnership frameworks with a broader set of Global Partners. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), cooperation with Iraq and Jordan focused on counterterrorism, defense education, and institutional capacity-building, under the aegis of the NATO-Iraq Partnership and Individual Tailored Partnership Programme. Meanwhile, NATO’s relationship with Colombia, its only partner in Latin America, was reinforced through expanded engagements on human security, resilience, and maritime security.
The eastern flank remained a focal point of NATO’s global partnership efforts, driven by Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine and the broader strategic contestation in the Black Sea region. NATO deepened its security cooperation with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, countries facing sustained hybrid threats, including disinformation, cyberattacks, and political interference. Through the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package and the newly expanded NATO-Moldova Political Dialogue Mechanism, the Alliance provided technical assistance, defense planning support, and capacity-building programs aligned with Euro-Atlantic integration objectives.
The Alliance’s military footprint in Eastern Europe was also significantly enhanced in 2024. NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) was augmented by additional rotational forces and multinational battlegroups in Romania and Poland, intended to reinforce collective defense under Article 5 and deter potential incursions. These units integrated troops from multiple NATO members and conducted combined arms training to improve interoperability and rapid response capability.
Infrastructure modernization accompanied these deployments. A major example was NATO’s investment in the expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base in Romania, part of a €2 billion multi-year project aimed at transforming the facility into one of NATO’s largest operational hubs in Southeastern Europe. The upgraded base will accommodate up to 10,000 troops and advanced air assets, including F-35s and long-range surveillance drones, thereby strengthening NATO’s strategic depth and projection capacity in the Black Sea region.
Taken together, these developments in 2024 reflect a strategic recalibration of NATO’s global partnerships—from political symbolism to substantive security cooperation. By embedding global partners into its deterrence, innovation, and resilience strategies, NATO not only enhances its own adaptability but also helps shape the broader international security architecture in an era of rising multipolar competition.
Long‑Term Support for Ukraine and NATO’s Force Evolution
NATO’s 2024 Annual Report frames the war in Ukraine not merely as a regional conflict, but as a long-term, systemic contest with far-reaching implications for European and global security. In response, NATO has embedded support for Ukraine within its own process of strategic adaptation—combining operational assistance, political integration, and structural transformation. This dual-track approach reflects a recognition that Ukraine’s defense is intrinsically linked to NATO’s evolving deterrence and defense architecture.
Militarily, Allies committed over USD 55 billion in security assistance to Ukraine in 2024, with approximately 60 percent provided by European members and Canada, marking a significant increase in non-U.S. burden-sharing. These contributions were coordinated through the establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany. Staffed by approximately 700 personnel under three-star command, NSATU serves as the central hub for synchronizing military aid—ranging from equipment deliveries and joint training initiatives to logistics coordination and standardization support. The operational mission of NSATU reflects NATO’s priority of ensuring Ukraine builds a force structure interoperable with NATO standards, capable of both immediate defense and long-term deterrence.
Complementing short-term military aid, NATO expanded its Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) Trust Fund, which reached nearly €950 million by the end of 2024. Funds were allocated for long-term capacity building in strategic sectors, including humanitarian demining, military medical services, procurement transparency, and infrastructure resilience. This dual emphasis on battlefield efficacy and institutional reform underlines NATO’s strategy to elevate Ukraine from a recipient of aid to a future contributor to regional stability.
Politically, the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) has become the principal platform for Allied consensus on the war and its resolution. Meeting at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers and prominently featured during the 2024 Washington Summit, the NUC has forged a shared commitment to a “just and lasting peace”—a diplomatic framework grounded in Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and post-war integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. While formal membership remains on hold pending the Alliance’s 75th Anniversary Summit, Ukraine’s political inclusion has intensified, symbolized by joint communiqués, expanded parliamentary engagement, and integration into NATO planning dialogues.
One of the most significant institutional innovations of 2024 was the launch of the Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland. JATEC institutionalizes the operational learning from Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression by integrating after-action reports and frontline tactics into NATO doctrinal development and Ukrainian force design. This facilitates doctrinal convergence and enhances NATO’s warfighting literacy based on real-world, high-intensity conflict.
Overall, NATO’s engagement with Ukraine in 2024 transcended traditional assistance. It crystallized into a model of comprehensive strategic integration: linking battlefield support with reform incentives, and embedding Ukraine’s defense into NATO’s broader effort to adapt for a more contested, multipolar security environment. In doing so, the Alliance reaffirmed not only its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty but also its own long-term relevance as a provider of collective security.
NATO–Moldova Cooperation
In 2024, NATO and the Republic of Moldova marked a significant milestone, celebrating 30 years of partnership. This enduring relationship, rooted in Moldova’s accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, has evolved to encompass a broad spectrum of cooperative endeavors. The year witnessed intensified collaboration, reflecting both the deepening of existing ties and the adaptation to emerging security challenges in the region.
Moldova’s engagement with NATO commenced in 1994 through the PfP program, laying the foundation for subsequent cooperative frameworks. In 2006, this relationship was further solidified with the adoption of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), facilitating structured political dialogue and practical cooperation. Over the years, initiatives such as the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative have been instrumental in aligning Moldova’s defense structures with NATO standards, enhancing interoperability and resilience.
The year 2024 was marked by a strategic intensification of NATO-Moldova relations. Recognizing the evolving security landscape, NATO endorsed an Enhanced DCB Package for Moldova, focusing on bolstering national resilience and civil preparedness. This package encompassed tailored support measures, including defense reform assistance, capacity building, and the provision of material aid.
A significant highlight was the joint visit of NATO legislators to Moldova, providing firsthand insights into the challenges faced by the country and reinforcing the alliance’s commitment to its partner.
Moldova’s active participation in NATO-led exercises underscores its commitment to enhancing operational readiness and interoperability. Notably, the Coherent Resilience 2024 Moldova Tabletop Exercise (CORE24-M) focused on strengthening the country’s resilience against hybrid threats targeting critical energy infrastructure. This exercise facilitated cooperation among Moldovan crisis response authorities, energy operators, and cyber defenders, ensuring preparedness against non-conventional security threats.
In the realm of defense education, the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) has been pivotal. Since 2009, DEEP has supported the professionalization of Moldova’s military education, aiding in curriculum development and faculty training. In 2024, significant progress was made in enhancing the skills of Moldovan instructors, aligning them with NATO best practices.
Furthermore, NATO’s support extended to the development of Moldova’s Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Corps, with reforms including the establishment of new ranks, payment systems, and multi-level education programs.
The evolving geopolitical dynamics present avenues for Moldova to deepen its engagement with NATO. Enhanced political dialogue, particularly in areas of shared interest such as cyber defense, countering disinformation, and energy security, can fortify mutual understanding and cooperation. Moreover, expanding capacity-building initiatives, including joint exercises and training programs, can further align Moldova’s defense capabilities with NATO standards.
The establishment of the EU–Moldova Security and Defence Partnership in May 2024 also opens prospects for synergistic collaboration between NATO and the EU in supporting Moldova’s security sector reforms and resilience-building efforts.
Looking ahead, a structured roadmap focusing on the following areas can enhance NATO-Moldova cooperation:
Continued support for the modernization of Moldova’s defense institutions, emphasizing transparency, accountability, and efficiency.
Strengthening Moldova’s cyber defense capabilities through joint training, information sharing, and the development of robust cyber infrastructure.
Collaborative efforts to safeguard critical energy infrastructure against hybrid threats, building on the successes of exercises like CORE24-M.
Enhancing public awareness and support for NATO-Moldova cooperation through strategic communication and outreach programs.
Conclusion
In 2024, NATO significantly enhanced its deterrence and defense capabilities across all domains, reflecting a proactive response to evolving security challenges. The implementation of the NATO Force Model (NFM) replaced the NATO Response Force, tripling the number of high-readiness forces available to the Alliance. This restructuring aimed to improve rapid deployment and operational flexibility, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank. Exercises like Steadfast Defender 2024, involving over 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO Allies, demonstrated the Alliance’s ability to conduct sustained, multi-domain operations across vast distances, reinforcing its commitment to collective defense.
Moldova’s partnership with NATO has deepened amidst regional tensions and internal challenges. Celebrating 30 years in the Partnership for Peace program, Moldova has engaged in various initiatives to bolster its defense capabilities and resilience. The Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) has been instrumental in aligning Moldova’s military education with NATO standards. Joint exercises, such as the Coherent Resilience 2024 Moldova Tabletop Exercise (CORE24-M), have focused on enhancing the country’s preparedness against hybrid threats, particularly in the energy sector. Despite constitutional neutrality and resource constraints, Moldova continues to seek avenues for deeper cooperation within the existing framework.
