The Secretary General’s Annual Report for 2024, released on 24 April 2025, provides a concise overview of NATO’s main achievements and priorities over the past year. The report underscores the Alliance’s enduring commitment to collective defence and cohesion among its 32 member states. Against what the Secretary General, Mark Rutte describes as “the most dangerous security environment in generations,” the report highlights efforts to strengthen deterrence and defence across all domains.

Strategic Context in 2024

In 2024, NATO operated within what Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called “the most dangerous security environment in generations,” a statement grounded not in rhetoric but in the unprecedented convergence of crises and systemic threats across the Euro-Atlantic area. The enduring impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its third year, forced the Alliance to confront the re-emergence of high-intensity warfare on the European continent—a reality that shattered assumptions of post-Cold War stability and necessitated a fundamental reconfiguration of NATO’s strategic calculus.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine remained NATO’s foremost challenge. The Alliance’s support for Kyiv extended beyond symbolic gestures: it encompassed real-time delivery of military hardware (including air defence systems and artillery), coordination via the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, and reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank. The activation of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) in July 2024 represented a structural evolution in force posture—designed not only for deterrence but also for rapid, scalable crisis response. This force replaced the legacy NATO Response Force and included pre-assigned, mission-tailored formations under the new NATO Force Model. At the same time, eight multinational battlegroups—comprising troops from across the Alliance—remained stationed along the eastern frontier, providing a tripwire against further Russian expansionism.

Beyond traditional military threats, 2024 witnessed a marked intensification of hybrid warfare, particularly from Russia. GRU- and FSB-linked entities conducted cyberattacks on financial institutions and government systems in countries such as Estonia, Poland, and Germany, while coordinated disinformation campaigns sought to undermine public trust ahead of key elections. Notably, a cyber intrusion targeting Latvia’s energy grid in March 2024 briefly disrupted regional electricity distribution—a stark reminder that critical infrastructure is now a frontline in hybrid confrontation. NATO’s response involved bolstering its cyber rapid response teams, developing new threat-intelligence protocols, and integrating national cybersecurity centres into collective defence planning.

Geopolitically, NATO faced the added complication of growing Sino-Russian alignment. In August 2024, joint Russian-Chinese naval exercises in the Barents Sea—supported by coordinated diplomatic posturing at the UN—highlighted the challenge of two near-peer competitors seeking to undermine Western influence in both regional and global arenas. NATO’s strategic communication began to shift accordingly, with growing references to the “global implications of authoritarian coordination” and the need to extend deterrence and partnerships beyond the North Atlantic area.

Politically, the Vilnius Summit in December 2023 marked a turning point in NATO’s commitment to future readiness. Allied leaders endorsed a new generation of regional defence plans, prioritized interoperability and force mobility, and pledged more ambitious defence spending. European Allies and Canada increased real defence expenditures by 19.4% year-on-year, reaching $486 billion—a notable achievement but still short of the capability gap identified in key domains like strategic lift, integrated air-and-missile defence, and space-based surveillance. Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasized the urgency of these investments, warning that deterrence without readiness is “deterrence in name only.”

NATO also revitalized its global partnerships strategy. Cooperation with the European Union focused on military mobility, resilience, and joint situational awareness. Simultaneously, NATO deepened political dialogues with Indo-Pacific partners—notably Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—to align responses to shared challenges, such as coercive economic practices, cyber instability, and growing militarization of critical maritime routes. These actions reflect NATO’s acknowledgment that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is increasingly intertwined.

Collectively, the strategic context of 2024 revealed an Alliance in transition: grappling with multiple, layered threats, while recalibrating its defence architecture and diplomatic posture to meet the demands of an increasingly multipolar and contested world.

Strengthening Deterrence & Defence

In response to what NATO officially termed “the most dangerous security environment in generations,” the Alliance took decisive steps to expand and operationalize its deterrence capabilities in 2024. The pool of combat-capable, high-readiness personnel was expanded to approximately 500,000 troops, encompassing land, air, maritime, cyber, and space forces. These units were structured for rapid deployment at short or no notice, tailored for both territorial defence and out-of-area operations. A major milestone was the formal activation of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) in July 2024, which replaced the legacy NATO Response Force. Unlike its predecessor, the ARF integrated pre-assigned, scenario-specific formations designed under the new NATO Force Model, enabling scalable and flexible deployment based on threat geography. This transformation aimed to eliminate the previous delays in mobilization by embedding readiness at every echelon of command. Additionally, NATO sustained eight multinational battlegroups stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, serving as both symbolic and operational deterrents on the Alliance’s most exposed frontlines.

To validate its readiness posture and reinforce allied interoperability, NATO launched Steadfast Defender 24—the largest NATO exercise since the end of the Cold War. From January to May 2024, over 90,000 troops, 50 naval vessels, 80 air platforms, and more than 1,100 combat vehicles mobilized across Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. The exercise was not merely a show of strength, but a live demonstration of NATO’s transatlantic reinforcement concept, proving the Alliance’s capacity to move substantial forces from North America to Europe under time pressure. In a significant regional development, Steadfast Dart, a follow-on exercise involving 10,000 troops, was conducted in the vicinity of Ukraine’s western border. It simulated hybrid-crisis scenarios, including cyber interference and infrastructure attacks, under high-intensity combat conditions. These drills served dual purposes: reassuring Eastern European Allies and signaling to Russia that NATO’s Article 5 guarantees remain credible. Meanwhile, more focused operations such as Ramstein Flag 2025 tested NATO’s integrated air command-and-control capabilities under real-world stressors—such as GPS jamming, drone swarms, and simulated ballistic missile strikes—representing an important leap toward credible Multi-Domain deterrence.

Recognizing that the battlefields of tomorrow will be contested across multiple, overlapping spheres, NATO accelerated its shift toward fully integrated Multi-Domain Operations (MDOs). Cyber-defence preparedness saw particular advancement: simulated attacks attributed to state-sponsored groups—particularly those linked to Russian and Chinese actors—were used to train cross-border incident response, coordination between civilian and military CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams), and resilience of NATO’s digital command structure. In space, NATO’s Science and Technology Board initiated feasibility projects on space asset redundancy and satellite resilience, aiming to ensure uninterrupted command, navigation, and surveillance capabilities even under hostile conditions. To institutionalize rapid reaction across all environments, the NATO Readiness Process was restructured: Allies now adhere to common standards for declaring force availability and proving their deployability, which significantly reduced ambiguity in crisis response timelines.

Lastly, NATO military leaders stressed that deterrence is effective only when exercised jointly, across domains and with realism. The multi-theatre format of Ramstein Flag, conducted simultaneously in Central Europe and the Arctic, validated NATO’s capacity to execute integrated operations involving air policing, cyber disruption containment, naval interdiction, and ground force maneuver under contested, degraded communications environments. These exercises—conducted in coordination with national civilian agencies—offered critical proof that NATO is not only reactive but proactively adapting to hybrid and kinetic threats alike. Together, these strategic and operational developments helped anchor NATO’s 2024 deterrence posture as one that is agile, integrated, and demonstrably capable of responding to aggression from any vector, conventional or unconventional.

Burden-Sharing & Capability Development

​ In 2024, NATO intensified its focus on equitable burden-sharing and the expansion of its defense-industrial and technological base—responding to both the hard realities of Russia’s sustained aggression and the internal imperative for a credible collective defense posture. The year underscored not only increased military investment but also diverging national commitments and renewed political tensions around cost-sharing.

Collectively, NATO members raised their defense spending to approximately USD 1.506 trillion, comprising 55% of global military expenditures. This marked an 11% increase over 2023 and reflected a decisive shift among European Allies and Canada, who collectively accounted for a meaningful share of the growth. Nevertheless, structural asymmetries persisted: the United States contributed roughly 64% of NATO’s total defense expenditure—reigniting long-standing debates about transatlantic burden equity. U.S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense and Congressional leaders, publicly advocated for raising the 2% GDP benchmark, suggesting a new target of 2.5–3% to reflect modern capability requirements.

Among member states, Poland emerged as a standout contributor, increasing its defense spending from 2.7% of GDP in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with a projected increase to 4.7% in 2025. Warsaw’s investments included large-scale procurement of Abrams tanks, HIMARS systems, and South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks, signaling a strategic ambition to become the primary defense hub on NATO’s eastern flank. By contrast, Canada, Italy, and Spain remained below the 2% threshold, prompting diplomatic friction—particularly as Canadian defense spending hovered near 1.3% of GDP, despite mounting regional security concerns in the Arctic.

In parallel with these budgetary shifts, NATO focused on strengthening its defense-industrial capacity to sustain long-term support to Ukraine and replenish stockpiles depleted by over two years of high-tempo military assistance. The NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge, adopted in 2024, set concrete benchmarks for increasing domestic production of key munitions, such as 155mm artillery shells, air-defense interceptors, and armored vehicles. Yet implementation remained uneven. For example, the Czech Republic and Norway successfully ramped up shell production through public-private consortia, while larger states like Germany and France faced internal regulatory and procurement bottlenecks.

Technological innovation received institutional backing through the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which became fully operational in 2024. DIANA supported over 120 start-ups across 25 accelerator sites, including partnerships with institutions like the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. Funded prototypes ranged from AI-enabled surveillance drones to quantum-encrypted communication systems, with select technologies earmarked for NATO-wide deployment by 2026.

However, Europe’s fragmented defense industrial landscape continued to hamper efficiency. The European Defence Agency (EDA) estimated €25 billion in annual inefficiencies due to duplicative procurement and a lack of cross-border coordination. To mitigate this, the European Commission introduced the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), dedicating €1.5 billion for 2025–2027 to incentivize joint weapons production and unlock economies of scale. Despite this effort, national interests—particularly from major producers like France and Italy—remained a barrier to full industrial harmonization.

Amid this evolving ecosystem, NATO and the EU recognized the urgency of transitioning toward a “war economy mode.” This shift entailed scaling up production, establishing common stockpiling standards, and accelerating interoperability frameworks across the Alliance. Ukraine’s integration into European defense structures was a key political priority: 2024 saw the launch of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum and the opening of the EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv, creating institutional pathways for joint procurement and defense R&D between Ukrainian firms and EU partners.

Together, these developments signaled NATO’s commitment not only to spend more—but to spend smarter—while reinforcing the alliance’s resilience in an era of protracted strategic competition and high-intensity conflict.

Resilience and Crisis Response

In 2024, NATO reinforced the strategic centrality of resilience as a core pillar of deterrence, recognizing that robust civil-military preparedness is essential not only for crisis response but for ensuring continuity of governance and societal function under stress. The Alliance elevated resilience from a supporting function to a strategic enabler, formalizing a cross-domain agenda to safeguard critical infrastructures, supply chains, and civilian support systems underpinning military operations.

A key milestone was the adoption of integrated resilience objectives, offering a framework for member states to develop tailored national implementation plans. These objectives encompassed seven baseline requirements, ranging from assured continuity of government and essential services to the protection of civil telecommunications and transport networks. For the first time, all Allies designated national-level resilience coordinators, tasked with synchronizing domestic policies and facilitating direct consultation with NATO structures, particularly within the Resilience Committee and the Civil Emergency Planning Committee.

The operationalization of these frameworks was tested through large-scale civil-military exercises, notably Exercise BULGARIA 2025, designed to simulate multi-sector crisis response, including natural disasters, cyberattacks on infrastructure, and mass displacement scenarios. This exercise included participants from ten NATO and partner countries, and highlighted best practices in interagency coordination, civilian logistics mobilization, and dual-use infrastructure utilization.

The NATO Resilience Symposium, held in Brussels in late 2024, convened over 200 participants from across the civil and defense spectrum. The event served as a strategic convergence point for civil protection agencies, military planners, academic researchers, and private sector stakeholders. Discussions focused on the integration of civilian resilience into NATO’s deterrence-by-denial strategy, emphasizing the growing relevance of whole-of-society defense models in light of hybrid and gray zone threats.

Early warning and situational awareness also received significant operational emphasis. The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) conducted enhanced Vigilance Activities across NATO’s eastern borders, particularly in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. These missions—combining AWACS platforms, ISR drones, and ground-based sensor networks—sought to close strategic warning gaps, provide persistent surveillance, and reduce decision-making timelines for Allied commanders. These efforts contributed to a more credible and transparent deterrent posture, in alignment with Article 5 responsibilities.

Moreover, NATO linked resilience to climate security, releasing the Secretary General’s Annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment. The 2024 edition underscored threats posed by climate-induced migration, water scarcity, and extreme weather events to infrastructure integrity and operational planning. For instance, simulations conducted by NATO’s Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence projected a 30% increase in climate-related disruptions to key logistics hubs in Southeastern Europe by 2035. The findings catalyzed efforts to “climate-proof” both civilian and military infrastructure, including through the deployment of modular, energy-resilient command facilities.

The culmination of these initiatives was the Strengthened Resilience Commitment, endorsed at the 2024 Washington Summit. This political declaration mandated the integration of civilian planning into NATO’s defense posture across peacetime, crisis, and conflict scenarios. It also expanded the scope of resilience beyond conventional threats to include irregular warfare, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and terrorism—institutionalizing resilience as a multi-domain defense concept.

In sum, NATO’s 2024 civil-military preparedness agenda represents a paradigm shift from reactive crisis management to proactive societal defense, ensuring that the Alliance remains not only militarily potent but structurally robust and socially resilient against 21st-century threats.

Partnerships and Outreach

In 2024, NATO deepened its global engagement strategy, advancing a networked approach to security by strengthening political and operational ties with partners across the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. These partnerships, rooted in shared democratic values and a commitment to the rules-based international order, are central to NATO’s strategic objective of projecting stability and countering systemic threats beyond its traditional area of responsibility.

The most prominent development was the consolidation of NATO’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, reflecting a growing recognition of the interdependence between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. For the third consecutive year, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea participated in the NATO Summit, reinforcing their status as de facto strategic partners. Dialogue during the summit emphasized convergence on key priorities: continued support for Ukraine, cybersecurity cooperation, counter-disinformation campaigns, and governance of emerging and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence. In operational terms, Indo-Pacific partners contributed to joint research initiatives within DIANA and engaged in NATO cyber defense exercises and information-sharing protocols.

In parallel, NATO advanced tailored partnership frameworks with a broader set of Global Partners. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), cooperation with Iraq and Jordan focused on counterterrorism, defense education, and institutional capacity-building, under the aegis of the NATO-Iraq Partnership and Individual Tailored Partnership Programme. Meanwhile, NATO’s relationship with Colombia, its only partner in Latin America, was reinforced through expanded engagements on human security, resilience, and maritime security.

The eastern flank remained a focal point of NATO’s global partnership efforts, driven by Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine and the broader strategic contestation in the Black Sea region. NATO deepened its security cooperation with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, countries facing sustained hybrid threats, including disinformation, cyberattacks, and political interference. Through the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package and the newly expanded NATO-Moldova Political Dialogue Mechanism, the Alliance provided technical assistance, defense planning support, and capacity-building programs aligned with Euro-Atlantic integration objectives.

The Alliance’s military footprint in Eastern Europe was also significantly enhanced in 2024. NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) was augmented by additional rotational forces and multinational battlegroups in Romania and Poland, intended to reinforce collective defense under Article 5 and deter potential incursions. These units integrated troops from multiple NATO members and conducted combined arms training to improve interoperability and rapid response capability.

Infrastructure modernization accompanied these deployments. A major example was NATO’s investment in the expansion of the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base in Romania, part of a €2 billion multi-year project aimed at transforming the facility into one of NATO’s largest operational hubs in Southeastern Europe. The upgraded base will accommodate up to 10,000 troops and advanced air assets, including F-35s and long-range surveillance drones, thereby strengthening NATO’s strategic depth and projection capacity in the Black Sea region.

Taken together, these developments in 2024 reflect a strategic recalibration of NATO’s global partnerships—from political symbolism to substantive security cooperation. By embedding global partners into its deterrence, innovation, and resilience strategies, NATO not only enhances its own adaptability but also helps shape the broader international security architecture in an era of rising multipolar competition.

Long‑Term Support for Ukraine and NATO’s Force Evolution

NATO’s 2024 Annual Report frames the war in Ukraine not merely as a regional conflict, but as a long-term, systemic contest with far-reaching implications for European and global security. In response, NATO has embedded support for Ukraine within its own process of strategic adaptation—combining operational assistance, political integration, and structural transformation. This dual-track approach reflects a recognition that Ukraine’s defense is intrinsically linked to NATO’s evolving deterrence and defense architecture.

Militarily, Allies committed over USD 55 billion in security assistance to Ukraine in 2024, with approximately 60 percent provided by European members and Canada, marking a significant increase in non-U.S. burden-sharing. These contributions were coordinated through the establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany. Staffed by approximately 700 personnel under three-star command, NSATU serves as the central hub for synchronizing military aid—ranging from equipment deliveries and joint training initiatives to logistics coordination and standardization support. The operational mission of NSATU reflects NATO’s priority of ensuring Ukraine builds a force structure interoperable with NATO standards, capable of both immediate defense and long-term deterrence.

Complementing short-term military aid, NATO expanded its Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) Trust Fund, which reached nearly €950 million by the end of 2024. Funds were allocated for long-term capacity building in strategic sectors, including humanitarian demining, military medical services, procurement transparency, and infrastructure resilience. This dual emphasis on battlefield efficacy and institutional reform underlines NATO’s strategy to elevate Ukraine from a recipient of aid to a future contributor to regional stability.

Politically, the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) has become the principal platform for Allied consensus on the war and its resolution. Meeting at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers and prominently featured during the 2024 Washington Summit, the NUC has forged a shared commitment to a “just and lasting peace”—a diplomatic framework grounded in Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and post-war integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. While formal membership remains on hold pending the Alliance’s 75th Anniversary Summit, Ukraine’s political inclusion has intensified, symbolized by joint communiqués, expanded parliamentary engagement, and integration into NATO planning dialogues.

One of the most significant institutional innovations of 2024 was the launch of the Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland. JATEC institutionalizes the operational learning from Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression by integrating after-action reports and frontline tactics into NATO doctrinal development and Ukrainian force design. This facilitates doctrinal convergence and enhances NATO’s warfighting literacy based on real-world, high-intensity conflict.

Overall, NATO’s engagement with Ukraine in 2024 transcended traditional assistance. It crystallized into a model of comprehensive strategic integration: linking battlefield support with reform incentives, and embedding Ukraine’s defense into NATO’s broader effort to adapt for a more contested, multipolar security environment. In doing so, the Alliance reaffirmed not only its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty but also its own long-term relevance as a provider of collective security.

NATO–Moldova Cooperation

​In 2024, NATO and the Republic of Moldova marked a significant milestone, celebrating 30 years of partnership. This enduring relationship, rooted in Moldova’s accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, has evolved to encompass a broad spectrum of cooperative endeavors. The year witnessed intensified collaboration, reflecting both the deepening of existing ties and the adaptation to emerging security challenges in the region.​

Moldova’s engagement with NATO commenced in 1994 through the PfP program, laying the foundation for subsequent cooperative frameworks. In 2006, this relationship was further solidified with the adoption of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), facilitating structured political dialogue and practical cooperation. Over the years, initiatives such as the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative have been instrumental in aligning Moldova’s defense structures with NATO standards, enhancing interoperability and resilience.

The year 2024 was marked by a strategic intensification of NATO-Moldova relations. Recognizing the evolving security landscape, NATO endorsed an Enhanced DCB Package for Moldova, focusing on bolstering national resilience and civil preparedness. This package encompassed tailored support measures, including defense reform assistance, capacity building, and the provision of material aid.

A significant highlight was the joint visit of NATO legislators to Moldova, providing firsthand insights into the challenges faced by the country and reinforcing the alliance’s commitment to its partner.

Moldova’s active participation in NATO-led exercises underscores its commitment to enhancing operational readiness and interoperability. Notably, the Coherent Resilience 2024 Moldova Tabletop Exercise (CORE24-M) focused on strengthening the country’s resilience against hybrid threats targeting critical energy infrastructure. This exercise facilitated cooperation among Moldovan crisis response authorities, energy operators, and cyber defenders, ensuring preparedness against non-conventional security threats. ​

In the realm of defense education, the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) has been pivotal. Since 2009, DEEP has supported the professionalization of Moldova’s military education, aiding in curriculum development and faculty training. In 2024, significant progress was made in enhancing the skills of Moldovan instructors, aligning them with NATO best practices. ​

Furthermore, NATO’s support extended to the development of Moldova’s Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Corps, with reforms including the establishment of new ranks, payment systems, and multi-level education programs.

The evolving geopolitical dynamics present avenues for Moldova to deepen its engagement with NATO. Enhanced political dialogue, particularly in areas of shared interest such as cyber defense, countering disinformation, and energy security, can fortify mutual understanding and cooperation. Moreover, expanding capacity-building initiatives, including joint exercises and training programs, can further align Moldova’s defense capabilities with NATO standards.​

The establishment of the EU–Moldova Security and Defence Partnership in May 2024 also opens prospects for synergistic collaboration between NATO and the EU in supporting Moldova’s security sector reforms and resilience-building efforts.

Looking ahead, a structured roadmap focusing on the following areas can enhance NATO-Moldova cooperation:​

• Continued support for the modernization of Moldova’s defense institutions, emphasizing transparency, accountability, and efficiency.​
• Strengthening Moldova’s cyber defense capabilities through joint training, information sharing, and the development of robust cyber infrastructure.​
• Collaborative efforts to safeguard critical energy infrastructure against hybrid threats, building on the successes of exercises like CORE24-M.​
• Enhancing public awareness and support for NATO-Moldova cooperation through strategic communication and outreach programs.

Conclusion

In 2024, NATO significantly enhanced its deterrence and defense capabilities across all domains, reflecting a proactive response to evolving security challenges. The implementation of the NATO Force Model (NFM) replaced the NATO Response Force, tripling the number of high-readiness forces available to the Alliance. This restructuring aimed to improve rapid deployment and operational flexibility, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank. Exercises like Steadfast Defender 2024, involving over 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO Allies, demonstrated the Alliance’s ability to conduct sustained, multi-domain operations across vast distances, reinforcing its commitment to collective defense.

Moldova’s partnership with NATO has deepened amidst regional tensions and internal challenges. Celebrating 30 years in the Partnership for Peace program, Moldova has engaged in various initiatives to bolster its defense capabilities and resilience. The Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) has been instrumental in aligning Moldova’s military education with NATO standards. Joint exercises, such as the Coherent Resilience 2024 Moldova Tabletop Exercise (CORE24-M), have focused on enhancing the country’s preparedness against hybrid threats, particularly in the energy sector. Despite constitutional neutrality and resource constraints, Moldova continues to seek avenues for deeper cooperation within the existing framework.

Sources: Secretary General Annual Report, Reuters, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO, US Army War College, Atlantic Council, ecfr.eu