The Russian military announced that it has captured the city of Chasiv Yar, a major stronghold of the Ukrainian army in the Donetsk region, in eastern Ukraine. The city of Chasiv Yar, which has been at the center of fighting for months, “has been liberated by Russian forces,” the Russian Defense Ministry announced in a statement. The advance represents a significant progress for Moscow’s forces and could allow them to move towards a series of fortress cities in the Donetsk region, such as Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Russia, which launched a large-scale offensive in Ukraine in February 2022, continues to gain ground little by little, at a time when US President Donald Trump gave his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin a ten-day deadline starting Tuesday to end the conflict, otherwise risking sanctions.
Russian pressures
Russia has been ramping up its massive strikes on Ukraine for weeks, often involving hundreds of drones and missiles, according to Kyiv. Russian President Vladimir Putin is demanding that Kyiv hand over the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, which Russia has claimed since September 2022, in addition to the Crimean peninsula annexed in 2014. Moscow is also demanding that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO. These conditions are unacceptable to Ukrainian leaders and their Western allies. Ukraine, in turn, is demanding that the Russian military withdraw completely from its territory, which is occupied by about 20 percent.
At least six people were killed in Kyiv, including a child, and dozens were injured in a combined Russian missile and drone attack overnight, local officials said. President Volodymyr Zelensky posted a picture of burning ruins, saying there were still people trapped under the rubble of a residential building.
Russia, which denies targeting civilians, has stepped up its airstrikes on Ukrainian cities far from the front line in recent months. US President Donald Trump, showing frustration with his Russian counterpart, this week reduced a deadline for Vladimir Putin to make peace with Ukraine. “President Trump has been very generous and very patient with Putin, trying to find a solution. Putin is doing it deliberately,” Sîbiga also posted.
Crime and Punishment
A major in the Ukrainian air force spied on the locations and deployment plans of several Western-made aircraft for the benefit of Russia, the Ukrainian Intelligence Service (SBU) announced, quoted by the Kyiv media. The major collected data on F-16 and Mirage aircraft, as well as on the Ukrainian Su-24 model. The senior officer, who had worked as a pilot instructor in the Ukrainian air force, is suspected of helping Russia plan drone and missile attacks on air bases in Ukraine. He was arrested for treason. “Anyone who chooses the side of the occupiers will feel the righteous power of Ukrainian justice,” said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Ukraine, which has been fighting against the invading forces of Russia for almost three and a half years, has several dozen Western-made fighter jets. In the case of the American F-16 model, the purchase of 42 aircraft, most of which were delivered by the Netherlands, is publicly known. The F-16 aircraft is used less by Ukraine to carry out attacks, but is used extensively to intercept drones and missiles launched by the Russians.
The war against corruption
Ukraine will “correct” a law revoking the independence of anti-corruption bodies, a law that has sparked outrage among many of Kyiv’s allies and protests in the country, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybikha said. The legislation, adopted on July 22 and then signed into law, would place the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) under the direct authority of the prosecutor general, who is appointed by President Zelensky. The law sparked outrage in civil society and the first large-scale street protests in Kyiv since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. It also drew strong criticism from the European Union, which Ukraine aspires to join. President Volodymyr Zelensky eventually proposed a new bill restoring the independence of anti-corruption structures, which is expected to be put to a vote in parliament. “We are correcting this,” the Ukrainian foreign minister said Wednesday in a comment sent to AFP. “Ukraine has a strong civil society and active young people. They have expressed their opinions. The Ukrainian authorities have heard their voices, as well as those of our partners,” said Andrii Sîbiha. He estimated that “adjustments” were necessary to protect anti-corruption agencies from political games, especially those of “Russia”. “A balance had to be found between the risks to security and reform, and this has been done,” he said. Faced with the first serious political crisis since the beginning of his mandate six years ago, Zelensky initially tried to defend the bill by accusing the targeted structures of inefficiency and being under “Russian influence.” Finally, he announced that he was proposing another bill to ensure their “independence” from the authorities again.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently had a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, after which she claimed on her X social media account that Ukraine, a candidate country for EU membership, has ‘achieved a lot on its European path’. The discussion comes in the context of the adoption by the Kyiv parliament of a law that places the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) under the direct authority of the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by Zelensky. This law, promulgated by the president immediately after a quick vote in parliament, provoked negative reactions from the European Union, a key supporter of Ukraine in the war with Russia, and the first large-scale demonstrations since this war began in 2022.
Western opposition
Taken by surprise by these developments, President Zelensky, who initially invoked ‘Russian interference’ as an argument for limiting the independence of the two institutions that he accused of inefficiency, now seems to have taken a step back and proposed a new law, which he promised would ‘guarantee the independence of NABU and SAP’. In a post after Sunday’s discussion with the Ukrainian president, Von der Leyen also mentioned that Ukraine ‘must build on these solid principles and maintain the independence of anti-corruption bodies, which are fundamental to the rule of law’. ‘Ukraine can count on our support to achieve this,’ added the European Commission President, referring to the accession criteria required by the EU. According to diplomatic sources, in this telephone conversation, Von der Leyen and Zelensky agreed that the new law proposed by the latter should be ‘adopted without delay, even next week’. According to the same sources, Von der Leyen also stressed that, once these legislative changes are made, Ukraine will make progress on the ‘relevant indicators’ that will allow it to receive new funds from the Mechanism for Ukraine. This mechanism, also called the Facility for Ukraine, is a fund established at the end of 2023 by EU states to provide financial assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia and which is provided with funding of 50 billion euros for the period 2024-2027. The European Commission has called for the allocation of another hundred billion euros to this fund, in its proposal for the EU’s multiannual budget for the period 2028-2035. The Ukrainian president also had a telephone conversation with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, in which they ‘reaffirmed the importance of the fight against corruption, carried out by independent and fully effective institutions’, according to a message from the French president. ‘We shared the conviction that what distinguishes it from Russia today is the fact that Ukraine remains, despite the war, a vibrant democracy and that it wants to continue progressing on its European path,’ Macron said. “I reaffirmed France’s support: we will continue to increase aid to Ukraine and pressure on Russia. It must finally accept a ceasefire that opens the way to talks for a solid and lasting peace, with the participation of Europeans,” the French president indicated.
Russian defiance
The Kremlin has been unimpressed by US President Donald Trump’s 10-day ultimatum to Russia to end the war in Ukraine or face new sanctions, with the Russian presidency saying the sanctions already imposed on Russia have helped it gain ‘a certain immunity’ to such measures. ‘We have been living under a huge number of sanctions for quite some time, our economy is operating under a huge number of restrictions,’ Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters. ‘Therefore, we have already developed a certain immunity in this regard and we continue to take note of all statements coming from President Trump, from other international representatives on this issue,’ added President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman. The latter has not yet commented on the ultimatum sent by her American counterpart. A comment came instead from the President of the Russian Senate, Valentina Matvienko, who warned that ultimatums ‘are not a very effective method of resolving conflicts’ and stressed that ‘we should address an ultimatum to the Ukrainian side, since they are the ones who are torpedoing the peace negotiations’. Donald Trump said on Tuesday that he was giving Putin a ten-day deadline to stop the war in Ukraine, thus shortening the 50-day ultimatum announced on July 14, and threatened Russia that, if it does not conclude a ceasefire agreement with Ukraine by August 8, it will be subject to new American sanctions and, in addition, the US will impose secondary customs duties on Russian oil imports. This ultimatum from the American president came two days after the meeting he had in Scotland with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, a meeting that materialized in an understanding regarding the framework of a trade agreement between the US and the EU, rather advantageous for the US.
Harsh measures
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed into law a law passed by the parliament in Kyiv this month that allows people over 60 to be drafted into the army, a measure aimed at mobilizing all possible human resources for the war effort. Ukrainian law previously did not allow military service for people over 60, although special permits were granted in some cases. Under the new law, those who wish to serve in the army can do so if they pass a medical examination and the commander of the unit to which they are assigned gives written consent for their integration into the unit. After signing a contract with the army, servicemen over 60 will have to go through a two-month probationary period. Their contracts will be terminated if they fail to prove they are fit for military service. Under martial law, imposed at the start of the Russian invasion, men aged 18 to 60 eligible for military service are banned from leaving Ukraine. Those over 25 can be drafted, so some are avoiding leaving their homes to avoid encountering military recruitment patrols. For those between the ages of 18 and 25, mandatory mobilization has not been decreed, but volunteers can join the army. The war launched by Russia in February 2022 through the invasion of Ukraine has the characteristics of a bloody conflict of attrition, in which both sides suffer great human losses that are difficult to replace. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the mobilization of about 300,000 reservists in September of the same year, but has not decreed any new mobilization since then, as that caused the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians who left their country for fear that they might be sent to the front. He claims that the number of those who volunteer and sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense would be sufficient to support the Russian army. In Ukraine, the first months of the war were marked by a patriotic fervor, with numerous volunteers joining the ranks of the Ukrainian army, but then Kyiv was forced to rely on compulsory mobilization, an unpopular measure that led to numerous attempts to flee the country, corruption of those responsible, desertions, and forced recruitment actions in which recruiting officers resorted to brutal methods.
US-UK axis
US President Donald Trump spoke warmly on Monday about the ‘special relationship’ with Britain, with words of praise for Prime Minister Keir Starmer, King Charles and Scotland, the leader’s home country. In a press conference alongside British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the American billionaire’s Turnberry golf club on the west coast of Scotland, the pair fielded questions from the media for more than an hour, taking a quick tour of global affairs, from setting a new deadline for Russia to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine to announcing food centers to alleviate hunger in Gaza. Among the compliments, Trump did not miss the opportunity to also launch warnings to Starmer on energy policy, immigration and taxes, as well as a direct attack on London Mayor Sadiq Khan, Starmer’s political ally. ‘The prime minister has been so supportive of us, he has been so strong and respected, and I respect him much more today than I did before, because I just met his wife and family. He has a perfect wife, and that’s never easy to get,” Trump said. Starmer, who spoke for only a small part of the 72 minutes the two spent in front of the world’s media, generously responded to the compliments in this new chapter of the friendship that seems to be blossoming between the two leaders, who come from opposite sides of the political spectrum. “It’s fantastic to be here – thank you for the hospitality – and to see this amazing golf course. I’ll invite you to a football pitch at some point and we can exchange sporting experiences,” Starmer joked. Keir Starmer listened to Donald Trump talk about reducing immigration, an area in which, according to the public perception, the British leader is failing, Reuters notes. Trump has stressed that this policy was essential to his victory in the 2024 US elections, along with his promises to cut taxes and stimulate the economy. Starmer’s government, just a year after winning a landslide victory, is facing a fiscal crisis caused by a stagnant economy, and many analysts expect tax increases later this year to cover the deficit. On energy, the two talked about the potential of small nuclear reactors, but they expressed opposing positions on other energy sources. Trump gently urged Starmer to exploit more of Britain’s oil and gas resources and renewed his criticism of the offshore wind turbines that dot the coast near his golf course and are a key part of Starmer’s plans for a carbon-free energy system. Putting aside their differences of opinion, the two expressed enthusiasm for Trump’s upcoming visit in September,when the White House leader will be hosted by King Charles for a state visit. “I hate to say it, but nobody knows more about pomp and ceremony than you,” Trump said. “I’m a big fan of King Charles. I’ve known him for a while. A great guy, a great person,” he insisted. Trump, who accepted an invitation during Starmer’s visit to the White House in February, will become the first world leader in modern times to make two state visits to the UK. “It will be a historic occasion and we’re all looking forward to it,” Starmer said.
Anti-Russian agreement?
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Monday that the trade deal reached between the United States and the European Union was “anti-Russian,” comparing it to a de facto ban on the purchase of Russian oil and gas. The United States recently reached a deal with Brussels that imposes 15 percent tariffs on most EU imports. In a subsequent statement, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the deal would help the EU completely abandon fossil fuels from Russia in favor of American alternatives. “Purchases of energy products from the United States will diversify our sources of supply and contribute to Europe’s energy security. We will replace Russian gas and oil with significant purchases of LNG, oil and nuclear fuel from the United States,” the European Commission chief said. Russia has repeatedly pointed out that American LNG is much more expensive than Russian. The EU, which imposed massive sanctions against Moscow over its war in Ukraine, has been trying for some time to buy less Russian hydrocarbons. According to Medvedev, Trump has ‘wiped the floor’ with the EU, but the agreement is not good for Russia either. ‘Of course, the ‘agreement’ is clearly anti-Russian in nature, prohibiting the purchase of our oil and gas,’ the former president wrote on Telegram. He predicted that for the EU and its citizens, the consequences will be disastrous, because they will have to pay more for energy. ‘We can only feel sorry for ordinary Europeans,’ Medvedev added.
Unchanged conditions
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently praised US President Donald Trump’s pragmatism on Ukraine, but insisted on Moscow’s conditions for ending the war, in particular recognition of the annexed territories and Kyiv’s non-admission to NATO, while he said of Europe that it had “gone crazy”. “President Trump is a pragmatic leader, he does not want any war and, unlike his predecessor in office (Joe) Biden, unlike the current European elites, he is open to dialogue,” Lavrov said in a speech at a youth forum in Solnechnogorsk, a satellite city of Moscow, located northwest of the Russian capital. The current dialogue between Moscow and Washington “shows that there are still reasonable people in the West,” the Russian minister said, adding that “these people enjoy considerable (popular) support, which is demonstrated by developments in the United States.” Lavrov claims that Russia “has always advocated dialogue, even in the most difficult times more difficult’, recalling that the dialogue between Moscow and the West was not interrupted even during the Cold War. ‘It seems very important to me to emphasize today that during the Cold War there was mutual respect. Now this no longer exists. Europe has simply gone crazy, I cannot say otherwise,’ said the Russian foreign minister. Such a position carries the risk of ‘a big war’ for Europe, the head of Russian diplomacy also warned, according to which even during the existence of the USSR ‘dialogue was developing and allowed the opposing camps to better understand each other’s intentions. ‘This instinct has been lost in Europe,’ Lavrov believes, quoted by The Moscow Times. In his opinion, this is largely related to the struggle of European elites to maintain their power, for which they do not hesitate to spend ‘hundreds of billions of euros’ to kill Russian soldiers and ‘promote attacks on journalists, energy facilities and critical infrastructure’. ‘Europe is doing all this with one goal, which is to use Ukrainians as cannon fodder so that Russia is no longer a competitor,’ the Russian minister said. At the same time, Lavrov insisted on what Moscow considers to be ‘legitimate demands’ regarding ensuring its security, in particular ‘Ukraine’s non-admission to NATO and no expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance in general’. ‘And, of course, the recognition of the realities established in our Constitution,’ the Russian minister added, referring to Russia’s sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula and the four Ukrainian regions annexed in 2022 (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia), noting that this is ‘a condition that admits no alternative’.
Historical fairy tales
In his speech, Lavrov lamented the fact that, for the first time in its history, Russia is fighting a war without any allies, according to The Moscow Times. This is despite Moscow benefiting directly from the support of North Korea, which, in addition to weapons and ammunition, also sent thousands of soldiers with the help of which it expelled Ukrainian forces from the Russian Kursk region, and currently various Russian officials claim that North Korean soldiers will also fight in the Donbas (eastern Ukraine). In addition, even if not directly, Russia is being helped in this war by China and Iran, the three countries being its main allies. ‘Russia is fighting alone against the entire West. In World War I, in World War II, we had allies. Now we no longer have allies on the battlefield. Therefore, we have to rely on ourselves. “We must not allow any weakness or negligence,” Lavrov told the young people gathered at the Solnechnogorsk forum. Regarding US President Donald Trump, who allegedly promised the Kremlin “a generous deal” including the easing of sanctions and the recognition of the annexation of Crimea, the Russian foreign minister said that the leader in the White House is acting guided by “common sense,” according to The Moscow Times. Trump’s intention to “cede” several Ukrainian regions to Russian President Vladimir Putin was also mentioned by Austrian Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger in an interview given to several international media outlets late last week, according to the Ukrainian news agency Ukrainski Nationalni Novini (UNN). As part of his “initial peace plan,” the US president proposed that “several regions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea” be ceded to Russia. At the same time, Trump made it clear to Putin that Ukraine “has no business” in NATO. However, despite all these proposals, Putin continues the war, Meinl-Reisinger stressed in the interview published on Saturday by Bild and taken over by the UNN news agency. Kyiv has long sought peace, but the Kremlin wants to continue military actions. If Putin really wanted to end this war, he would have sat down at the negotiating table long ago, the head of Austrian diplomacy said, according to quoted media.
Since 2022, the Republic of Moldova has been going through the most intense campaign to influence the will of the electorate externally since the proclamation of the former Soviet republic’s independence. Recently, President Maia Sandu pledged to bring the Republic of Moldova into the European Union within the next four years. “It will not be easy, but it will not be impossible,” declared Maia Sandu. “That is why we must continue to work day and night to join the EU as soon as possible. Not in 10-20 years, but in the next 4 years,” she said. As expected, these statements were harshly criticized by pro-Russian political forces.
Clear threats
The President of the Republic of Moldova stated that the Republic of Moldova has already obtained the status of a candidate state and has initiated accession negotiations, something that some considered impossible five years ago. Maia Sandu criticized and preached attempts at internal destabilization, noting that some forces in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova are trying to undermine the state. She emphasized that these actions endanger the country’s security and the EU accession process.
The public report presented by the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) on March 5, 2024 – completed in November 2024 and reconfirmed in March 2025 – demonstrates that the Russian Federation (RF) has moved from occasional propaganda tactics to a large-scale hybrid war, aimed at compromising the European vector and installing a government loyal to the Kremlin in Chisinau.
In the winter of 2022, less than a year after the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin recalibrated its policy towards the former Soviet space. The opportunity arose through simultaneous crises – energy, economic and security. According to SIS, the first clear sign of escalation was the Russian plan for a “rebellion” on the territory of Gagauzia, aimed at forcing Chisinau to abandon pro-EU reforms. In parallel, the network of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor – already definitively sentenced to 15 years for “bank fraud” – became the spearhead of Russian political operations.
The year 2023 brings the first extremely clear public evidence, of course contested by those targeted. The investigation Ilan Shor’s Courier in Moscow published by RISE Moldova shows how paid messengers transported cash from the Russian Federation to Chisinau, avoiding the official banking system. In November 2024, SIS publishes the Report on the complex operation “UTA Gagauzia”, identifying the “Victory bloc” – a political platform without legal personality registered in Moscow, but coordinated in the Republic of Moldova through four front parties (Sansa, Renaștere, Forța Alternativa, Victory). The 2024-2025 five-year term becomes a “total electoral year” (presidential, referendum, parliamentary), and the RF allocates increased resources: clandestine financing, religious soft-power, digital call-centers and paramilitary training camps.
Paramilitary training and black money
In July 2024, according to SIS, a training ground was organized on the outskirts of Moscow where 115 young Moldovans learned techniques for penetrating police cordons, urban combat tactics, and the use of pyrotechnic devices. A few months later, the headquarters of the CEC, TRM, and the Government became targets of vandalism with paint – incidents confirmed by the General Inspectorate of Police. The campaign culminated in October 2024, when, at the request of SIS, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrested a Russian instructor suspected of training “urban guerrilla groups.”
The SIS report describes an impressive pyramid scheme: coordinating staff (Moscow) → executive staff (Chisinau) → 119 territorial cells → 1,900 primary cells → 33,000 activists → 84,000 targeted sympathizers. The activist receives 2,000 lei monthly, respectively 3,000 lei in October of the campaign – an amount confirmed by video interceptions presented by Ziarul de Garda, and also taken over by international media. The objective of each activist: “recruit 5-10 voters for payment”.
In April 2024, the Russian NGO EVRAZIA was born, registered in Moscow by the former accountant of the Shor Party, Nelli Parutenco. The board of directors includes deputies of the “United Rossiya” party – additional evidence that the initiative belongs to the Russian ruling elite. EVRAZIA becomes the financial-logistical hub, being financed through fictitious grants, “employment” contracts and MIR cards issued by the sanctioned bank Promsvyazbank. The “Get to Know Russia” excursions, “Land of Childhood” camps or “Eurasia – Continent of Opportunities” seminars were used for cover;
Ziarul de Garda published in October 2024 images of Marina Tauber explaining to activists when the “Moscow salaries” would be resumed. Anticorruption prosecutors later confirmed that 3 million lei in cash was seized after 30 simultaneous searches. In addition, StopFals and MediaGuard investigations identify over 160 local Telegram channels running identical narratives, from “Western colonization” to “obligatory LGBT education,” all citing Ilan Shor’s personal account.
The war for the soul of the Republic of Moldova
A few weeks ago, the Sensika platform, which specializes in global media monitoring and analysis, published its first report on strategic cyber threats. Titled CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory, the document analyzed 643,601 articles from 45 countries, published between December 2024 and March 2025. The findings provide a broad look at a vast Russian disinformation campaign that is trying to adapt after several Russian news portals and TV channels were blocked in several European countries.
At the center of the report is the “Pravda” network – a new media entity that emerged amid the disappearance of Russia Today and Sputnik from the European space, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By the beginning of 2025, “Pravda” had transformed into a true global propaganda ecosystem: approximately 190 sites and over 140 subdomains broadcast content in 83 countries, in multiple languages - including regional idioms, such as Catalan or Basque.
According to an investigation by DFRLab, the operation is being led by TigerWeb, an IT company in Crimea with direct ties to the Russian occupation administration and Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. The content promoted by “Pravda” is mainly taken from Russian sources and Telegram channels that spread unverified and manipulative content. The report shows that this ecosystem disseminates news adjusted with “surgical precision” to suit the specifics of each country.
The document published by Sensika indicates three main regions targeted by disinformation campaigns: the former Soviet space, the Balkans and Central Europe. The preferred targets appear to be states with significant Russian-speaking communities, countries with Euro-Atlantic aspirations and democracies in transition or less consolidated.
There is also a strong disproportionality in the volume of content broadcast and the share of the population. For example, in the former Soviet Union countries – Moldova, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Lithuania, Georgia and Ukraine – which account for only 5.8% of the total population covered, 35.8% of the content is allocated to them. In contrast, the countries of Western Europe, which cover 43.7% of the population, are allocated only 21.3% of the content published by “Pravda”. Just over 16% of all publications are directed at the Balkan states, where 3.2% of the targeted population is located.
Repetitive propaganda
The SIS report, cited above, shows how, after the suspension of licenses for seven Russian re-transmitting TV stations, the information front is moving to Telegram, TikTok and Facebook. The MediaGuard analysis (July 2024) finds that “Telegram and TikTok have become the main propaganda tools”, generating millions of views per week. The SIS report corroborates: 160 Telegram channels, 90 TikTok, 70 Facebook groups, 43 VKontakte bot-farms.
Paid campaigns on Meta use dozens of anonymous pages – Moldova Culturală Plus, Valorile Moldovenești, etc. – with budgets of over 138,000 euros in 2024. The recurring narratives used are already known: “Europe takes your children and forces you to be LGBT”; “The government brings war through military cooperation with NATO”; “Șor pays pensions and low tariffs – proof that Moscow’s money helps ordinary people”.
Between August and September 2024, several hundred priests and parishioners of the Moldovan Metropolis (subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate) receive invitations to “pilgrimages” to Russia. Upon their return, SIS documents contracts signed with EVRAZIA for MIR cards and payments of $1,000/priest. The clergy are instructed to collect signatures against the EU referendum and to broadcast anti-Western sermons. In October, Dmitri Chistilin – a Russian-Ukrainian double agent – is declared undesirable after proving to be a “point of contact” between EVRAZIA and the clergy.
Hybrid attack
On the day of the first round of the presidential elections (October 20, 2024), the CEC web infrastructure and the alegeri.md portal suffer three waves of DDoS attacks, mostly originating from Russian IPs masked by VPN. STISC quickly implements geofencing; however, the update of voter turnout is delayed by almost an hour, fueling online conspiracies about “voting fraud.”
At the same time, Russia Today sends reporter Konstantin Pridybaylo to the Moscow polling station, who makes live broadcasts on Telegram that are instantly picked up by RT, amplifying the narrative of the “persecuted Russian-speaking diaspora.” SIS notes that a few minutes later, anonymous local channels were replicating the same frames and subtitles, a sign that they had received a video feed as a package.
The most serious argument in the report remains the “hard” component. Between June 19-24, 2024, 115 young Moldovans participated in a training course coordinated by the youth organization of “Edinaia Rossia” (Molodaia Gvardia). The lessons included: tactics for “disarming” law enforcement; using spray paint as a weapon of blindness; releasing detained accomplices; urban sabotage with stones, eggs, and paint balloons.
On September 22, several institutions in Chisinau (Public Television, SCJ, CEC) were vandalized exactly according to the script. Two of the detained persons admitted that they were paid 5,000 euros for “image operations”. In parallel, a small group was sent to a camp in Bosnia, where instructor Konstantin Goloskokov (known for his connections with Wagner) teaches “psychology of protest masses” and “drone operators”. According to the BiH MIA, a Russian citizen Alexandr Bezrukovni was arrested for paramilitary activity – confirming the SIS conclusions.
Financial assault
The key to any interference remains, of course, financing. In 2024, SIS identified four major channels: cash carriers on FR → KIV flights; Promsvyazbank & MIR cards – accounts opened remotely using stolen data; P2P transfers from Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) with cash-out in RM; crypto: USDT runs on Bybit/Binance, conversion to local “providers” who exchange USDT for lei on the black market (5-7% commission).
The police and PCCOCS organized over 100 searches in October 2024: district leaders, currency exchanges, shell companies; 3 million lei and hundreds of bank cards were seized. The mechanism of “youth grants” actually masked electoral payments to the target electorate. SIS warns that the network recruits students to open accounts, in exchange for 1,000 lei and 30% of the amount for each cash “outtake”. Such networks have eroded the Moldovan AML system, and the National Bank of the Republic of Moldova has summoned bankers to block cards with suspicious patterns.
Media surveys
In May 2023, RISE Moldova (May 2023) demonstrated how Ilan Shor’s couriers transport financial resources from Moscow. The investigation follows two intermediaries who transport, monthly, 300,000 USD in double envelopes, hidden among religious souvenirs. Reporters film the moment when the money is picked up at Sheremetyevo Airport and delivered to an apartment in the Rîșcani sector.
Ziarul de Garda published the investigation under the name Inside the Pyramid between August and October 2024. Three months of hidden camera footage shows how activists make voter lists, promise 3,000 lei/month “until the vote” and deliver motivational video clips received on Telegram from “sponsors in Moscow”.
Unimedia published in March 2024 an interview with the head of the SIS in Chisinau, Alexandru Musteață, who mentioned “Telegram and TikTok are the main tools; plans for aggressive protests in March and the reactivation of the separatist vector in Gagauzia”.
These investigations confirm the SIS claims and provide narrative details missing from the classified documents: names of intermediaries, transport routes, screenshots, audio files. The synergy between the press and state institutions increased public pressure and legitimized the countermeasures.
In the Parliament session of April 17, 2025, President Maia Sandu articulated, for 35 minutes, the firmest position since her inauguration. “The hybrid attack on the Republic of Moldova is not just a political challenge, but a direct danger to our democracy. We will not give in to blackmail, manipulation or dirty money. Our country will freely decide whether to go towards Europe,” she declared.
It identifies five directions of action: (1) tougher laws against external party financing; (2) strengthening SIS and STISC; (3) strategic partnership with the EU for cybersecurity; (4) depoliticization of the Church; (5) media education on a national scale.
Although the pro-Russian opposition left the room, the speech had a galvanizing effect: referendum volunteers registered on the Votez UE platform within 24 hours, and the president’s trust rating rose to 54% (IRI poll, May 2025).
Institutional response
Internally, SIS reported that 147 information notes were sent to the Prosecutor’s Office, IGP, CEC, NBM. Key results achieved include blocking web access to Promsvyazbank; freezing hundreds of accounts linked to MIR cards; revoking the accreditation of 8 OSCE observers with GRU links; closing dozens of anonymous pages on the Facebook network (collaboration with Meta);
Externally, Chisinau has requested assistance from EPPO and EUROPOL to track the funds. France has provided data on payments to front NGOs, and Lithuania has confirmed the “Trustee Plus UAB” license used to issue virtual Visa cards.
On the cyber dimension, STISC launched the Cyber-Shield MD program with EU4Digital funding. Measures: DNS firewall, sharing of indicators with CERT-EU, joint exercise with SANS-Institute – training 150 Moldovan specialists.
Impact and scenarios
Legitimacy of the electoral process – the IDIS survey shows that 61% of respondents believe that “dirty money” can change the outcome of the vote. Social polarization is a permanent danger, and pro-Russian identity narratives manage to secure 30% of the electorate, especially in Gagauzia, Taraclia, and the municipalities of Balti and Tiraspol for the Russian Federation and its representatives in politics in Chisinau.
According to one scenario considered by experts, the resilience of Moldovan institutions will increase. The government could adopt an anti-oligarch law, the CEC introduces real-time reporting of funding, the NBM finalizes the register of accounts. The impact would be profound, with the Russian Federation forced to reduce its spending.
Another scenario analyzed by experts assumes the rapid adaptation of the Russian Federation, with Moscow moving to an intensive system of crypto micro-payments and the use of deepfakes strategies with generative AI, and the Telegram network would become even more opaque to authorities in different states.
A more violent scenario, analyzed by officials and experts, assumes an escalation of violence, with paramilitary networks taking action in Chisinau and other major cities in the Republic of Moldova, attempting to occupy the Parliament and other public institutions on the night of the announcement of the referendum results.
The Russian Federation’s interference in the Moldovan elections is not an isolated episode, but a multi-year, multi-sectoral campaign, combining money, religion, media and brute force. The SIS report – corroborated with the investigations of RISE, Ziarul de Garda, StopFals, Unimedia and with the warnings of President Maia Sandu – demonstrates that democracy can be eroded without tanks, only through “cash, click & chaos”. However, the coordinated response of Moldovan institutions, EU support and the mobilization of civil society have shown that resilience is possible.
The challenge for 2025-2026 will be to transform these defensive measures into permanent policies: full transparency of financing, media culture, cybersecurity and independent justice. Only in this way can the Republic of Moldova protect its European option – not by banning ideas, but by immunizing society against lies and poisoned money. As Maia Sandu said at the Parliament rostrum, “Moldova is no longer alone”. But external solidarity must be doubled by internal responsibility. Hybrid war is not won in the trenches, but in the mind and wallet of every citizen.
Effects of war
The President acknowledged that the Moldovan economy is affected by the war in Ukraine and global instability. She stressed that access to the European Union market and pre-accession funds are important advantages for Moldova. “Moldova’s exports to the European Union represent 67% of the total. Unlike other small countries, we have this guarantee – that despite all the trade wars, we can benefit from free access to the European Union market,” she said. Maia Sandu promised to continue investing in education, innovation and agriculture to increase the country’s competitiveness. She noted that Moldova will start benefiting from pre-accession funds, and the Growth Plan for Moldova, which involves 1.9 billion euros in support from the European Union, is just the beginning.
In her recent speech, the President of the Republic of Moldova also addressed the reform of the judiciary, acknowledging that this is a major challenge. She stressed that although progress has been made, much remains to be done to ensure an independent and fair judiciary. “There are no magic solutions to fix a long-defective judiciary, you cannot do it in a day or a year. But there are actions that can get us there,” she said. Maia Sandu noted that, in the last four years, 140 judges have left the judicial system, and the cleaning of the system continues. She promised to continue the fight against corruption and asked citizens to decide whether they want to continue on this path or return to old practices. Concluding her speech, Maia Sandu conveyed a message of hope, emphasizing that Moldova has real reasons for hope and that, together, they can build a protected, wealthy and joyful country. “We have peace, we have friends, we are on the European path. Moldova has the chance to grow and offer its citizens a dignified life,” she concluded.
Orthodox Phalanx
The role of the Orthodox Church of Moldova (directly subordinate to the Russian Patriarchate) in the mechanism of Russian influence is extremely important. The Metropolitanate of Chisinau and All Moldova (MCÎM), led by Metropolitan Vladimir (Cantarean), controls approximately 85% of the parishes in the former Soviet republic, as well as all of the historical monasteries.
The Moscow Patriarchate treats the MCIM as a canonical outpost in the post-Soviet space. Key themes of Russian propaganda appear in sermons and church media: “traditional values threatened by the West”, “European Union imposes ‘LGBT ideology’”, “Moldova’s neutrality is sacred”. The messages are reposted by Telegram channels affiliated with the “Victory” bloc, counting on the social authority of the clergy. MediaGuard analysis from 2024 shows that quotes from sermons reached, on average, 600,000 views per week on Telegram.
The pilgrimages funded by the Russian Patriarchate, organized between July and September 2024, involved nearly 500 Moldovan priests and parishioners, who were transported to Moscow free of charge to receive “spiritual support”, but unofficially training sessions were organized on the “dangers of EU accession”.
Contracts with the Russian NGO “EVRAZIA” are extensive and frequent. The press from the Republic of Moldova published the model contract signed in Moscow: the clergy received MIR cards issued by the sanctioned bank Promsvyazbank and an allowance of 1,000 USD, with the obligation to “support EVRAZIA projects in the Republic of Moldova.”
As part of the electoral mobilization process and against the referendum for European integration, MCÎM clergy were asked to collect signatures against the EU accession referendum (during March-August 2024), to promote pre-packaged messages in liturgies and at religious events (e.g.: “Way of the Cross / Peace March” in September 2024) or to broadcast live from in front of polling stations in European states, where there is a diaspora originating from the Republic of Moldova, actions of an anti-European propagandistic nature.
Subversive actions
The MCÎM manages over 1,200 parishes, monasteries, dozens of theological schools and a network of social NGOs, partially financed by grants coming through the Department of External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, but also from European organizations, the funds being used for purposes other than those declared.
According to officials of the security services of the Republic of Moldova, several dozen information notes dedicated to “exploiting the ecclesiastical factor” were sent to the Government and Parliament in Chisinau in 2024.
On October 14, 2024, the EU Council added EURASIA to the list of entities sanctioned for “destabilizing actions in the Republic of Moldova”, a measure reflected by the media in the former Soviet republic.
After Maia Sandu’s speech on April 17, 2025, the Government put into consultation a draft law that prohibits external financing of religious groups for political purposes and fines the involvement of clergy in electoral campaigns.
The Russian Church in Moldova functions as a “platform of moral legitimacy” for the Kremlin’s narratives. Access to rural communities, spiritual authority, and social-care network make the MCIM a multiplier of political messages that is difficult to counter with purely secular tools. In 2024, its involvement became more professional: written contracts, bank cards, communication “manuals” received on Telegram – a sign that Russian actors consider the religious vector essential in the electoral equation.
At the same time, internal resistance – priests leaving Moscow’s jurisdiction – shows that the MCÎM is not monolithic, although the process is still slowed down.
Gagauzia and Taraclia
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in September 2025, Gagauzia and Taraclia have become the most visible pieces of the mechanism through which the Russian Federation is trying to maintain its political influence in the Republic of Moldova. Both regions, with distinct ethnic identities and traditionally skeptical of Chisinau’s pro-European orientation, are today connected to Moscow not only through cultural affinities, but also through a financial and logistical architecture that transforms them into true controlled voting basins.
The first step was to seize local and regional leadership positions. With the election of Evghenia Guțul as the Bashkan of Gagauzia in the 2023 elections, the network of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor found the ideal partner to establish a Russian-sponsored “social model” in Comrat. In April 2024, Guțul signed an agreement in Moscow with the state-owned bank Promsvyazbank and the NGO “Evrazia”, which is on the list of entities sanctioned by the EU for hybrid interference; the document paved the way for monthly payments of 2,000 Moldovan lei for about a quarter of Gagauzia’s population, money officially presented as “philanthropic donations”.
At the same time, ten Russian regions – from St. Petersburg to Tatarstan – have already concluded “interregional cooperation” protocols with the Gagauz autonomy, consolidating a parallel network of influence that bypasses the central government.
The scheme was replicated in 2024 in Taraclia, the compact Bulgarian district in the south, where Mayor Veaceslav Lupov facilitated the expansion of the “Eurasia program” to local pensioners and civil servants. Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War note that the payments, of about $100 per month, target up to 20 percent of each region’s population and create an economic dependency directly managed by Moscow.
Money for protests
Through MIR cards issued by Promsvyazbank, beneficiaries are registered in a unified database, which allows for their rapid mobilization for voting or protests, according to the scenarios described by the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova.
This social-financial mechanism is accompanied by a campaign of political legitimacy. In February 2024, a “congress of deputies” in Tiraspol officially asked for Russia’s help against “pressure from Chisinau and NATO.” The message was repeated almost identically in Comrat by the “Victory” group, Shor’s electoral vehicle, underlining the narrative that the southern regions could become, if necessary, hotbeds of contesting the election results.
On local social networks, television stations in Gagauzia and Taraclia broadcast talk shows sponsored by the Shor Foundation, where the 2025 elections are presented as a “last chance” to block EU accession.
According to the SIS report, ATMs in Bender and Ribnita, where MIR cards work unhindered, are being used to withdraw cash intended for paid activists. In Taraclia, agro-industrial halls are being transformed into warehouses for electoral materials imported from the Giurgiulesti–Vulcănești route. From here, minibuses with Gagauzian license plates deliver posters, banners and T-shirts to the central districts of the country, avoiding the control filters around Chisinau.
Just a few months before the official start of the parliamentary campaign, Chisinau is trying to break this cycle. In March 2025, Bashkana Evghenia Guțul was detained at Chisinau Airport by anti-corruption prosecutors, on charges of illegal financing of the “Victory” campaign.
Harsh reaction
The Kremlin’s reaction – which condemned the arrest as “political repression” – shows the importance of the Gagauz leader’s figure for Russian plans. Meanwhile, the National Bank froze 180 MIR cards issued in the names of residents of Gagauzia and Taraclia, and the EU extended the sanctions regime to the Evrazia structure and other local officials involved.
However, the social effects of the “Russian salary” are already being felt. In Gagauz villages, anti-European discourse is intertwined with the fear that “Brussels will stop Moscow’s money,” and in Taraclia, propaganda exploits the cultural connection with Bulgaria to insinuate that the EU will impose the union of Moldova with Romania. In these conditions, electoral experts warn that every vote obtained through economic loyalty could be converted into essential parliamentary mandates for a new pro-Russian majority in 2025.
The Gagauzia and Taraclia regions are complementary tools for the Russian Federation’s strategy: testing grounds for electoral-based “social assistance,” logistical corridors for opaque financing, and reservoirs of identity narratives designed to fracture the electorate. The success or failure of this tactic will depend on how quickly Chisinau, supported by its European partners, manages to break the circle of money coming through Promsvyazbank, offer credible economic alternatives, and impose absolute transparency on local campaign financing. The 2025 elections will not only be a test for Moldovan democracy, but also a silent referendum on the EU’s ability to counter, in real time, a hybrid influence model calibrated specifically for the vulnerable terrain of Moldova’s southern regions.
Transnistria Redoubt
This fall, on September 28, the Republic of Moldova will elect its future parliament under the pressure of the most sophisticated arsenal of influence that the Kremlin has ever mobilized in the Dniester. The political campaign has already begun in the laboratories of Tiraspol, where the separatist regime is preparing the electorate to become, once again, the maneuvering table for Russian interests.
The political signal was given as early as February 28, 2024, when the so-called “congress of deputies of all levels” of Transnistria officially asked the State Duma in Moscow for “protective measures” against Chisinau. The declaration, identical in tone to the annexation demands from the Ukrainian Donbas, was designed to legitimize possible interventions under the pretext of defending “Russian compatriots.”
Since then, the officials of the occupation regime in Tiraspol have not even tried to hide their intentions or the prepared scenario. If the pro-European forces remain in power after the elections, the region could demand recognition from Moscow, thus blocking the European path of the entire country, the media believe.
There are also means of military pressure, accessible to Tiraspol or Moscow. On the left bank of the Dniester River, there are approximately 1,500 soldiers from the Russian Task Force (GOTR), formally assigned to a “peacekeeping mission”. Although the contingent is aging and official rotations have been practically impossible since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the presence of the Russian flag on the Cobasna depot, where about 20,000 tons of Soviet ammunition are located, remains a factor of strategic intimidation. Kiev periodically reminds that the depot can be exploited as a pretext for a false flag operation or as a direct threat to the energy security of the region. The vast majority of soldiers in this occupation contingent are recruited locally, from among citizens of the Republic of Moldova.
Electoral phalanx
In March 2025, the GOTR and the Transnistrian militia organized a “repulsion of Ukrainian saboteurs” exercise, broadcast live on local television. The main message was that the troops in the region “are ready to intervene in the event of election-related unrest in Chisinau.”
The manipulation of the Transnistrian electorate, however, has a numerical stake as important as the military factor. Approximately 220,000 Moldovan citizens residing in the region have valid documents and, in previous elections, were transported to the right bank of the Dniester in an organized manner, in buses paid for by foundations close to Moscow. Investigations published in March 2025 show that in the presidential elections and the EU referendum in 2024, over 35 million euros were spent on buying votes, part of which came through Promsvyazbank and ATMs in Bender.
For September 2025, the same financial infrastructure is already recalibrated: MIR cards continue to be funded, and “electoral stipends” vary between 50 and 80 euros per voter, according to an SIS note quoted by the Chisinau press.
The energy crisis that began on January 1, 2025, when the flow of Russian gas through Ukraine was stopped, provided the Tiraspol regime with another weapon against Chisinau. Over 50,000 households were left without heat, and the Transnistrian authorities accused the Moldovan government of “economic sabotage,” although the problem was Gazprom’s refusal to find alternative routes. Chisinau offered humanitarian aid and energy from Romania, a proposal that Tiraspol rejected in order to maintain the narrative of a “Western siege.” In parallel, separatist leaders promised that “Russia will not allow Moldova to freeze Transnistria,” reviving the theme of Russian military protection for the region.
The propaganda war
Propaganda is making its way into the landscape with equal intensity. The public broadcaster in Tiraspol rebroadcasts daily talk shows on Rossiya-1 and TV Zvezda, and local Telegram networks distribute clips against European integration. In October 2024, the DFRLab laboratory identified over 40 Transnistrian channels participating in coordinated campaigns with anonymous pages from Gagauzia and Taraclia, a sign that the Kremlin’s information operation is synchronizing its messages across the entire Moldovan territory.
Smuggling remains the source of funding that fuels the parallel system in the region. The Transnistrian corridor, traditionally used for cigarettes and alcohol to the EU, has been adapted to transport cash destined for pro-Russian parties. According to the Customs Service of the Republic of Moldova, in 2024 over 14 million euros in cash were confiscated at the crossing points with Transnistria, part of the amounts being linked to the network of activists of the “Victory” bloc. SIS sources claim that the real flow is at least triple, and the network includes officials from the local border police and decision-makers from the Sheriff holding.
All these elements converge in a scenario of hybrid pressure: organized bought and transported votes, military depot used as a blackmail factor, energy crisis meant to stir up civil anger, and non-stop propaganda portraying the government in Chisinau as a “NATO agent.” For the Russian Federation, Transnistria is not just a military outpost, but a political and economic multiplier through which it can reverse the result of a decisive election.
Moldova, for its part, is trying to respond with anti-smuggling measures and a social package that includes energy compensation for the region’s residents, but the impact of these policies depends on the speed of delivery and Chisinau’s ability to convince the Transnistrian population that European support is more reliable than Russian. In the absence of a negotiated reintegration solution, the 2025 elections will demonstrate whether the Kremlin’s hybrid mechanism can transform Transnistria from a frozen conflict into a hot vote against Moldova’s European future.
Hybrid offensive
Moscow has been testing a whole hybrid toolkit in Moldova in recent years, and the 2025 parliamentary elections will be the moment when the Kremlin will try to combine all these tools into a single electoral maneuver. This time, the focus is no longer only on the traditional bastions – Transnistria, Gagauzia or Taraclia – but on other minorities dispersed throughout the rest of the country: Russians, Ukrainians, Roma and even emerging communities of economic migrants with dual citizenship.
Together, they account for almost 10% of the population according to provisional data from the 2024 census – 4.9% Ukrainians, 3.2% Russians and just under half a percent Roma – a sufficient electoral mass to decide the balance in a close election.
The first lever is “passportization”. In the last two years, Russian authorities have accelerated the processing of citizenship applications submitted by Russians and Ukrainians from the Republic of Moldova. The Ministry of Justice in Chisinau admits that it cannot cope with the volume, over 70% of applicants being citizens of the Russian Federation, and another 20% citizens of Ukraine.
A Russian passport automatically means access to the MIR payment system and the so-called “social measures” promised by Moscow: child allowances, energy compensation, scholarships. In 2025, these benefits will be converted into a “moral obligation” to vote for pro-Russian lists, especially in cities with a high density of Russian speakers – Bălţi, Tighina, Chişinău and areas in the north of the Moldovan Republic.
The second lever is the dependence on remittances. Even after Moldovan banks reduced direct transfers from Russia, in the first quarter of 2024 Moldovan residents received another $435 million from the Russian Federation, or about a quarter of all money sent home by migrant workers. An administrative order from Moscow could accelerate or freeze these flows, turning the subsistence economy of tens of thousands of families into a political pressure button. Warnings are already circulating on Telegram that the “Sandu government” could “confiscate” money coming from relatives in Russia – a message intended to stir up insecurity and push beneficiaries towards parties openly declared to be friendly to the Kremlin.
Parallel networks
In parallel, the network of Russian cultural organizations – cultural centers, “Russkiy Mir” centers, language circles – received instructions to mobilize their students to vote in the form of cultural excursions. The scholarship for Russian-speaking students, for example, already requires the signing of a “civic cooperation agreement” that obliges the participant to support “Russian strategic projects in the CIS space,” which implicitly includes pro-Kremlin Moldovan electoral campaigns. In 2024, almost a thousand Russian-speaking high school students and students benefited from these scholarships, with paid tickets to “Lomonosov” University or to summer camps in Sochi, according to the model already applied for young people in Gagauzia.
Roma communities, although numerically small, are vulnerable to vote-buying. In the rural districts of Cahul, Soroca, and Soldanesti, local police reports mention the distribution of food packages and 500-700 lei in exchange for an oath to photograph the ballot paper – a tactic that investigators link to intermediaries close to the former “SOR” bloc. As Roma often face the lack of updated identity documents, philanthropic foundations established in the Russian Federation have offered to pay the fees for issuing Moldovan passports, conditioning the aid on supporting lists of “the common people” at the polls.
The vote of the diaspora in Russia should not be neglected either. According to the OSW Observatory, in 2023 over 220,000 Moldovans were legally working in the Russian Federation.
In 2025 they will have polling stations in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large urban centers, and the logistics of transportation have long been taken over by the satellite NGOs of the Russian Embassy.
Above all these levers looms the symbolic military threat. The Russian Forces Task Force in Transnistria can at any time launch exercises to “defend minorities” on the Dniester. Even if the troops do not move from their barracks, the psychological effect on Russian-speaking minorities is strong: “Russia is here, it protects you, vote with those who guarantee peace.” The public station in Tiraspol rebroadcasts such messages daily, and the echo reaches mixed villages in the districts of Călăraşi, Hînceşti or Drochia, where the Russian or Ukrainian population, although numerically reduced, can tilt the result in the polling stations with low turnout.
The Kremlin’s stakes are not limited to separatist enclaves or formalized ethnic autonomies. The 2025 strategy targets the diaspora from the European Union, Great Britain, Russia, or other states, Russian-speaking urban minorities, Ukrainian communities in the north and west, and poor Roma groups in rural areas. Combining passporting, social packages paid in rubles, Russian-language propaganda, and direct vote-buying mechanisms, the Russian Federation can transform an electoral fragment of 8-10% into a pivot capable of deciding parliamentary majorities in Chisinau. If these plans are not countered with full transparency in campaign financing, European logistical support for vote supervision, and rapid countermeasures against MIR flows, any democratic outcome risks being confiscated by a geopolitical game from which minorities, in reality, gain nothing.
The reconfiguration of the geopolitical order in eastern Europe has become one of the central themes of international politics in recent years, amid the pressures generated by the conflict in Ukraine and movements for Strategic re-establishment across the continent. In this context, the Republic Of Moldova is getting closer to the European Union (EU), amid an extended support from Romania and a regional dynamic that requires solidarity and cooperation. At the same time, Ukraine remains a critical space, not only in the light of the ongoing war against Russian aggression, but also in the country’s perspective towards large-scale reconstruction and European integration.
Potential for cooperation
Recently, two studies dedicated to these developments were published, namely “European orientation of the Republic Of Moldova. Support efforts from Romania “(SPOs 2024 study, European Institute of Romania) and ” the Romania–Moldova–Ukraine triangle. A framework for enhanced regional connectivity” (published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung). They analyze, on the one hand, the political and economic developments of the Republic Of Moldova and its european path, and on the other hand, the potential for cooperation between Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in a trilateral framework. The cited sources propose several paths of reflection on how a strengthened partnership between the three countries can greatly influence the trajectory of the region, whether we are talking about the effective integration of Moldova into the EU, about the reconstruction of Ukraine or about energy and infrastructural security.
These papers try to answer important questions, including what are the main characteristics of the european path of the Republic of Moldova and what role Romania plays in this endeavor or how the conflict in Ukraine influences the regional stability and the process of reform and integration in the case of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.
The consulted studies also answer the question of how the Romania–Moldova–Ukraine trilateral format can be used to accelerate reconstruction, economic interconnection and energy resilience in Eastern Europe, but also what evolution scenarios can be foreseen and what recommendations can be drawn up for political decision-makers and civil society in the three states.
Geopolitical and historical context
In order to understand the current dynamics between Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, it is necessary to shed light on a series of geopolitical and historical factors that have shaped, in the long term, the relations between these states and their sphere of influence. On the one hand, the region is marked by the legacy of the former Soviet Union, which left behind frozen conflicts, such as the one in Transnistria, and a high degree of economic dependence on Russia (especially in the energy sphere). On the other hand, the expansion of NATO and the EU to the East, after 2004 and 2007, radically changed the ratio of forces, turning Romania into an important member of the Western bloc and giving it extra weight in relation to the neighboring countries.
Moldova emerged as an independent state with the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. Having a majority Romanian-speaking population, but also important minorities (Ukrainian, Russian, Gagauz, Bulgarian), Moldova was, from the beginning, a space of ideological confrontation between East and West, between pro-Russian and pro-European parties. The Soviet legacy left a precarious economic system and weak institutions, making corruption and political instability two endemic problems.
Tortuous trajectory
Ukraine, for its part, has had a tortuous trajectory since 1991, swinging between the desire of some elites to get closer to the EU and NATO and Russian pressure to keep Kiev within its sphere of influence. The events of 2013-2014 (Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the onset of armed conflict in the Donbas) accelerated the direct confrontation with Moscow and increasingly stimulated rapprochement with the West. However, corruption, oligarchy and multiple regional divisions have been obstacles to substantial reforms.
Romania, although it gained the status of an EU member state in 2007 and a NATO member since 2004, inherited internal economic and institutional challenges, but managed to go through an intensive process of reforms, under the pressure of the accession conditions imposed by Brussels. In parallel, Bucharest sought to define a position of” pivot ” towards the East, especially towards the Republic Of Moldova, which it considers a space of special national interest due to its historical and cultural affinities.
Weapon of frozen conflicts
One of the elements that marked regional stability is the frozen conflicts that arose after the breakup of the USSR. Moscow has instrumentalized historical divergences to create a salve of frozen conflicts through which it has maintained a significant geopolitical presence.
In the first years of independence (1992), the Republic Of Moldova faced a Russian military invasion, the separation of the Transnistrian region, politically and militarily supported by the Russian Federation, which still maintains troops illegally stationed in the area. The conflict remains unresolved and represents a major obstacle to Moldova’s European integration, as well as an instrument of Moscow’s pressure.
After 2014, Ukraine was partially destabilized by separatist movements in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, orchestrated with Russian support. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea escalated the conflict, and the situation escalated into open war in 2022, with devastating consequences for the Ukrainian economy and society.
Beyond these confrontations, the region also faces latent tensions related to Gagauzia (in Southern Moldova) or various claims and minorities that still hinder a broad political consensus. In addition, Russia’s geopolitical influence was constantly exerted through energy levers, disinformation and economic pressure, which directly determined the pro-Western orientation of a significant part of the political elites in Chisinau and Kiev.
Enlargement Of The European Union
The expansion of NATO and the EU to the East gave Romania, Poland and the Baltics the opportunity to connect to the Euro-Atlantic space, but sparked a vehement reaction from Russia, which perceived the move as a loss of traditional influence. For Moldova, the rapprochement with the EU was marked by the signing of the Association Agreement and the deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which entered into force in 2016, which increased Moldova’s access to the European market and provided a legal framework for internal reforms. For Ukraine, the association with the EU was also a trigger for the conflict with Russia (see Euromaidan protests), but also a catalyst for Western-oriented reforms.
In such an equation, Romania has come to play a new strategic role: in addition to being a member of the EU and NATO, it is located on the eastern border of both organizations, therefore having a vital interest in strengthening stability and security at its borders. Through the prism of cultural relations, Romania has paid special attention to Moldova since the 90s, but the focus on Ukraine has grown exponentially after 2014, amid the crisis in Donbas and, more recently, the war triggered by the Russian Federation in 2022. This paradigm shift led to the creation, in 2022, of a format of trilateral consultations, at the level of foreign ministers, between Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, laying the foundation for a much deeper cooperation between the three countries.
The Republic Of Moldova and the strategic role of Romania
Study ” European orientation of the Republic Of Moldova. Approaches to support from Romania ” (SPOS 2024) analyzes the European integration path of Chisinau, highlighting the progress and blockages that this country is facing, but also how Romania contributed to the rapprochement with the EU, through various instruments and initiatives.
At the official level, Moldova’s relationship with the EU began to take shape as early as 1998, through the signing of the partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Subsequently, Chisinau became part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, and the Eastern Partnership (EAP), launched in 2009, along with five other former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus). For Moldova, this framework allowed it to receive financial and technical assistance from the EU and to orient its institutional reforms towards European standards.
A significant moment was the Vilnius Summit (2013), where Moldova initialled the association agreement with the EU, which also includes the deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The agreement, then ratified in 2014, further expanded the access of Moldovan products to the European market, contributing to the diversification of exports and a partial reduction of dependence on the Russian market. Also, another win for Chisinau was the liberalization of the visa regime with the EU (starting from 2014), which facilitated the mobility of Moldovan citizens in the European area, with substantial social and economic implications.
Internal structural problems: corruption, political instability and Transnistrian conflict
Despite the progress in market integration and cooperation with the EU, Moldova has faced numerous internal problems, including corruption and “theft of the billion”. The Moldovan banking system was shaken in 2012-2014 by a huge corruption scandal, which resulted in the disappearance of 1 billion dollars (about 12-15% of GDP) from the reserves of the National Bank. Despite the intervention of the authorities, this episode eroded public confidence in the political class and slowed down structural reforms.
Governments changed with high frequency, the influence of oligarchs in politics remained high, and geopolitical orientations varied according to fluctuating parliamentary majorities. This has reduced the government’s ability to consistently implement the pro-European reform agenda.
The breakaway region of Transnistria, where Russian troops are deployed under the pretext of peacekeeping, is a security vulnerability and a major obstacle to European integration. Even though the Moldovan authorities sought formulas for peaceful resolution, Moscow continued to use Transnistria as a tool of pressure.
Granting candidate country status
A radical change of pace in the relationship with the EU took place in June 2022, when Moldova received the status of candidate country, in parallel with Ukraine. According to the study, this decision was, to a good extent, a political reaction of European leaders to Russian aggression against Ukraine and to the risk of expanding the conflict in the region. By accepting Moldova as a candidate state, Brussels sent a strong political signal that the ex-Soviet space is not left to Moscow’s mercy and that Chisinau’s european path is a strategic priority for the EU.
In order to take advantage of this historic opportunity, the Moldovan authorities must carry out a series of urgent reforms. These include judicial reform and ensuring the independence of the judiciary, including the revision of the Superior Council of Magistracy, the mechanism for appointing judges and integrity procedures; the fight against high-level corruption and the investigation of large banking and financial frauds; electoral reform and stabilization of the political climate, in order to avoid populism and institutional blockages that have plagued the country over the past decades; strengthening administrative capacities, including the civil service, to meet the requirements of harmonization with the acquis communautaire; resolving territorial conflicts or, at least, finding management mechanisms that do not jeopardize the international status of the country (concerning Transnistria).
Romania’s Contribution
Romania is mentioned in the SPOS 2024 study as the main European partner of the Republic Of Moldova, having a privileged relationship due to historical, cultural and linguistic affinity. But this relationship goes beyond historical symbolism, taking on a pragmatic dimension, including through financial and energy support. In 2022 and 2023, Romania provided Moldova with significant amounts in the form of grants and loans with low interest rates, delivered electricity (especially in the context of the energy crisis generated by the reduction or cessation of Russian gas supplies) and facilitated the realization of the Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline, thus allowing the diversification of Moldova’s energy sources.
The transfer of best practices and technical assistance is another way of support. Bucharest has provided support for reforming public administration and fighting corruption, including through the secondment of experts, training programs and institutional exchanges. Also, at the level of accession negotiations, Romania can share its experience gained between 2000 and 2007.
Romania has been the” voice ” of the Republic of Moldova in the Council of the EU and in the European Parliament, constantly campaigns to keep the Republic of Moldova on the enlargement agenda and has an active role in attracting European funds for Chisinau.
Although, in certain periods, the relations between Bucharest and Chisinau have been affected by the changes of power in Chisinau and some political reluctance, in the medium and long term, the partnership remains strategic and essential for the security and development of both states.
Ukraine in the context of Russian aggression
The second study, published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,” the Romania–Moldova-Ukraine triangle. A framework for enhanced regional connectivity” focuses on how the Russian war against Ukraine has radically altered the security parameters in eastern Europe, creating new emergencies and opportunities for trilateral cooperation.
Since 2022, millions of Ukrainians have had to leave their homes, either becoming external refugees (in EU countries, including Romania) or internally displaced persons. This massive displacement of the population has generated huge pressures on the host countries, but also on the economy and social infrastructure of Ukraine.
The war has had a devastating impact on critical infrastructure – power grids, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, housing buildings – and reconstruction costs are estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars.
As one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and vegetable oils, the blockade of Black Sea ports and the destruction of silos have created major problems on international food markets, including food crises in countries dependent on imports of Ukrainian wheat.
International reaction
The West’s response was, on the one hand, to impose severe economic sanctions against Russia and, on the other, to provide consistent military, financial and humanitarian support to the Ukrainian government. In this framework, the EU and the US have mobilised significant amounts (tens of billions of euros/dollars) for military and macro-financial assistance. In addition, Ukrainian goods were allowed to enter the European market duty-free and developed, under the Coordination of the European Commission, the so-called “Solidarity Lanes” – land and river corridors through which Ukrainian products can be transported through Poland, Romania and other neighboring states.
Difficult negotiations
Talks aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine are ‘just beginning’ and promise to be ‘difficult’, the Kremlin said on Sunday, on the eve of talks in Saudi Arabia with US mediators. ‘It’s a very complex subject and there’s a lot of work to be done. We are just getting started,’ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Russian television.
Peskov, who expects ‘difficult negotiations‘, noted that Monday’s’ main topic of discussion’ will be the resumption of the agreement on the export of grain via the Black Sea, which was in force between the summer of 2022 and 2023, allowing Ukraine to export its grain.
Russia pulled out after a year, bemoaning the fact that the West is not, in its view, sticking to its commitments to relax sanctions on Russian exports of agricultural products and Fertilizers. ’ Our negotiators will be ready to discuss nuances around this issue, ‘Peskov noted, saying Moscow had’ numerous ‘ questions on the subject.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman did not speak in the television interview about the demand for a total ceasefire approved by Kiev and supported by Donald Trump, and did not mention a limited agreement on the cessation of hostilities targeting the energy infrastructures of the two belligerent sides, as agreed by the Russian President and his US counterpart earlier this week.
On the topic of bilateral relations with the United States, Dmitry Peskov welcomed the sustained rapprochement between the two leaders since mid-last month and the resumption of contacts.
‘We can disagree on one point, but that doesn’t mean we should deprive ourselves of mutual benefits,’ he stressed, citing ‘common sense’. ’ We believe that the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in a large number of areas is difficult to estimate between our two countries, ‘ Peskov added. However, he also said he expected ‘no sanctions (to be) lifted’ anytime soon.
The energy dimension of conflict
One of the predilected targets of the Russian attacks was Ukraine’s energy infrastructure (power plants, energy and gas transmission networks), which generated long periods of power outages and difficulties in providing thermal energy for the population. In this situation, the interconnection of Ukraine to the European power grid (ENTSO-E), achieved in record time, has become vital to maintain the functionality of the Ukrainian energy system. However, EU energy imports cannot fully compensate for domestic production losses and exposure to European market fluctuations (including higher prices) remains a major challenge.
In the long term, the reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy system can be a true model of green transition and energy security, if one invests in renewable sources, new efficient power plants and storage infrastructure. In addition, connecting with European markets can help stabilize the network and increase resilience in the face of future possible aggressions or supply crises.
Post-conflict reconstruction
Despite the war, Ukraine received, like the Republic Of Moldova, the status of a candidate country to the EU in June 2022. While the situation on the ground remains uncertain, talks on Ukraine’s reconstruction have already begun, involving multiple international conferences and pledges of assistance. The main obstacles are numerous, including the persistence of hostilities. Without a lasting truce, private investment is extremely risky, and the costs of reconstruction are rising as the war continues.
Corruption and administrative capacity is another sensitive topic. Ukraine, like Moldova, has a history of high-level corruption and the influence of oligarchs on government decisions. The EU and international partners demand guarantees that reconstruction funds will be used transparently and that structural reforms will be implemented consistently.
Ukraine’s accession to the bloc will be an even more complex process than in the case of the Republic Of Moldova, given the much larger territory and population and the need to align with the European acquis in post-conflict conditions.
Romania-Moldova-Ukraine: prerequisites, evolution and development potential
Both the SPOs 2024 study and the ESF report insist on the need to strengthen a trilateral format between Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, addressing issues such as transport infrastructure, energy security, post-conflict reconstruction and European integration. Lately, concrete initiatives have been outlined, aimed at giving substance to this endeavor.
In 2022, shortly after the start of the Russian invasion, the heads of the diplomats of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine agreed a framework for regular consultation. One of the main motivations is the need for coordination. The war generated a large flow of refugees, security problems, difficulties in supplying vital products. Coordinated action can be more effective in obtaining financial and logistical support from the EU and other states.
Synchronization of power grids and cooperation to ensure a stable flow of gas, electricity and fuel become strategic priorities. The Port of Constanta and the Danube ports offer alternatives to the Russian blockade of the Black Sea. In addition, land corridors through Moldova and Romania can be optimized.
Romania, as an EU member, can provide advice, assistance and support in Brussels for the Republic Of Moldova and Ukraine on their way to accession.
The first meetings at ministerial level (April 2023, July 2024) led to the signing of joint declarations, focused on mutual support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, on strengthening resilience in the face of Russian hybrid threats and on deepening economic integration.
Security and defence
Romania being a member of NATO, and Ukraine making efforts to obtain advanced status in relation to the Alliance, military cooperation translates into: joint exercises, information exchange, logistical assistance and perhaps even future research projects and production of defense equipment. For Moldova, which has a constitutionally enshrined neutrality status, cooperation is mainly aimed at strengthening capacities to resist cyber attacks and other types of hybrid aggression.
Road connections (e.g. A8 – the highway that could link Iasi to western Romania, but also to Chisinau and Odessa), the modernization of the European gauge railway, as well as the development of ports on the Danube (Galati, Braila, Giurgiulesti) are crucial to facilitate trade flows.
Investments to increase the storage and processing capacity of goods in the Port of Constanta will increase the potential to take over Ukraine’s exports, reducing vulnerability to Russian blockades and attacks.
Implementing common border checkpoints could reduce red tape and waiting times, boosting cross-border trade.
Energy and interconnection
Expanding interconnection capacities and developing new transmission lines to ensure bidirectional flow must quickly become a priority. Romania can export electricity (for example, produced from nuclear or renewable resources) to Moldova and, in the future, contribute to the restoration of the Ukrainian energy system.
Gas pipelines connecting Romania with Moldova, the potential for expansion to Ukraine, but gas storage in Ukrainian infrastructure and Romanian storage are another possible direction of collaboration.
Trilateral cooperation could focus on investments in wind farms (including offshore in the Black Sea), solar energy, energy efficiency projects. They can also be financed through EU funds or from international financial institutions, constituting an important pillar of the green transition in the region.
Reconstruction Of Ukraine
From the perspective of Bucharest and Chisinau, the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war is a huge economic opportunity, which could lead to major investments and joint projects in areas such as infrastructure, construction, IT, agriculture. Romania can become a regional hub for Western companies interested in investing in Ukraine, while Moldova, through its cultural and logistical proximity, can be a bridge. This effort must be coupled with a clear legal framework and anti-corruption measures so that funds are spent transparently.
The FES study underlines that Romania is the only state in this trio that is de facto inside the EU and NATO, enjoying a number of significant diplomatic and political instruments. Consequently, Bucharest can campaign for funds dedicated to the reconstruction of Ukraine and the interconnection of Moldova, through channels such as the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (Cohesion Policy, Connecting Europe Facility, Modernization Fund, InvestEU, etc.). Romania can also promote the establishment of specific pre-accession assistance programs for the Republic of Moldova and argue for maintaining the subject of enlargement on the EU agenda, even in times of euroscepticism.
Romania can facilitate the exchange of expertise, Romania having the know-how resulting from its own accession negotiations and from the management of European funds, which can be valuable for Chisinau and Kiev.
Evolution scenarios
Given the major uncertainties related to the end of the war in Ukraine, the political stability in the Republic Of Moldova and the future of the Russian position, the studies examine various scenarios that can define the trajectory of the region in the medium and long term.
Relative peace and accelerated integration seems to be an optimistic scenario. In this scenario, hostilities in Ukraine end relatively quickly, either with a peace agreement favorable to Kiev or with a significant withdrawal of Russian forces. Thus, the reconstruction of Ukraine would receive a rapid impetus, with large sums of money invested in the restoration of infrastructure. Access to the EU market would become easier and internal reforms would accelerate.
Moldova would be more protected from Russian pressure and political stability would increase, allowing it to meet the EU accession criteria faster.
Romania would benefit from regional economic growth, stimulated by joint projects and reconstruction. Its status as a transit hub for Ukrainian exports and as a strategic partner of Moldova would be strengthened.
A gridlock scenario would mean a war of attrition and slowed reforms. The conflict in Ukraine continues at a lower intensity, but without a clear resolution. In this case, Ukraine would still receive international assistance, but reconstruction remains difficult to implement in conflict zones. Private investors are cautious.
The Republic Of Moldova risks being periodically destabilized by pressure and disinformation from Russia (including through Transnistria, Gagauzia), and the pace of EU accession reforms is maintained, but does not reach the desired acceleration.
Romania retains its role but faces geopolitical uncertainty, increasing defence spending and managing refugee flows or instability at the border. Trilateral cooperation is advancing, but in the sphere of crises and reactivity rather than in a strategic vision of development.
Escalation and destabilization
The worst case scenario would mean escalation of the conflict and extensive destabilization. Here, Russia is engaging in a broader military and political escalation, either over Ukraine or exerting direct or hybrid military pressure on Moldova.
Ukraine would face massive destruction, and reconstruction becomes impossible to plan in the absence of a prospect of peace. The energy system and Transport continue to suffer constant attacks.
The Republic Of Moldova could become the target of provocations, either by straining the situation in Transnistria, or by internal protest actions orchestrated by pro-Russian actors, which can lead to major government blockades.
Romania is facing a crisis at its borders, having to significantly increase military and humanitarian support, while maintaining a firm position alongside NATO and the EU.
This scenario would practically nullify much of the integrated benefits and would considerably undermine Moldova’s european path and Ukraine’s reconstruction.
Challenges and opportunities
Taking into account the conclusions of the two studies and possible scenarios, we can inventory a series of common challenges, but also opportunities that Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine can capitalize on if they act in a robust trilateral framework.
The major challenges are numerous, including prolonged geopolitical uncertainty. Continuing the war in a form of varying intensity makes long-term planning difficult, whether we are talking about investments, reforms or infrastructure projects.
Incomplete domestic reforms are another current issue. Systemic corruption, oligarchic influence, institutional weaknesses – all this undermines the credibility and ability of Moldova and Ukraine to absorb funds and meet EU requirements.
Hybrid threats remain a dangerous constant, with Russia frequently using disinformation, energy manipulation and economic pressures as weapons, likely to destabilize pro-Western governments in Chisinau and Kiev.
The unresolved Transnistrian conflict remains a point of vulnerability for Moldova, preventing, at least theoretically, a full control over the territory. EU integration is complicated by uncertainty about the region’s status.
Limited administrative resources are another structural threat. Both Moldova and Ukraine have a small number of experts specialized in key areas (energy, accession negotiations, Public Administration). Romania, although more advanced, also has challenges regarding institutional capacity building.
Opportunities and advantages
Access to European and international funds is favored by collective actions, involving regional infrastructure and cross-border connectivity, are more attractive to financiers (EIB, EBRD, European Commission, World Bank). Joint projects increase the chances of obtaining increased financing and favorable credit conditions.
Increasing energy resilience is another obvious advantage. Synchronizing power grids, developing gas supply corridors, strategic storage (including the use of deposits in Ukraine) and encouraging investments in renewables can reduce dependence on Russia and stabilize the regional energy market.
The collaboration can strengthen Romania’s position as a logistics and commercial hub. Through its Black Sea and Danube ports, Romania can become the gateway for Ukrainian trade (and, in some scenarios, even for exports from the Caucasus), while also stimulating the development of its own historically poorer regions, such as the Moldavia region in Romania.
Once security in Ukraine improves, investment in reconstruction can be an engine of regional growth. Romanian and Moldovan companies can participate in this effort, creating jobs and generating income.
Another effect will be the strengthening of Moldova’s international position. Being part of a trilateral format of which an EU member state (Romania) is also part, Chisinau increases its visibility and credibility in front of other European capitals, accelerating the convergence process with EU institutions and legislation.
Another advantage will be the creation of a platform for dialogue and stability. The trilateral format can help defuse bilateral conflicts or tensions between Moldova and Ukraine (e.g. minor disputes over border segments or railway track divergences) and provide a framework for negotiation and mutual support.
Strategic recommendations
The two studies propose, in their conclusions, several directions of action, which, integrated and nuanced. At the strategic level (governments and policy makers) the institutionalization of the trilateral format should be pursued. One solution would be to periodically (2-3 times a year) hold summits at the level of prime ministers, foreign ministers or ministers of infrastructure and energy, accompanied by working groups on areas (transport, energy, trade, digital, etc.).
Developing a common strategy for the reconstruction of Ukraine is an opportunity. Development of sectoral plans that identify priority projects (road and rail infrastructure repairs, Health System Modernization, restoration of electrical networks) and attract international investments, including opportunities for Romanian and Moldovan companies.
The active support of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine on the european course must remain an absolute priority. Romania can help in particular through legislative and administrative expertise, through training scholarships for civil servants, by facilitating the exchange of experience at local and regional level (from the mayoralties and county councils in Romania to the homologous authorities in Moldova and the regions of Ukraine).
An extended security architecture and defensive cooperation can be supported by creating mechanisms for joint monitoring and analysis of security risks, implicitly of cyber threats, disinformation and potential destabilizing military movements in the territories of the three states. Romania can use NATO instruments and the expertise of Western partners in this respect.
Structural recommendations
Cross-border infrastructure projects will help strengthen relations in all areas. Speeding up the rehabilitation of border crossing points, implementing the common customs control system (one-stop-shop), upgrading roads and railways (including gauge conversion where possible).
The development of energy corridors by increasing the gas transmission capacity in the direction of Romania–Moldova–Ukraine, but also the increased interconnection in the field of electricity, with investments in high voltage lines and transformer stations must remain a priority, regardless of the color of the government.
The creation of logistics hubs through the arrangement of common industrial and logistics areas, where companies from the three states can store, process and redistribute goods will provide a boost to the economy. Ports in the Danube area, but also on the Black Sea (Constanta, Reni, Odessa) could have complementary roles, with coordinated investments.
Digitization and cyber cooperation through the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) for cyber security, to alert in real time to attacks and disinformation campaigns will play an extremely important role. Cooperation with National Computer Emergency Response Team (certs) needs to be extended.
Regional Impact
Strengthening cultural and academic ties by creating University and research consortia in which institutions from Romania, Moldova and Ukraine collaborate in scientific fields of common interest (e.g. energy security, sustainable agriculture, medicine) is a solution for relaunching these sectors. Joint scholarships and student and teacher mobility can strengthen social cohesion and mutual understanding.
Transparent monitoring of funds, including by non-governmental organisations in the three states, which could work together to track and report on how international funds for reconstruction, infrastructure and reforms are managed to prevent fraud and abuse.
Combating Russian disinformation and promoting the truth about pro-European integration must be supported. Independent Media and Public Radio and TV institutions can run joint campaigns to inform citizens, explaining the benefits of European integration, debunking propaganda and myths cultivated by hostile actors.
Accelerated transformation
The Eastern European region is in an accelerated transformation phase, under double pressure: on the one hand, the devastating war in Ukraine, which obliges immediate support and resistance actions, and on the other hand, the historic opportunity to advance the European integration process for the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Romania, as a member state of the EU and NATO, finds itself in a key position, with the potential to decisively influence developments in the region, either through diplomatic and financial initiatives, or through its role as a security provider and stability anchor.
Why is the rapprochement of Moldova and Ukraine with the EU important? Clearly, for Chisinau and Kiev, this road means access to a single market and a robust legal framework that can accelerate reforms and bring long-term prosperity. But beyond the internal benefits, their integration has a geostrategic significance: it weakens Russia’s expansionist ambitions, creates a space of stability and democracy in the east of the continent and strengthens the European pillar of regional security.
The Romania–Moldova–Ukraine trilateral cooperation can boost the Coordination of Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts by channeling resources and technical expertise, while also attracting private investments. At the same time, it will allow Moldova to benefit from the “synergetic effect” of approaching the EU together with Ukraine, accelerating its own reforms and capitalizing on international support networks.
This format of in-depth collaboration will allow Romania to be positioned as a regional hub, strengthening its port, energy and transport sectors, while exerting increased diplomatic influence within the EU.
Stability frame
Both studies cited in this analysis underline the importance of a stable security framework at local, regional and international levels. Without a minimum of peace or a robust truce in Ukraine, investment and reconstruction of the former Soviet republic will be limited. In addition, domestic reforms and the fight against corruption remain crucial – otherwise the available funds will be wasted and the enthusiasm of Western partners will decrease.
Last but not least, it should be noted that the integration of Moldova and Ukraine into the EU is not only a matter of political will in Brussels. It involves a major internal effort of these states, from the transformation of the administration and the justice system, to the adoption of a vast set of sectoral policies (environment, agriculture, competition, digital market). Romania can support this process, but the main responsibility ultimately lies with the leaders and societies of Moldova and Ukraine, who must fully assume the values and rigors of the European area.
The Romania–Moldova–Ukraine trilateral cooperation, supported by the support of the EU and the international community, can lead to a profound transformation of Eastern Europe. Through joint projects on infrastructure, energy interconnection, combating disinformation, post-conflict reconstruction and strengthening democracy, the three countries can create an area of stability and development on the Union’s eastern border. In a world where geopolitical competition is intensifying, such a coordinated effort is not only beneficial, but also necessary, to protect European values and regional security.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who is blocking a European financial aid package of 50 billion euros over four years for Ukraine, has explicitly requested that this aid be granted outside the EU budget and be subject to annual review.
Strong Opposition
“If we want to support Ukraine, let’s do it outside the EU budget and on an annual basis! This is the only sustainable democratic position with five months to go before the European elections,” Orban mentioned in a post on the social network X. He clarified his position after stating on Tuesday that he was willing to support Kiev but “without harming the EU’s common budget.” The Hungarian Prime Minister gave up his veto on Ukraine’s accession negotiations with the EU in December at the European Council. However, he blocked a €50 billion EU financial aid package for Ukraine for the next four years. This decision was made amidst tensions between Budapest and Kiev regarding the rights of the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathia region and the European Commission’s withholding of EU funds that Hungary is entitled to. The Hungarian government has been accused by Brussels of violating the rule of law. Before the December summit, the European Commission unlocked €10.2 billion from cohesion funds for Hungary, along with €920 million from the European REPowerEU plan. However, over €21 billion of other EU funds (cohesion funds and post-pandemic recovery plan) remain frozen.
During this time, Viktor Orban is demanding the unblocking of all European funds, which he claims have been unfairly withheld from his country for political reasons by the European Commission due to Hungary’s opposition to illegal migration and the LGBT movement.
While discussions with Budapest continue regarding the lifting of the veto on aid to Ukraine ahead of a new European summit scheduled for February 1st, the European Commission is exploring alternative solutions, such as taking out a €20 billion loan and providing this amount to Ukraine. Hungary opposes this loan scheme as well, which is similar to the financing of the European post-pandemic recovery plan, warning that ultimately, all EU member states will have to repay this credit through their own contributions to the EU budget.
Is the EU blackmailed?
Hungary is far from reaching an agreement with the European Union regarding aid for Ukraine, according to Gergely Gulyas, the chief of staff to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. This statement comes as the EU seeks to secure a deal on a new financial assistance package for Kiev, as reported by Reuters.
Gergely Gulyas made these remarks after European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated during a session at the European Parliament in Strasbourg that she was “confident” that all 27 EU member states would find a solution to provide funds to Ukraine, a matter currently hindered by Hungary’s resistance.
Hungary is in discussions with the Commission, but it is not certain that an agreement will be reached. If an agreement is not reached, the other 26 EU member states may find a solution without Hungary, said Orban’s chief of staff.
Providing aid through 26 bilateral agreements is an option that has been brought up but is more complicated and costly than using the central budget, and it could potentially affect EU unity.
Gergely Gulyas also explained that the President of the European Commission has conditioned the unlocking of new EU funds for Hungary on changes related to LGBTI issues and migration, attempting to exert pressure on Budapest.
He emphasized that Hungarian voters have clearly expressed their opinions on these two issues and assured that his government is willing to reach an agreement on matters that are “not harmful.” However, when it comes to issues on which Hungarian citizens have made their stance clear, this would be “antidemocratic and unacceptable,” the source further emphasizes.
Historical Relations
In the past, Hungary and Russia had historical ties, especially in the 19th century when both countries were part of the Habsburg Empire and shared political and cultural connections. However, these relations became tense after the Cold War when Hungary moved out of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.
Hungary and Russia have a significant trade relationship. Hungary imports energy, especially natural gas, from Russia and has been a supporter of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which would enable the direct supply of Russian gas to Western Europe. This has been criticized by some European countries and the United States, who believe it could increase Western Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources.
Hungary and Russia have cooperated in the field of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Hungary operates a nuclear power plant, the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, which has four nuclear reactors and plays a crucial role in the country’s electricity production. This plant was built in collaboration with Russia and was modernized through an agreement signed in 2014, which included the construction of two new reactors at Paks.
This nuclear cooperation has been of interest in the context of European energy and geopolitical security. Some Western countries and organizations have expressed concerns about Hungary’s dependency on Russia in terms of nuclear energy, viewing it as a potential influence of Russia in the energy infrastructure of Eastern Europe.
Hungary is a member of the European Union (EU) and is subject to EU policies and regulations. Within the EU, Hungary has previously opposed the sanctions imposed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This stance has drawn criticism from other EU member states that have supported the sanctions.
The relationship between Budapest and Moscow is complex and ever-changing, influenced by multiple economic, energy, and geopolitical interests and considerations. This relationship can evolve based on changes in the domestic and international policies of both countries.
Budapest and Kiev
The relations between Ukraine and Hungary have been tense at various points in recent history due to various issues, especially those related to the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and the bilateral relations between the two countries.
One of the main sources of tension between the two countries is the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, which resides mainly in the Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia) region in western Ukraine. Hungary has periodically raised concerns regarding the rights and status of this minority, including issues related to the use of the Hungarian language in schools and local administration. Russian propaganda has exploited these differences to the fullest, with accusations of the involvement of Russian federal security services in various destabilization actions.
A major source of tension was Ukraine’s adoption of an education law in 2017, which raised concerns in Hungary. The law restricted the use of minority languages in schools and imposed limits on the use of the Hungarian language in the education system. Hungary saw this law as a threat to the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.
Tensions related to minority issues have led to diplomatic conflicts between the two countries. Hungary has blocked or put on hold certain Ukrainian initiatives within the European Union and NATO in response to these concerns.
The relations between Ukraine and Hungary should be understood in the broader geopolitical context of Eastern Europe and Ukraine’s relations with other neighboring states, such as Russia and Romania. The current leadership in Budapest has used the issue of minorities in relations with all neighboring states, raising accusations of serving the strategic interests of Hungary within the broader context of Moscow’s strategy to weaken the European Union and NATO from within.
German Warning
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has warned that the war between Russia and Ukraine could extend to neighboring countries, as reported by the media. “We hear threats from the Kremlin almost every day – most recently again against our friends in the Baltic states,” Pistorius said in an article published by the Tagesspiegel newspaper on Friday, marking exactly one year since taking office as the Federal Minister of Defense. Regarding the German army (Bundeswehr), Boris Pistorius emphasized: “We need to rapidly strengthen our defense capabilities, in the context of the urgency of the threat situation.” “Therefore, we must consider the fact that (Russian President) Vladimir Putin might even attack a NATO country at some point,” Boris Pistorius stated, estimating that if it were to happen, it would be within “5-8 years” from now. With his call for the Bundeswehr to become “war-ready,” Pistorius intended to “shake up” German society. He is waiting for proposals to reintroduce a version of mandatory military service by April, after his country abandoned it in 2011. According to the German minister, the defense industry needs to become more efficient. Boris Pistorius has advocated for reforming public debt, for security reasons. “With a debt mechanism in its current form, we will not get through these crises unscathed,” he explained. On the other hand, the Berlin representative rejected requests for increasing German military aid to Ukraine, saying that the Bundeswehr cannot be brought to “exhaustion” and leave Germany “defenseless.” On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, claiming to carry out a “special military operation of denazification” in the neighboring country and to protect the Russian-speaking community.
Parliamentary Protest
The European Parliament has contested the European Commission’s decision to unfreeze over 10 billion euros in EU funds for Hungary last December, in a resolution voted on Thursday, two weeks before an extraordinary European Council summit dedicated to adopting aid for Ukraine, as reported by Agerpres in a special correspondence. In the resolution adopted with 345 votes in favor, 104 against, and 29 abstentions, MEPs express their deep concern about the ongoing erosion of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights in Hungary, particularly with the recent adoption of the so-called “national sovereignty protection package” – which has been compared to Russia’s “foreign agents law,” as stated by the community legislature in a press release. Expressing regret for the Council’s failure to apply the procedure provided for in Article 7, Paragraph (1), following its activation by the Parliament in 2018, the community legislature calls on the European Council to determine whether Hungary has seriously and persistently violated EU values, in accordance with the more direct procedure provided for in Article 7, Paragraph (2). In theory, the procedure can lead to the suspension of voting rights at Council of the EU meetings. MEPs also condemn the actions of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who last December blocked the crucial decision to revise the EU’s long-term budget, including the aid package for Ukraine, thereby fully violating the EU’s strategic interests and the principle of loyal cooperation. The EU must not yield to blackmail, they emphasize in the adopted resolution.
The EP announces its regret over the European Commission’s decision to release up to 10.2 billion from previously frozen funds, despite Hungary not having fulfilled the required reforms for judicial independence, and in a context where the EU executive recently extended the application of measures from the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. Furthermore, MEPs condemn systemic discriminatory practices against the academic environment, journalists, political parties, and civil society in the allocation of funds. They also express regret for the use of manipulated public procurement procedures, government and government-affiliated entities’ public purchase offers, and the use of EU funds to enrich the government’s political allies. The necessary measures for unlocking EU funding, under various regulations, should be treated as a single package, and payments should not be made if deficiencies persist in any area. The European Parliament insists that it will examine whether legal action should be initiated to annul the partial unfreezing of funds and emphasizes that it can use a range of legal and political measures if the Commission fails to fulfill its duties as guardian of the treaties and to protect the EU’s financial interests. In the EP plenary session in Strasbourg, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen justified her decision on Wednesday to unfreeze certain funds for Hungary, explaining that Budapest had carried out the reforms demanded by Brussels to strengthen the independence of its judicial system.
However, she reminded that “about 20 billion euros” of EU funds destined for Hungary remain frozen, due to concerns especially related to LGBT+ rights, academic freedom, and the right to asylum.
The EP, in its adopted resolution, also questions whether the Hungarian government will be able to fulfill its duties in the second half of 2024, warning that if the position of President of the European Council is vacant, it will fall to the Hungarian Prime Minister during the Council’s six-month presidency. The text refers to Charles Michel’s announced candidacy in the European parliamentary elections, who announced that he will submit his resignation upon the formation of the new community legislature if elected. MEPs call on the Council to find adequate solutions to mitigate these risks and demand reforms to the Council’s decision.
Nuclear Discussions Impossible
Russia has stated that talks with the USA on nuclear arms control are impossible if the situation in Ukraine is not considered, while also accusing Washington of trying to impose its military dominance, according to the media.
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, explained in a press conference that Washington has proposed separating the two issues and resuming talks on “strategic stability” between the two countries, which hold the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. Lavrov emphasized that this proposal is unacceptable for Russia due to the West’s support for Ukraine in the war that has already lasted for nearly two years.
He made these remarks in the context where the New Start treaty, the last bilateral Russian-American agreement on nuclear arms control, expires in February 2026, and tensions between the two nuclear superpowers are at their highest level since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. “We see not the slightest interest from the USA or NATO in settling the Ukrainian conflict and listening to Russia’s concerns,” added the head of Russian diplomacy, as quoted by the Russian media.
He accused the West of pushing Ukraine to use increasingly long-range weapons to strike deeper inside Russia. Such attacks have intensified in recent weeks; on December 30, 25 people were killed in the southern Russian city of Belgorod in one such attack. Sergey Lavrov provided no evidence to support his claim that the West encourages Ukraine to carry out such attacks but accused the United States of seeking military superiority over Russia, as noted by Reuters.
The Russian minister insisted that talks on arms control are unfounded as long as the West conducts what he called a “hybrid war” against Moscow. “We do not reject this idea in the future, but we condition this possibility on the West abandoning its policy of undermining and disrespecting Russia’s interests,” concluded Lavrov.
The Russian Federation, the inheritor of the Soviet nuclear power, has the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, nearly 6,000 warheads, according to experts. Together, the USA and Russia hold about 90% of the global nuclear warhead count, enough to destroy the planet several times over.
The Russian foreign minister also called on the USA to cease its “aggression” against Yemen, following the American military’s fourth bombing of Houthi rebels in less than a week. “The most important thing now is to end the aggression against Yemen, as the more the Americans and the British bomb, the less willing the rebels will be to negotiate,” Lavrov noted in the same press conference.
Purification of Russia
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on Thursday that the military offensive against Ukraine has allowed for the “purification” of Russia from people who “do not feel a sense of belonging to the history and culture” of the country.
Since the beginning of the conflict nearly two years ago, hundreds of thousands of people have fled the country for political reasons or fear of being drafted into the military, a choice firmly condemned by Russian authorities. The suppression of any dissenting voice has sent hundreds more to prison, as any criticism of the Kremlin’s policies is not tolerated in Russia, according to international media.
“The special military operation has united our society like never before and contributed to its purification from those without any sense of belonging to Russian history and culture,” said Sergey Lavrov, using the official euphemism to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “Some have left, others have stayed and started to reflect,” he added during a press conference in Moscow, where he reviewed the activities of Russian diplomacy in 2023.
This is not the first time Russian authorities, who claim they want to “denazify Ukraine,” have spoken about the need to “purify” society. In March 2022, at the beginning of the conflict, President Vladimir Putin said that “such an autopurification of society will only strengthen our country.” “Every people, and the Russian people in particular, will always be able to identify the trash and traitors and spit them out as one would spit out a fly that flew into their mouth,” Putin stated.
In the same press conference, the Russian Foreign Minister equated the Holocaust – the genocide against the Jewish people carried out by Nazi Germany during World War II – with the killing of other peoples by the Nazis, as reported on its website by Radio Svoboda, the Russian service of Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL).
Lavrov implied this while commenting on Israel’s operation against the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, recognized as a terrorist organization by the USA and EU, in the Gaza Strip. According to the Russian minister, “Israelis should not create the impression that, because they suffered during World War II, they can do anything today,” as reported by the radio station. “Yes, there was the Holocaust, a terrible crime. But there was also genocide against all the peoples of the Soviet Union. They did not suffer less… If we were to follow this logic, then we too can do anything, everything is allowed for us,” Lavrov stated in his press conference.
In this context, the head of Russian diplomacy stated that, during Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, “far fewer” civilian casualties are observed compared to the current operation by Israel in the Gaza Strip, according to the Russian official news agency RIA Novosti. Moscow criticizes Israel, accusing it of causing a high number of civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip. In 2022, Israel protested against a statement by Sergey Lavrov, who claimed that Adolf Hitler had “Jewish blood,” and in 2023, when he compared the West’s policy towards Russia with Hitler’s actions against the Jews, according to Radio Svoboda.
Coalition for Artillery
Allies of Ukraine launched an “artillery” coalition in Paris on Thursday to address urgent weapon needs of Kyiv, which has warned of an “ammunition shortage” ahead of the two-year anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, international media reports.
“The ammunition shortage is a very real and pressing issue our armed forces are currently facing,” wrote Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustam Umerov on social network X (formerly Twitter) during the launch of an “artillery coalition,” led by France and the USA.
“We need to strengthen Ukrainian defense capabilities to protect the free world against the Russian threat,” he stated.
The artillery coalition launched on Thursday is one of the components of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the so-called Ramstein Group, which brings together over 50 countries in several subgroups, from demining to anti-air defense.
“There is no alternative to modern artillery; we must continue our efforts and increase our ammunition production,” the Ukrainian defense minister said in a video conference during the opening ceremony, after canceling his visit for “security reasons”.
France announced on this occasion that it would “release a sum of 50 million euros” to “purchase 12 additional Caesar (howitzers)” – bringing the total number of such equipment for Ukraine to 67 – and said it has the capacity to produce another 60, funding of which will depend on allies.
“I called Emmanuel Macron to thank France for launching the ‘artillery’ coalition for Ukraine and committing to produce dozens of ‘Caesars’,” said President Volodymyr Zelensky on social network X. The two leaders also discussed the “need to further strengthen Ukraine’s anti-air defense,” targeted almost every night by drones and missiles launched by Moscow, added Zelensky.
Kyiv has already deployed 49 Caesars, produced by Nexter (Franco-German group KNDS), with another six howitzers to be delivered “in the coming weeks,” according to the French Ministry of Defense. France has the capacity to produce another 72 such howitzers and is prepared to finance the manufacture of 12, indicated French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu. “Thus, 60 remain to be financed, about 250 million euros, a sum that seems accessible for different budgets of the allies,” he continued in front of representatives of 23 countries supporting Ukraine’s defense.
To arm the howitzers, the EU had set a goal to supply Ukraine with a million munitions by spring 2024. But only 300,000 shells have been delivered so far, according to European parliamentarians. Ukrainians launch between 5,000 and 8,000 shells daily, compared to 10,000-15,000 by the Russian side, emphasized Cedric Perrin, chairman of the French Senate’s International Affairs Committee, noting that “national and European production is extremely weak” and that “the current economy does not meet Ukrainian expectations.” From the French side, Minister Lecornu insisted on Thursday on tripling French ammunition deliveries to Ukraine, which have increased from 1,000 units per month to 2,000 in the first year of war and should rise to 3,000 shells starting in January. “We are in the process of rebuilding gunpowder stocks. We are recycling powders from unused ammunition,” he told reporters. The minister also announced the delivery of about 50 air-to-ground guidance kits A2SM per month starting in January, throughout the year. With a medium range, these can be adapted to “Soviet-class” aircraft such as Mig and Sukhoi, used by Ukraine, he assured.
France has already transferred or sold 30 Caesars to Ukraine, which ordered an additional six howitzers in the fall. Denmark has also provided 19 units of an eight-wheeled armored version. Mounted on a truck, the Caesar howitzer can fire 155 mm shells at a distance of 40 kilometers. Emmanuel Macron announced he will visit Ukraine in February, for the second time since the war began on February 24, 2022. France is “about to finalize” a security agreement with Kyiv similar to the one signed on Friday between the United Kingdom and Ukraine for a duration of ten years, he added, announcing among other things the delivery of about 40 Scalp missiles.
The Ukrainian army is advancing slowly on the southern front in an attempt to achieve more results before the fall sets in, while the Russian army has concentrated over 420,000 soldiers on the ground to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensive. “We must reclaim our land,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared in an interview with CNN.
Hopes in Kiev
Zelensky’s statement comes amid reports of Ukrainian forces advancing towards Tokmak, a significant railway junction in the south used by the Russian army to maintain the front in the region. “Ukraine will not back down, will not abandon its own territory. We will never do that,” Zelensky added, reiterating that the war would be long, as a frozen conflict does not mean peace.
Zelensky acknowledges the slowdown of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which he attributed to Russia’s aerial superiority and the slow delivery of Western arms. “Some things are on the way. Many people say the counteroffensive is too slow, but some things are on the way,” he insisted.
In this regard, he assured that he would once again discuss with American partners the need to supply Kiev with long-range ATACMS missiles, which are expected to be received as early as this fall.
In any case, the war will not have a happy ending, Zelensky said. “This is not a movie that lasts an hour and a half (…) There will be no ‘happy end.’ We have lost a lot of people,” the Ukrainian president stated.
Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar indicated that in the past week, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has managed to recapture 4.8 square kilometers of territory in the southwest of the Donetsk region and the neighboring Zaporizhia region. Maliar explained that with the recovery of this territory, Ukrainian forces attacking on these two segments of the front line have liberated a total of 256.5 square kilometers since Ukraine began its counteroffensive in early June.
Race Against the Weather
While senior American officials claim that Ukraine has between 30 and 45 days to continue its counteroffensive before worsening weather conditions, Kirilo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, has stated that adverse weather will not hinder Kiev from pursuing its plans. “Last autumn, combat actions did not cease. This year will be the same,” he asserted, promising that the offensive “in all directions will continue.”
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in its daily report on Monday, estimates that “cold and wet weather will impact but not stop” Kiev’s operations.
In turn, Russia is said to have concentrated around 420,000 troops in the occupied territories to thwart Kiev and launch its own offensive, according to Ukrainian sources. Moscow is thus attempting to “take revenge” and regain some of the territories liberated by Ukraine last year, such as extensive areas in the Kharkiv region, as indicated by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
Furthermore, Russian forces aim to gain full control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east, one of the primary objectives of their military intervention in Ukraine, according to GUR.
Black Sea, Theater of War
Officials in Kiev have announced that Ukraine has recaptured two oil and gas drilling platforms from the Russians in the Black Sea, which had been under Moscow’s control since 2015 and were located close to the annexed Crimean Peninsula in 2014.
“Ukraine has taken control of ‘Vishki Boika’ (Boiko Towers),” announced the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s intelligence service (GUR) in a statement. During a “unique operation,” “clashes took place between Ukrainian special forces on board ships and a Russian Su-30 fighter jet,” the statement added, stating that “the Russian plane was damaged and had to retreat.”
During the operation, other “valuable trophies” were also captured, such as helicopter ammunition and a radar system capable of tracking the movement of ships in the Black Sea, GUR further reported.
The statement recalls that Russia had occupied these platforms since 2015 when it annexed Crimea in 2014, and Moscow had been using them for military purposes since the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia has not yet commented on this information, and the cited news agencies have not been able to independently verify GUR’s information. “For Ukraine, regaining control of the Boiko Towers has strategic importance, and as a result, Russia has lost the ability to use them for military purposes,” GUR emphasized in a video posted on Telegram.
“Russia is now deprived of the ability to fully control the waters of the Black Sea, and this means that Ukraine has taken significant steps toward the liberation of Crimea,” the GUR statement concludes. Before Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine extracted a significant portion of natural gas from the Black Sea, supplying gas not only to Crimea but also to mainland Ukrainian regions.
Foto: wikipedia
Billions for Ukraine
In 2024, Ukraine will need financial assistance from the United States in the range of $12 to $14 billion, as budgetary expenses remain high amid the Russian invasion, stated Ukrainian Finance Minister Serghei Marcenko on Monday.
Marcenko also expressed hope that the interim budget of the United States would be approved soon, allowing Ukraine to receive an additional $3.3 billion by the end of the year to cover the budget deficit. “There are no discussions yet, there is a lot of uncertainty, and we are not confident that this is guaranteed,” said Serghei Marcenko at a business forum held in Kiev.
Marcenko added that in 2024, the ministry he heads would like to receive funding from the United States for the state budget at a level similar to this year. “Not lower than this year: somewhere between $12 and $14 billion. That’s what we expect,” Serghei Marcenko stated.
Ukraine received nearly $10 billion in financial aid from the United States this year to cover the budget deficit, and Ukrainian authorities estimate that their needs will not diminish next year as the Ukrainian army makes slow progress in its counteroffensive.
Although U.S. President Joe Biden has requested emergency funds of $24 billion to respond to the war in Ukraine, the next tranche of American aid for Ukraine has faced political obstacles as the United States enters a cycle of presidential elections.
Ukraine’s new Defense Minister, Rustem Umerov, stated last week that he would request a budget increase for defense this year by 251 billion hryvnias ($6.8 billion), given that military expenses are rising day by day.
Finance Minister Serghei Marcenko mentioned that the Kiev government would discuss the Defense Minister’s request at the next meeting but appreciated that “I’m not sure we’ll be able to cover all the needs” mentioned by Rustem Umerov.
War for Peace
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated on Tuesday that a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine is not yet in sight, as Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine continues.
Although key actors have sometimes been brought together for discussions, Germany must not turn its back on the daily brutality of the war, Scholz emphasized during the “International Meeting of Religions and Cultures in Dialogue” forum in Berlin, an annual event organized by the lay Catholic movement Sant’Egidio.
“This requires effort and time,” the German Chancellor said about peace negotiations. “Time that we actually don’t have, because in the meantime, Russia continues to bomb, torture, and kill in Ukraine,” he added. As the basis for any peace, “the Russian leadership must understand that it is about the withdrawal of troops,” Olaf Scholz stressed: “Then there will be the possibility for discussions, and the Ukrainian government will participate, I am sure of that.”
Over 18 months since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the Chancellor rejected the “narratives” that a peace deal had already been negotiated between Ukraine and Russia in the spring of 2022 but had been sabotaged by the United States or the United Kingdom. “No, it’s not true,” Scholz firmly stated, thus refuting one of the “narratives” that Moscow has recently been pushing.
He stated that any “common understanding” that might have been found in the early days of the war “was destroyed because the Russian president used that time to move his troops around Ukraine after the failure of the attack on the capital Kiev and to begin the assault on eastern Ukraine.”
Scholz once again defended the delivery of German arms to Ukraine: “We will continue to support Ukraine in its right to self-defense as long as necessary.”
Foto: Facebook
Moscow Sets Conditions
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on Tuesday that the cancellation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decree prohibiting dialogue with Moscow should be the first step for negotiations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, according to the official Russian news agency TASS. The same idea was expressed during the day by Russian President Vladimir Putin at an economic forum in Vladivostok (Russia’s Far East), as reported by the Russian press. Lavrov opined that the longer Kiev postpones negotiations with Moscow, the more challenging it will be to negotiate later.
“This is our official position; I will say it again: against the backdrop of the ban on negotiations signed by (Ukrainian President Vladimir) Zelensky, this position should not raise any questions,” Sergei Lavrov said in an interview on Rossia-1 television.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree in October 2022 officially declaring the ‘impossibility’ of any negotiations between Kiev and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, effectively leaving the door open for discussions with Russia.
Zelensky promulgated the decree after the Kremlin declared the annexation of four Ukrainian regions occupied by the Russian army, which Moscow still only partially controls at present – Luhansk and Donetsk in the east, and Kherson and Zaporizhia in the south.
“He (Putin) does not know what dignity and honesty are. Therefore, we are willing to engage in dialogue with Russia, but with a different Russian president,” Zelensky stated at the time, as quoted by Reuters.
Putin’s Threat
Ukraine may begin peace negotiations only when it runs out of resources and will use any potential cessation of hostilities to rearm with the help of the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday.
The war has devastated areas in eastern and southern Ukraine, killed or injured hundreds of thousands, and triggered the most significant rupture in Russia’s relations with the West since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
Speaking at an economic forum in Russia’s Pacific port city of Vladivostok, Putin stated that Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russian forces thus far has failed, and the Ukrainian army has suffered heavy losses.
“I have the impression that they want to bite as much as they can and then, when their resources are almost zero, seek a cessation of hostilities and start negotiations to replenish their resources and restore their fighting capacity,” Putin said.
The President added that many potential mediators have asked him if Russia is ready to cease fighting, but he has stated that Russia cannot stop as long as it faces a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
For any chance of discussions, Putin noted that Ukraine should first lift its self-imposed legal ban on peace talks and explain what it wants.
Tough Confrontation
Russia controls approximately 18% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, which it annexed in 2014, and territories in eastern and southern Ukraine seized in 2022.
Putin also stated that the West’s decision to supply Ukraine with cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions is a crime, but such deliveries, while potentially prolonging the war, will not change its ultimate outcome.
He also criticized the West’s decision to provide Ukraine with F-16 aircraft.
When asked if Russia needs to introduce a new mandatory mobilization, Putin stated that 1,000-1,500 Russians sign voluntary contracts daily to join the army.
In the last six or seven months, 270,000 people have signed voluntary contracts, Putin said—a slightly lower figure than the 280,000 announced by former President Dmitry Medvedev earlier this month.
Foto: Wikipedia
Illegal Annexations
The Kremlin insisted on Monday that negotiations with Ukraine are possible only if Kiev recognizes the reality created on the ground, referring to the Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia in September 2022.
“In any case, the regime in Kiev will have to discuss based on the recognition of the realities that emerged after it refused to resolve the issues peacefully in March (2022),” following the failed negotiations in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine, held a month after the war began, said Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman for the Russian presidency.
At the same time, the Kremlin’s spokesperson stated that there are currently no prerequisites for a return to negotiations. “At present, there are no prerequisites for the resumption of the negotiation process,” Peskov stated.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not appear willing to negotiate. “Everyone wants this war to end, but it must end on fair and sustainable terms that reflect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Blinken said in an interview with ABC News.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in an interview with The Economist over the weekend, said he is emotionally prepared for a long-lasting war and believes that “this is not a favorable moment” for possible negotiations with Russia, as the counteroffensive continues, and Moscow sees Ukraine’s difficulties on the battlefield, according to Ukrainska Pravda.
European Dreams
Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated during a visit to Kiev that Ukraine’s place is in the European Union, and Kiev can count on us and our vision of EU expansion as a necessary geopolitical consequence of Russia’s war, as reported by German media.
“Ukraine already has candidate status. And now we are preparing to make a decision on opening discussions on EU accession,” Baerbock said.
According to her, Ukraine’s results regarding judicial reform and media legislation are already impressive, but there is still a long way to go in implementing anti-oligarch legislation and fighting corruption. The European Union itself must “work quickly to ensure that we are positioned adequately for more seats at the table,” explained the Berlin representative.
Furthermore, the German Foreign Minister referred to reports of Ukrainian children being deported to Russia, stating that those responsible for the crimes must be brought to justice. Germany supports organizations and authorities “that provide traumatized children with a safe and secure home,” she said.
“The first step toward peace is for Putin to let these children return home,” Baerbock added. The issue is to be addressed at the UN General Assembly.
Annalena Baerbock’s visit to Ukraine is the fourth since the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022. The German Foreign Minister arrived in Kiev by train from Poland as Ukrainian airspace remains closed.
Last May, Baerbock became the first member of the German executive to travel to Ukraine since the start of the war. On that occasion, she visited Bucha, near Kiev, the site of horrifying Russian troop atrocities against civilians. Annalena Baerbock also visited Ukraine in mid-September last year and in January of this year.
