Mr. Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi is a Doctor of Political Sciences, Senior Specialist at the Hennady Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, which operates under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kiev. He answered our questions about the war, Ukrainian peace conditions and the strategic relations between Ukraine and Romania.
KP:. We passed the 600-day mark since the beginning of the illegal Russian military invasion. What is the current situation on the front lines? How much longer do you think it will take to fully liberate the territories occupied by the Russian Federation?
S.Z.: Overall, the situation on the front remains very tense. Russian forces continue to attack Ukrainian forces. However, Ukraine is putting up a strong resistance and conducting counteroffensive operations. In addition, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are launching attacks on the enemy’s rear positions, such as airfields, ammunition depots, seaports, fleet vessels, and so on. This may help in stopping and pushing back the enemy’s forces.
Currently, it is difficult to predict how long the combat operations will continue, especially in the context of the de-occupation of Ukrainian territories. However, the active phase, according to many forecasts, could last for at least a year. It is not ruled out that a very pessimistic scenario is possible, where the war could stretch over several years.
K.P.. Some Western media outlets believe that the current counteroffensive by the Ukrainian army is taking place under unequal conditions. What types of weaponry do the Ukrainian armed forces still require?
S.Z.: I believe that the Russian-Ukrainian war is, in general, an asymmetric conflict, given the differences in size, capabilities, and the number of personnel between Russia and Ukraine. This presents a significant challenge for Kyiv, which is trying to not only defend itself but also to counterattack in unequal conditions.
Ukraine requires various types of modern weaponry that, due to their significantly advanced technological characteristics, could compensate for the numerical composition of the mostly outdated enemy’s arsenal. Among other things, Kyiv needs artillery systems, long-range missile projectiles, air defense systems, next-generation aviation technology, modern armored vehicles and versatile unmanned aerial vehicles.
K.P.: What is the current role of Transnistria in the Russian war strategy, and how will Ukraine respond to this threat? How do you see the evolution of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine?
S.Z.: Transnistria remains an area of instability near the Ukrainian border. Its role as a Russian “enclave” has been reinforced during the Russian-Ukrainian war. This is because at any convenient moment for the Kremlin, the operational group of Russian forces in Transnistria could become active and strike Ukraine.
The situation forces Kyiv to maintain a contingent of around 10,000 troops near the border of the unrecognized republic, which are essential for combat operations. Transnistria also poses a potential threat to Chisinau.
It’s not ruled out that the problem could be resolved through military means. However, as stated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a press conference after the European Political Community summit held in Bulboaca, Ukraine might engage in military action on the territory of Transnistria but only at the request of the Moldovan government.
Regarding the state of Ukrainian-Moldovan relations, they are considered stable and neighborly. This is because, among other reasons, both countries share common challenges and are moving towards European Union membership.
K.P.: The tactic employed by Ukraine has forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to partially withdraw from the Crimean region. Can Kyiv ensure the security of maritime transport? How can Ukraine be assisted by Western partners in this regard?
S.Z.: Kyiv is attempting to ensure the security of maritime transport, including by striking at the military infrastructure of the occupied Russian-controlled Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. To some extent, they have been successful in this endeavor.
However, the situation is complex. In this context, it is crucial for Western partners to continue providing military assistance, such as aerial and naval drones, long-range missile projectiles, up-to-date intelligence/satellite data, and more. Additionally, political, diplomatic, economic, sanctions, and other forms of pressure on Moscow are equally important.
K.P.: What are the conditions under which Ukraine is prepared to engage in peace negotiations, considering that all Western partners have stated that Ukraine is the one to decide when and under what conditions these negotiations will be initiated?
S.Z.: Ukraine is prepared to engage in peace negotiations, and official statements from Kyiv have made this clear on multiple occasions. However, they insist that all points of the Ukrainian “peace formula” be met before negotiations can proceed. These points include: Implementation of the UN Charter and the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the world order; Withdrawal of Russian forces and cessation of hostilities; Justice, including holding a tribunal for those responsible for the aggression and compensation for damages; Release of all detainees and deported individuals; Security guarantees for Ukraine; Radiological and nuclear safety; Food security and other related issues.
It is also crucial that Russia renounces any territorial claims to Ukraine, which would entail amending the Russian Constitution and other laws to remove any affiliation of five Ukrainian regions with the Russian Federation.
K.P.: President Zelensky has made a series of visits to the United States, Canada, and NATO headquarters. How will the relations between Kyiv and its Western partners evolve?
S.Z.: Western partners have been supporting Ukraine and providing resources to counter Russian aggression. There is also considerable emphasis on post-war reconstruction in Ukraine and support for its European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
Given that the collective West continues to keep Ukraine in its focus, there is hope that this attention will persist until Ukraine achieves full integration with the Western world. This ongoing support and engagement with Western partners are essential for Ukraine’s stability, security, and its path toward further integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
K.P.: President Zelensky recently made an official visit to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart, Klaus Iohannis. The two heads of state signed a Strategic Partnership, elevating the level of relations between the two countries. Also the governments of Romania and Ukraine hold a joint sesion in the ukrainian capital city. What are Kyiv’s expectations from this agreement? What more can Romania do to support Ukraine?
S.Z.: Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made a visit to Romania, where he had a meeting with his counterpart Klaus Iohannis. This was the first visit of a Ukrainian leader to Romania since the onset of the major war.
During President Zelensky’s visit to Romania, an agreement was reached to establish a training center for Ukrainian F-16 pilots. Bucharest is also expected to provide Ukraine with air defense systems and artillery. Additionally, the launch of a new corridor for the export of Ukrainian grain through Moldova to Romania was announced.
The fact that Iohannis and Zelensky declared that Romania and Ukraine have entered into a strategic partnership agreement is seen as a significant step that elevates the level of relations between the two countries to a qualitatively new level.
It is essential for the pace of cooperation between Bucharest and Kyiv to not only remain in good standing but also to strengthen further. This should be understood in the context of military cooperation as well as other potential areas of collaboration.
It is noteworthy that the Romanian leader expressed support for the Ukrainian “formula of peace” and stated that only Ukraine will determine when and how to conduct peace negotiations.
Furthermore, Klaus Iohannis expressed support for the commencement of negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the European Union by the end of the year. This is of great importance to all involved parties, as being part of a unified political and economic space can guarantee effective resistance to external aggressors, with Russia being such an aggressor. Romania understands this well.
The autumn of 2023 promises to be geopolitically active in the southern regions of the Republic of Moldova. Political forces funded by fugitive oligarchs Ilan Șor and Vladimir Plahotniuc are stirring up tensions in the autonomous Gagauz region as local elections draw near. The Republic of Moldova has expelled dozens of Russian diplomats in recent weeks
Republic of Găgăuzia
One local leader, the President of the regional legislature, the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, Dmitri Constantinov, does not rule out the creation of a “Gagauz Republic.” He stated in an interview with a TV station from the separatist Transnistria region that “people are demanding it,” although he did not provide evidence of this statement. Constantinov later reaffirmed his statement to the media in Chisinau, stating that the Republic of Moldova has been “somewhat negligent in its attitude towards Gagauzia’s laws.” On September 9, a meeting of deputies of all levels will take place in Comrat, and, as Constantinov mentioned, “it is possible” that “some of the deputies may support this idea.”
Dmitri Constantinov subsequently declared that he would appear before the Prosecutor’s Office if summoned for explanations following his statements about the possible proclamation of the Gagauzia Republic. He also maintains that he is not a proponent of this idea, mentioning that his statement was not correctly understood.
Constantinov’s response came after the Secretary-General of the DA Platform, Liviu Vovc, announced on Facebook that he had filed a complaint with the relevant authorities against him. According to Vovc, the President of the People’s Assembly, in his capacity as a public figure, advocates against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. This comes after he said that Gagauzia could self-proclaim as a “republic.”
Referring to the statements of the local elected official from Gagauzia, Victor Petrov, a political ally of Shor, who had characterized Constantinov’s statements as a provocation that could lead to the elimination of autonomy a few days ago, the President of the People’s Assembly stated that his statement was not correctly understood. Furthermore, a few days after the declaration about creating a republic, Constantinov declared that he was renouncing this idea. “I said that on the 9th, there would be a continuation of the session, where deputies, those with mandates, would be summoned, and I have a mandate. I was asked if the question of the Gagauz Republic could be raised there, and I said I can’t tell you what questions will be discussed there and how they will be voted on. I can’t know. That’s why I can’t guarantee,” he said.
Every year, on August 19th, Gagauzia celebrates the proclamation of the Gagauz Republic. From 1990 to 1994, Gagauzia self-proclaimed itself as a separate republic from Moldova, but from December 1994 to July 1995, Gagauzia was reintegrated into Moldova, becoming an autonomous region.
What is Gagauzia?
Gagauzia is an autonomous region located in the southern part of the Republic of Moldova. It possesses a distinct ethnic, cultural, and linguistic character and is renowned for its predominantly Gagauz population, who speak the Gagauz language, a Turkic language.
Gagauzia has a complex history, with the Gagauz people being descendants of the Oghuz Turks, as some researchers think. They have developed a unique traditional culture, influenced by other peoples who have lived in the area over time, especially in the Balkan region. The Gagauz people were colonized by the Russian Empire in the current region as part of its imperial policy.
Gagauzia obtained the status of an autonomous region within the Republic of Moldova in 1994. This autonomy grants Gagauzia partial control over internal affairs, including the right to choose its local leadership and promote Gagauz culture and language.
The predominant religion in Gagauzia is Orthodox Christianity. The Gagauz Orthodox Church plays a significant role in the religious and cultural life of the region, while also serving as one of the means through which Russian influence is exerted in the area.
The economy of Gagauzia is primarily based on agriculture and the food industry. The region is known for its wine production and animal husbandry.
Relationship with the Republic of Moldova
Gagauzia has a complex relationship with the Republic of Moldova. Over the years, there have been debates and negotiations concerning its status and autonomy. Gagauzia maintains its distinct identity but also collaborates with the central administration of the Republic of Moldova. Gagauzia has its own autonomous government and legislation. It has a regional government and an autonomous president who oversees local affairs.
Certainly, disagreements between Chisinau (the capital of the Republic of Moldova) and Comrat (the capital of Gagauzia) have been present in the relationship between the two entities in recent decades, often related to issues of autonomy, local governance, cultural identity, and control over resources. One of the main sources of tension has been Gagauzia’s autonomous status within the Republic of Moldova. Gagauzia gained its autonomy status in 1994, granting it a significant degree of self-governance in certain areas. However, there have been disagreements regarding the boundaries of this status and the extent to which Gagauzia can exercise its autonomy.
Disputes have also arisen regarding control over resources, including agricultural land, industries, and sources of income. Gagauzia’s economy is largely based on agriculture and the food industry, and questions about rights to these resources can lead to tensions with the central administration in Chisinau.
Political aspects and local elections can also contribute to tensions. In some cases, the election of the president and government of Gagauzia can lead to divergences and affect relations with the central administration of the Republic of Moldova.
Dialogue, negotiation, and a commitment to the peaceful development of the relationship between the two entities are essential for maintaining stability and cooperation in the Republic of Moldova.
Transnistrian Precedent
The threat of a new Transnistrian scenario in the context of Russia’s illegal military aggression against Ukraine should raise questions for all sensible individuals in autonomy. The authorities in Chisinau must swiftly clarify the rights and obligations of both parties, including those of Gagauzia, to remove this leverage favorable to Russian interests.
Just a year ago, Mustafa Şentop, former President of the Turkish Parliament, delivered a message of unity during his visit to Comrat in the context of the war in Ukraine. “The future of Gagauzia is not elsewhere but in Moldova. Gagauzia is an integral part of Moldova. It is more important than ever to have a constructive attitude in relations with Chisinau,” said the former head of the Ankara Legislature, an ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His statements are clear evidence that Gagauz separatist ambitions are fueled by the Russian Federation, while Turkey, a NATO member state and a candidate for EU membership, does not view Gagauzia as an independent state but an integral part of the Republic of Moldova.
Foto: Facebook
The Şor Executive
During a recent special session of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia (APG), deputies managed to approve the structure of the executive committee, but with some reservations, which were accepted by Governor Evghenia Guțul. The condition set by the deputies is that “by November 2023, when the autonomy’s 2024 budget is to be formed, the structure should be optimized, and the number of departments and officials reduced.” The second significant point is the reduction of the budget for maintaining the executive committee’s staff.
Deputy Mihail Jelezoglo reminded that some candidates in the governor’s team did not pass the Gagauz language proficiency exam – Doiceva, Kendighelean, and Cîlcic. “Our approval of these candidates in the executive committee structure will give any court the right to challenge today’s decision of the APG,” he mentioned.
Vice President of the APG Alexandr Tarnavschi stated, “It’s not the governor’s fault that she doesn’t know all the people in the proposed executive committee, as the list was not made by her but by Ilan Şor.” He continued, “You are not to blame for this; perhaps you are an honest person but inexperienced. I believe it would be more honest to resign because you are being used by others. They do not support this executive committee because its members cannot distance themselves from Şor. You will not be able to work because you will not find common ground with Chisinau or European structures,” said the deputy.
Nicolai Dudoglo, former mayor of Comrat, later stated that “we must defend her, and the central authorities should not scare the autonomy authorities with criminal cases. We all need a little patience now that we have chosen a new governor,” he said, emphasizing that Evghenia Guțul “learns quickly and is different now.” He mentioned that he would run as an independent candidate for the position of mayor of Comrat, pointing out his desire to join the political team of oligarch Şor.
Dudoglo admitted that he had suggested that the President of the People’s Assembly, Dmitri Constantinov, resign. “Enough, leave, you’ve done everything you can in this position,” he told him. “I have nothing against Constantinov, but I consider him guilty of the deadlock in Gagauzia,” said Dudoglo, who is close to Vladimir Plahotniuc.
Weak Opposition
Within the autonomy, there are several leaders opposing the feudalization policy promoted by Şor, including the Vice President of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, Alexandr Tarnavschi. He stated that the new governor, Evghenia Guțul, and her team affiliated with the former “ŞOR” Party, which was banned by the Constitutional Court, are not prepared to govern Gagauzia. Vice President of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, Alexandr Tarnavschi, shares this opinion.
It should be noted that the head of autonomy and the team she has presented have not distanced themselves from the unconstitutional “ŞOR” party and the convicted politician Ilan Şor. Furthermore, Guțul does not position herself as the head of Gagauzia for the entire autonomy but as a representative of the “ŞOR” Party, and she constantly speaks about it. This makes the authorities in Chisinau increasingly cautious about Gagauzia, especially since autonomy, after the assumption of power by Evghenia Guțul, is isolated from external partners and donors.
It is hard to believe that the republican authorities will negotiate with the Executive Committee of Comrat, given that without dialogue, you cannot develop the economy and manage social issues. The lack of dialogue between the Moldovan Government and the Executive Committee will worsen the situation in Gagauzia.
On the agenda of the Moldovan Parliament is the draft law of Deputy Radu Marian regarding the reimbursement of taxes to economic agents from the Gagauzia budget. In this case, the lack of dialogue between Comrat and Chisinau can lead to the approval of this project in its initial version, which would mean the collapse of the Gagauzia budget system.
Foto: Facebook
Fantasy Promises
The “ȘOR” Party and its oligarchic leader have promised to build an airport, investments of 500 million euros, and natural gas at 12 lei/m3. These promises have allowed Șor members to exert public pressure, including through massive protests, even though it is evident that the governor will not fulfill these promises.
It should be noted that the deputies of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia have repeatedly refused to discuss topics related to the structure and composition of the new Executive Committee (local government). Parliamentarians are dissatisfied that the proposed list includes individuals affiliated with the fugitive politician Ilan Șor. At the last session held on August 25, deputies only managed to approve the structure of the Committee, suggesting to the governor to modify the list of members and only then seek the vote of the People’s Assembly.
Some deputies expressed dissatisfaction with the candidate for the position of deputy governor, Mihail Vlah. According to them, Vlah was involved in a case of voter bribery during the polling stations set up in Gagauzia during the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria. They also mentioned that the public television station in Gagauzia, GRT, is at risk of disappearing due to mismanagement. Deputies from Gagauzia reminded Guțul about Marina Tauber’s statements, according to which the vote in the People’s Assembly for the new composition of the Executive Committee is “a mere formality.”
By the decision of the People’s Assembly, Evghenia Guțul has until November 15 to present the new composition of the Executive Committee.
Spy War
The situation in Gagauzia has also influenced the recent spy war between Chisinau and Comrat. Dozens of Russian diplomats and their families recently left the territory of the Republic of Moldova after the authorities in Chisinau decided to reduce the staff at the Russian Embassy due to “destabilizing” actions in the country. Some of them carried out official and unofficial activities in southern Moldova. At the end of July, the Moldovan government announced that the number of accredited diplomats and “technical-administrative” staff working at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Chisinau would be reduced from over 80 individuals to 25. Chisinau’s decision came “as a result of numerous unfriendly actions towards the Republic of Moldova, unrelated to diplomatic mandates, as well as attempts to destabilize the internal situation in our country.”
In response, Moscow announced through the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would not remain without a response. “This is a new step towards the destruction of bilateral relations on the part of the regime in Chisinau. In its desire to stand out in front of its Western sponsors in terms of Russophobia, the official Chisinau is falling to ever greater depths, borrowing the Ukrainian and Baltic experiences, as well as standard measures, including public offenses against our country, banning the Russian-language press, and attacking the Russian language,” said Maris Zaharova.
The Chisinau Parliament decided to extend the state of emergency by 60 days, a decision taken at the request of the Government of the Republic of Moldova. The Prime Minister from Chisinau, Dorin Recean, invoked the imminent danger to the security of the country due to the war in Ukraine. The opposition harshly criticized this decision, calling for early parliamentary and presidential elections.
State of emergency
55 deputies voted for the extension of the state of emergency after the prime minister from Chisinau, Dorin Recean, came to the Parliament, presenting the arguments in this regard. “The war is near us, especially lately, when the civilian infrastructure in Odessa is being bombed. The Russian Federation is attacking our neighbors, killing them and making it difficult for them to live. This, indisputably, also affects us by disrupting logistics chains, breaking transport chains and the hybrid war that Russia is waging against the Republic of Moldova”, said the Prime Minister. According to the officials from Chisinau, the risks to the security of the Republic of Moldova are high, including “because of the attacks in the immediate vicinity of the NATO border, in the Odesa and Reni regions, close to the border of the Republic of Moldova. Also, the country will be affected after the suspension of the agreement on the export of grain through the Black Sea basin, imposed by Russia on July 17, which will lead to the increase of grain transit through the country. The authorities also say that the country remains exposed to hybrid warfare, through the promotion of false information, military manipulation and inter-ethnic violence. At the same time, the war in Ukraine could prevent the supply of natural gas and electricity to the Republic of Moldova”.
The Republic of Moldova has been in a state of emergency since February 24, 2022, the day Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, it has been extended several times. According to the act, during the state of emergency, CSE members can issue binding and enforceable provisions for the heads of central and local public administration authorities, economic agents, public institutions, but also for citizens of the Republic of Moldova and foreigners in the country.
The opposition accuses
The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, is dealing with the “witch hunt” in Gagauzia and is taking all possible measures to destabilize the situation in the region, said the oligarch Ilan Șor, convicted in the Republic of Moldova for participating in the famous theft of the billion, launched accusations to the head of state Maia Sandu whom he called a “dictator” who is destabilizing the region. Ilan Şor said that Sandu is trying to show himself in a favorable light in front of the “western masters” before the upcoming elections, through unfriendly actions against UTA Gagauzia. “The elections are approaching and the dictator Sandu must prove that she is not staying in Chisinau and receiving money from the West for nothing. Driven by paranoia, she is organizing a “witch hunt,” said the fugitive politician, who is on the US and EU sanctions list.
For his part, Vlad Batrîncea, the vice-president of the Parliament, the president of the BCS faction, criticized the decision of the Recean government. He pointed out that the opposition expressed against the extension of the state of emergency, a situation in which investments do not come, it is not an economic program. “The state of emergency is convenient only for those who want to make purchases secretly, to manage public money non-transparently, outside of legal and parliamentary procedures.” At the end of the briefing, Vlad Batrîncea reiterated that the country needs early parliamentary elections. According to the deputy, BCS initiated a motion of censure against the Recean government, which is the shortest way to these elections. Vlad Batrîncea urged all the opposition forces in the country, including the extra-parliamentary parties, to consolidate around this idea, to organize free and fair early parliamentary elections, so that people capable of managing public affairs in the interest of the citizens come to power.
Secret Service War The Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS) announced that, after starting the necessary legal procedures, it denounced the Partnership Agreement with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Official notifications have been sent to the authorities of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Service submitted strict measures, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, to denounce the cooperation agreement with the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR), according to a press release from the SIS sent to the media. “Starting with February 24, 2022, with the invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the cooperation relations of the Intelligence and Security Service with the special services of the Russian Federation were stopped, so that the agreements given have no practical applicability, being in fact non-functional. The inconsistency and dissonance of the provisions of these agreements with the national interest and security of the Republic of Moldova argues for the denunciation process initiated by the Intelligence and Security Service”, argued the SIS representatives. Moreover, the provisions of these agreements, signed in 1994, including the additional protocols, represented legal clauses invoked by the Russian Federation to argue the presence of representatives of the Russian special services in the region to the left of the Dniester in the Republic of Moldova. Thus, with the denunciation of these agreements, such “arguments” can no longer be advanced by the Russian Federation, SIS mentions. “The Intelligence and Security Service does not maintain external partnership relations with similar structures of other states, which clearly defy the legislation and act to the detriment of national security, carry out subversive activities against the Republic of Moldova, including undermining the functionality of the state’s democratic institutions, destabilization of the socio-political, economic situation and jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country”, the SIS representatives concluded.
Harsh statements
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Integration of the Republic of Moldova (MAEIE) qualified on Thursday as “false and slanderous” the latest statements of the spokeswoman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zaharova, according to which a rapprochement of Chisinau with NATO would mean the loss of sovereignty by the Republic Moldova, according to the daily Ziarul Naţional from Chişinău. In a statement, the MAEIE emphasizes that it is Russia that does not respect the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and illegally maintains military troops on its territory in Transnistria. “The relations of the Republic of Moldova with various international organizations, including NATO, represent the sovereign and independent decision of our republic. Regarding the Republic of Moldova-NATO partnership, it already has a history of 30 years, being oriented towards the development of the capacities to counter the new complex challenges and ensuring the security of citizens and our state”, the press release states. At the same time, “we mention that the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova does not mean self-isolation. The authorities develop partnerships with those organizations and states that support and contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in our republic”, states the diplomacy from Chisinau. MAEIE recalls that, at the NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11, the North Atlantic Alliance reiterated its support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and respect for the neutrality status of the Republic of Moldova. NATO states also declared that they support the sovereign right of the Republic of Moldova to choose its development model, its foreign policy course and to decide its future without outside interference. “In the same vein, we suggest the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia to read in full article 11 of the Constitution of our country, including paragraph (2) which specifies that the Republic of Moldova does not allow the deployment of military troops of other states on its territory, or namely, the Russian Federation directly violates this article”, concludes the MAEIE statement. The Empire Strikes Back The authorities of the Republic of Moldova should be aware that the country’s approach to NATO leads to a total loss of sovereignty, the spokeswoman of the Russian MFA, Maria Zaharova, said on Thursday, quoted by the official Russian news agency TASS. “Let’s hope that the Moldovan political class is still aware of the fact that (the Republic of Moldova)’s approach to NATO not only does not bring more security, but on the contrary leads to a total loss of sovereignty”, Zaharova declared in a press conference . Russia has repeatedly expressed its position towards the “provocative policy of continuing the expansion of NATO, especially the attraction of the Republic of Moldova into the Alliance, despite its status of neutrality enshrined in its Constitution”, she stated. “We observe a consistent increase in the interaction between pro-Western forces in Chisinau and Euro-Atlantic structures contrary to national interests and without taking into account the opinions of their own citizens”, she added, stating that over 60% of Moldovan citizens oppose their country’s membership in NATO. “Obviously, the Moldovan people, traditionally friendly to Russia, unlike their current leaders, are fully aware of the aggressive nature of the North Atlantic bloc and understand that the situation in neighboring Ukraine was largely caused by irresponsible attempts at expansion of the Alliance”, emphasized Zaharova. “It is unlikely that the population of the Republic of Moldova would want it to become – under the pretext of implementing various partnership formats – another testing ground for geopolitical confrontations”, concluded the spokeswoman of the Russian MFA. Photo: wikipedia Western support The Republic of Moldova received consistent financial support from international organizations. In the most recent example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has approved an additional financing, worth 165 million euros, for the Republic of Moldova to buy natural gas, the president of the EBRD, Odile Renaud-Basso, recently stated in an interview for the Infotag press agency. The EBRD official recalled that last year the financial institution offered the Republic of Moldova a revolving loan of 300 million euros for gas purchases, which helped Moldova to purchase gas from alternative sources in Europe for the first time, instead of taking at the Russian group Gazprom. “In 2023 we will continue to increase funding for Moldova. We have approved an additional financing worth 165 million euros for the purchase of gas… The funds, totaling 465 million euros, will allow the government to buy 75% of the gas the country needs”, said Odile Renaud – Basso.
Gas deliveries frequently caused tensions between the Republic of Moldova and Russia until the end of last year, as until now Chisinau depended almost exclusively on Gazprom for gas imports.
En Conferința pentru Securitate de la Munchen, un fel de ceas deșteptător al problemelor legate de configurația de putere în lume a sunat în acest an „ora înghețului”. Alarma a fost fixată de la Kremlin și a fost premeditată ca atare pentru a face o demonstrație de forță politică la finalul săptămânii trecute. Victima a fost de această dată estul Ucrainei, stat care se îndreaptă, ca toate celelalte țări din sfera de influență ex-sovietică, spre un deznodământ nefericit. Înghețarea conflictului din estul țării în regiunile Donbas și Lugansk sub pretextul respectării Acordurilor de la Minsk.
Decizia Rusiei survine pe fondul unei dezamăgiri, sau mai degrabă a scenariului negativ, în care Donald Trump nu este tocmai „calul de curse” pe care a pariat Moscova în a negocia cu Washington acestă bucată răsăriteană de Europă. Este foarte important de urmărit succesiunea care a condus la această nouă turnură în criza dintre Vest și Est.
Cu câte zile înainte de Conferința de la Munchen, Casa Albă cerea Rusiei să înapoieze Crimeea către Ucraina. Nu numai că nu s-a conformat, dar Rusia a plusat la masa de joc. Putin a decretat recunoașterea pașapoartelor separatiștilor proruși din estul Ucrainei și a plăcuțelor de înmatriculare. Un scenariu care se repetă în paralel și cu regiunea separatistă transnistreană a R. Moldova. Dacă ar fi să folosim și noi în retorică rusească, acest lucru ar echivala cu o „provocare”, dar lucrurile nu se opresc doar aici.
Nu numai extinderea recunoașterii republicilor separatiste de către Rusia în acest spațiu este importantă. Nu doar pașaportizarea în masă în Lugansk, Donbas și Transnistria, ci și pașii programatici care sunt făcuți după un scenariu bine pus la punct. Situația merge și mai departe. Foarte puțini au anticipat următorul pas al Rusiei în această privința. Și anume cel de a-și putea apăra toți cetățenii, inclusiv aceștia mai noi, prin intervenție militară directă în afara granițelor Federației Ruse. Acțiuni ce sunt conforme cu modificările aduse constituției Rusiei în urmă cu câțiva ani. De altfel, precedentul pentru această situație există încă din martie 2014, atunci când în Duma de stat de la Moscova s-a votat în unanimitate propunerea președintelui Vladimir Putin de intervenție militară în Ucraina și anexarea Crimeei.
Dar ce relevanță au pentru Chișinău toate acestea? Într-un astfel de context regional, nu este de mirare că și în Republica Moldova lucrurile se precipită. Republica Moldova este, vrând-nevrând, inclusă în acest malaxor al politicilor rusești în regiune. Vârful de lance al intereselor rusești în R. Moldova îl reprezintă, paradoxal, președintele și partidul său pe care încă îl conduce de facto. De la venirea la putere, Dodon își asediază propria cetate. Vrea să o incendieze din interior pentru ca apoi să o construiască în rânduiala rusească. Dovadă a acestei realități crude este întâlnirea de marți pe care a avut-o cu Candu și Filip. Acestora le-a spus verde-n față că în aprilie se pregătește să semneze Acordul de colaborare cu Uniunea Euroasiatică. Mai mult, că va denunța, după venirea PSRM la putere, a celui existent – Acordul de Asociere a Republicii Moldova la UE.
A fost aleasă și data, respectiv începutul lunii aprilie. Ceea ce ne face să credem că scenariul a fost ticluit încă din timpul vizitei la Moscova din ianuarie. Data nu este deloc una întâmplătoare. În aprilie 2009, Republica Moldova lua drumul european în urma revoltelor anti-comuniste. Un anotimp bun pentru ca PSRM și sateliții politici pro-moscoviți ce gravitează în jurul mișcării anti-UE să încerce, în 2017, să dea o lovitură finală guvernării pro-europene și să pună cruce pe acest parcurs. La întâlnirea de marți cu Dodon, Candu și Pavel au părut mai blajini decât europenii de la Bruxelles, în timp ce Dodon a făcut un spectacol populist de forță și a încercat să măture pe jos cu ei. În mare parte i-a și reușit.
En Conferința pentru Securitate de la Munchen, un fel de ceas deșteptător al problemelor legate de configurația de putere în lume a sunat în acest an „ora înghețului”. Alarma a fost fixată de la Kremlin și a fost premeditată ca atare pentru a face o demonstrație de forță politică la finalul săptămânii trecute. Victima a fost de această dată estul Ucrainei, stat care se îndreaptă, ca toate celelalte țări din sfera de influență ex-sovietică, spre un deznodământ nefericit. Înghețarea conflictului din estul țării în regiunile Donbas și Lugansk sub pretextul respectării Acordurilor de la Minsk.