Since 2022, the Republic of Moldova has been going through the most intense campaign to influence the will of the electorate externally since the proclamation of the former Soviet republic’s independence. Recently, President Maia Sandu pledged to bring the Republic of Moldova into the European Union within the next four years. “It will not be easy, but it will not be impossible,” declared Maia Sandu. “That is why we must continue to work day and night to join the EU as soon as possible. Not in 10-20 years, but in the next 4 years,” she said. As expected, these statements were harshly criticized by pro-Russian political forces.

Clear threats

The President of the Republic of Moldova stated that the Republic of Moldova has already obtained the status of a candidate state and has initiated accession negotiations, something that some considered impossible five years ago. Maia Sandu criticized and preached attempts at internal destabilization, noting that some forces in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova are trying to undermine the state. She emphasized that these actions endanger the country’s security and the EU accession process.

The public report presented by the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) on March 5, 2024 – completed in November 2024 and reconfirmed in March 2025 – demonstrates that the Russian Federation (RF) has moved from occasional propaganda tactics to a large-scale hybrid war, aimed at compromising the European vector and installing a government loyal to the Kremlin in Chisinau.

In the winter of 2022, less than a year after the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin recalibrated its policy towards the former Soviet space. The opportunity arose through simultaneous crises – energy, economic and security. According to SIS, the first clear sign of escalation was the Russian plan for a “rebellion” on the territory of Gagauzia, aimed at forcing Chisinau to abandon pro-EU reforms. In parallel, the network of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor – already definitively sentenced to 15 years for “bank fraud” – became the spearhead of Russian political operations.

The year 2023 brings the first extremely clear public evidence, of course contested by those targeted. The investigation Ilan Shor’s Courier in Moscow published by RISE Moldova shows how paid messengers transported cash from the Russian Federation to Chisinau, avoiding the official banking system. In November 2024, SIS publishes the Report on the complex operation “UTA Gagauzia”, ​​identifying the “Victory bloc” – a political platform without legal personality registered in Moscow, but coordinated in the Republic of Moldova through four front parties (Sansa, Renaștere, Forța Alternativa, Victory). The 2024-2025 five-year term becomes a “total electoral year” (presidential, referendum, parliamentary), and the RF allocates increased resources: clandestine financing, religious soft-power, digital call-centers and paramilitary training camps.

Paramilitary training and black money

In July 2024, according to SIS, a training ground was organized on the outskirts of Moscow where 115 young Moldovans learned techniques for penetrating police cordons, urban combat tactics, and the use of pyrotechnic devices. A few months later, the headquarters of the CEC, TRM, and the Government became targets of vandalism with paint – incidents confirmed by the General Inspectorate of Police. The campaign culminated in October 2024, when, at the request of SIS, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrested a Russian instructor suspected of training “urban guerrilla groups.”

The SIS report describes an impressive pyramid scheme: coordinating staff (Moscow) → executive staff (Chisinau) → 119 territorial cells → 1,900 primary cells → 33,000 activists → 84,000 targeted sympathizers. The activist receives 2,000 lei monthly, respectively 3,000 lei in October of the campaign – an amount confirmed by video interceptions presented by Ziarul de Garda, and also taken over by international media. The objective of each activist: “recruit 5-10 voters for payment”.

In April 2024, the Russian NGO EVRAZIA was born, registered in Moscow by the former accountant of the Shor Party, Nelli Parutenco. The board of directors includes deputies of the “United Rossiya” party – additional evidence that the initiative belongs to the Russian ruling elite. EVRAZIA becomes the financial-logistical hub, being financed through fictitious grants, “employment” contracts and MIR cards issued by the sanctioned bank Promsvyazbank. The “Get to Know Russia” excursions, “Land of Childhood” camps or “Eurasia – Continent of Opportunities” seminars were used for cover;

Ziarul de Garda published in October 2024 images of Marina Tauber explaining to activists when the “Moscow salaries” would be resumed. Anticorruption prosecutors later confirmed that 3 million lei in cash was seized after 30 simultaneous searches. In addition, StopFals and MediaGuard investigations identify over 160 local Telegram channels running identical narratives, from “Western colonization” to “obligatory LGBT education,” all citing Ilan Shor’s personal account.

The war for the soul of the Republic of Moldova

A few weeks ago, the Sensika platform, which specializes in global media monitoring and analysis, published its first report on strategic cyber threats. Titled CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory, the document analyzed 643,601 articles from 45 countries, published between December 2024 and March 2025. The findings provide a broad look at a vast Russian disinformation campaign that is trying to adapt after several Russian news portals and TV channels were blocked in several European countries.

At the center of the report is the “Pravda” network – a new media entity that emerged amid the disappearance of Russia Today and Sputnik from the European space, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By the beginning of 2025, “Pravda” had transformed into a true global propaganda ecosystem: approximately 190 sites and over 140 subdomains broadcast content in 83 countries, in multiple languages ​​- including regional idioms, such as Catalan or Basque.

According to an investigation by DFRLab, the operation is being led by TigerWeb, an IT company in Crimea with direct ties to the Russian occupation administration and Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. The content promoted by “Pravda” is mainly taken from Russian sources and Telegram channels that spread unverified and manipulative content. The report shows that this ecosystem disseminates news adjusted with “surgical precision” to suit the specifics of each country.

The document published by Sensika indicates three main regions targeted by disinformation campaigns: the former Soviet space, the Balkans and Central Europe. The preferred targets appear to be states with significant Russian-speaking communities, countries with Euro-Atlantic aspirations and democracies in transition or less consolidated.

There is also a strong disproportionality in the volume of content broadcast and the share of the population. For example, in the former Soviet Union countries – Moldova, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Lithuania, Georgia and Ukraine – which account for only 5.8% of the total population covered, 35.8% of the content is allocated to them. In contrast, the countries of Western Europe, which cover 43.7% of the population, are allocated only 21.3% of the content published by “Pravda”. Just over 16% of all publications are directed at the Balkan states, where 3.2% of the targeted population is located.

Repetitive propaganda

The SIS report, cited above, shows how, after the suspension of licenses for seven Russian re-transmitting TV stations, the information front is moving to Telegram, TikTok and Facebook. The MediaGuard analysis (July 2024) finds that “Telegram and TikTok have become the main propaganda tools”, generating millions of views per week. The SIS report corroborates: 160 Telegram channels, 90 TikTok, 70 Facebook groups, 43 VKontakte bot-farms.

Paid campaigns on Meta use dozens of anonymous pages – Moldova Culturală Plus, Valorile Moldovenești, etc. – with budgets of over 138,000 euros in 2024. The recurring narratives used are already known: “Europe takes your children and forces you to be LGBT”; “The government brings war through military cooperation with NATO”; “Șor pays pensions and low tariffs – proof that Moscow’s money helps ordinary people”.

Between August and September 2024, several hundred priests and parishioners of the Moldovan Metropolis (subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate) receive invitations to “pilgrimages” to Russia. Upon their return, SIS documents contracts signed with EVRAZIA for MIR cards and payments of $1,000/priest. The clergy are instructed to collect signatures against the EU referendum and to broadcast anti-Western sermons. In October, Dmitri Chistilin – a Russian-Ukrainian double agent – ​​is declared undesirable after proving to be a “point of contact” between EVRAZIA and the clergy.

Hybrid attack

On the day of the first round of the presidential elections (October 20, 2024), the CEC web infrastructure and the alegeri.md portal suffer three waves of DDoS attacks, mostly originating from Russian IPs masked by VPN. STISC quickly implements geofencing; however, the update of voter turnout is delayed by almost an hour, fueling online conspiracies about “voting fraud.”

At the same time, Russia Today sends reporter Konstantin Pridybaylo to the Moscow polling station, who makes live broadcasts on Telegram that are instantly picked up by RT, amplifying the narrative of the “persecuted Russian-speaking diaspora.” SIS notes that a few minutes later, anonymous local channels were replicating the same frames and subtitles, a sign that they had received a video feed as a package.

The most serious argument in the report remains the “hard” component. Between June 19-24, 2024, 115 young Moldovans participated in a training course coordinated by the youth organization of “Edinaia Rossia” (Molodaia Gvardia). The lessons included: tactics for “disarming” law enforcement; using spray paint as a weapon of blindness; releasing detained accomplices; urban sabotage with stones, eggs, and paint balloons.

On September 22, several institutions in Chisinau (Public Television, SCJ, CEC) were vandalized exactly according to the script. Two of the detained persons admitted that they were paid 5,000 euros for “image operations”. In parallel, a small group was sent to a camp in Bosnia, where instructor Konstantin Goloskokov (known for his connections with Wagner) teaches “psychology of protest masses” and “drone operators”. According to the BiH MIA, a Russian citizen Alexandr Bezrukovni was arrested for paramilitary activity – confirming the SIS conclusions.

Financial assault

The key to any interference remains, of course, financing. In 2024, SIS identified four major channels: cash carriers on FR → KIV flights; Promsvyazbank & MIR cards – accounts opened remotely using stolen data; P2P transfers from Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) with cash-out in RM; crypto: USDT runs on Bybit/Binance, conversion to local “providers” who exchange USDT for lei on the black market (5-7% commission).

The police and PCCOCS organized over 100 searches in October 2024: district leaders, currency exchanges, shell companies; 3 million lei and hundreds of bank cards were seized. The mechanism of “youth grants” actually masked electoral payments to the target electorate. SIS warns that the network recruits students to open accounts, in exchange for 1,000 lei and 30% of the amount for each cash “outtake”. Such networks have eroded the Moldovan AML system, and the National Bank of the Republic of Moldova has summoned bankers to block cards with suspicious patterns.

Media surveys

In May 2023, RISE Moldova (May 2023) demonstrated how Ilan Shor’s couriers transport financial resources from Moscow. The investigation follows two intermediaries who transport, monthly, 300,000 USD in double envelopes, hidden among religious souvenirs. Reporters film the moment when the money is picked up at Sheremetyevo Airport and delivered to an apartment in the Rîșcani sector.

Ziarul de Garda published the investigation under the name Inside the Pyramid between August and October 2024. Three months of hidden camera footage shows how activists make voter lists, promise 3,000 lei/month “until the vote” and deliver motivational video clips received on Telegram from “sponsors in Moscow”.

Unimedia published in March 2024 an interview with the head of the SIS in Chisinau, Alexandru Musteață, who mentioned “Telegram and TikTok are the main tools; plans for aggressive protests in March and the reactivation of the separatist vector in Gagauzia”.

These investigations confirm the SIS claims and provide narrative details missing from the classified documents: names of intermediaries, transport routes, screenshots, audio files. The synergy between the press and state institutions increased public pressure and legitimized the countermeasures.

In the Parliament session of April 17, 2025, President Maia Sandu articulated, for 35 minutes, the firmest position since her inauguration. “The hybrid attack on the Republic of Moldova is not just a political challenge, but a direct danger to our democracy. We will not give in to blackmail, manipulation or dirty money. Our country will freely decide whether to go towards Europe,” she declared.

It identifies five directions of action: (1) tougher laws against external party financing; (2) strengthening SIS and STISC; (3) strategic partnership with the EU for cybersecurity; (4) depoliticization of the Church; (5) media education on a national scale.

Although the pro-Russian opposition left the room, the speech had a galvanizing effect: referendum volunteers registered on the Votez UE platform within 24 hours, and the president’s trust rating rose to 54% (IRI poll, May 2025).

Institutional response

Internally, SIS reported that 147 information notes were sent to the Prosecutor’s Office, IGP, CEC, NBM. Key results achieved include blocking web access to Promsvyazbank; freezing hundreds of accounts linked to MIR cards; revoking the accreditation of 8 OSCE observers with GRU links; closing dozens of anonymous pages on the Facebook network (collaboration with Meta);

Externally, Chisinau has requested assistance from EPPO and EUROPOL to track the funds. France has provided data on payments to front NGOs, and Lithuania has confirmed the “Trustee Plus UAB” license used to issue virtual Visa cards.

On the cyber dimension, STISC launched the Cyber-Shield MD program with EU4Digital funding. Measures: DNS firewall, sharing of indicators with CERT-EU, joint exercise with SANS-Institute – training 150 Moldovan specialists.

Impact and scenarios

Legitimacy of the electoral process – the IDIS survey shows that 61% of respondents believe that “dirty money” can change the outcome of the vote. Social polarization is a permanent danger, and pro-Russian identity narratives manage to secure 30% of the electorate, especially in Gagauzia, Taraclia, and the municipalities of Balti and Tiraspol for the Russian Federation and its representatives in politics in Chisinau.

According to one scenario considered by experts, the resilience of Moldovan institutions will increase. The government could adopt an anti-oligarch law, the CEC introduces real-time reporting of funding, the NBM finalizes the register of accounts. The impact would be profound, with the Russian Federation forced to reduce its spending.

Another scenario analyzed by experts assumes the rapid adaptation of the Russian Federation, with Moscow moving to an intensive system of crypto micro-payments and the use of deepfakes strategies with generative AI, and the Telegram network would become even more opaque to authorities in different states.

A more violent scenario, analyzed by officials and experts, assumes an escalation of violence, with paramilitary networks taking action in Chisinau and other major cities in the Republic of Moldova, attempting to occupy the Parliament and other public institutions on the night of the announcement of the referendum results.

The Russian Federation’s interference in the Moldovan elections is not an isolated episode, but a multi-year, multi-sectoral campaign, combining money, religion, media and brute force. The SIS report – corroborated with the investigations of RISE, Ziarul de Garda, StopFals, Unimedia and with the warnings of President Maia Sandu – demonstrates that democracy can be eroded without tanks, only through “cash, click & chaos”. However, the coordinated response of Moldovan institutions, EU support and the mobilization of civil society have shown that resilience is possible.

The challenge for 2025-2026 will be to transform these defensive measures into permanent policies: full transparency of financing, media culture, cybersecurity and independent justice. Only in this way can the Republic of Moldova protect its European option – not by banning ideas, but by immunizing society against lies and poisoned money. As Maia Sandu said at the Parliament rostrum, “Moldova is no longer alone”. But external solidarity must be doubled by internal responsibility. Hybrid war is not won in the trenches, but in the mind and wallet of every citizen.

Effects of war

The President acknowledged that the Moldovan economy is affected by the war in Ukraine and global instability. She stressed that access to the European Union market and pre-accession funds are important advantages for Moldova. “Moldova’s exports to the European Union represent 67% of the total. Unlike other small countries, we have this guarantee – that despite all the trade wars, we can benefit from free access to the European Union market,” she said. Maia Sandu promised to continue investing in education, innovation and agriculture to increase the country’s competitiveness. She noted that Moldova will start benefiting from pre-accession funds, and the Growth Plan for Moldova, which involves 1.9 billion euros in support from the European Union, is just the beginning.

In her recent speech, the President of the Republic of Moldova also addressed the reform of the judiciary, acknowledging that this is a major challenge. She stressed that although progress has been made, much remains to be done to ensure an independent and fair judiciary. “There are no magic solutions to fix a long-defective judiciary, you cannot do it in a day or a year. But there are actions that can get us there,” she said. Maia Sandu noted that, in the last four years, 140 judges have left the judicial system, and the cleaning of the system continues. She promised to continue the fight against corruption and asked citizens to decide whether they want to continue on this path or return to old practices. Concluding her speech, Maia Sandu conveyed a message of hope, emphasizing that Moldova has real reasons for hope and that, together, they can build a protected, wealthy and joyful country. “We have peace, we have friends, we are on the European path. Moldova has the chance to grow and offer its citizens a dignified life,” she concluded.

Orthodox Phalanx

The role of the Orthodox Church of Moldova (directly subordinate to the Russian Patriarchate) in the mechanism of Russian influence is extremely important. The Metropolitanate of Chisinau and All Moldova (MCÎM), led by Metropolitan Vladimir (Cantarean), controls approximately 85% of the parishes in the former Soviet republic, as well as all of the historical monasteries.

The Moscow Patriarchate treats the MCIM as a canonical outpost in the post-Soviet space. Key themes of Russian propaganda appear in sermons and church media: “traditional values ​​threatened by the West”, “European Union imposes ‘LGBT ideology’”, “Moldova’s neutrality is sacred”. The messages are reposted by Telegram channels affiliated with the “Victory” bloc, counting on the social authority of the clergy. MediaGuard analysis from 2024 shows that quotes from sermons reached, on average, 600,000 views per week on Telegram.

The pilgrimages funded by the Russian Patriarchate, organized between July and September 2024, involved nearly 500 Moldovan priests and parishioners, who were transported to Moscow free of charge to receive “spiritual support”, but unofficially training sessions were organized on the “dangers of EU accession”.

Contracts with the Russian NGO “EVRAZIA” are extensive and frequent. The press from the Republic of Moldova published the model contract signed in Moscow: the clergy received MIR cards issued by the sanctioned bank Promsvyazbank and an allowance of 1,000 USD, with the obligation to “support EVRAZIA projects in the Republic of Moldova.”

As part of the electoral mobilization process and against the referendum for European integration, MCÎM clergy were asked to collect signatures against the EU accession referendum (during March-August 2024), to promote pre-packaged messages in liturgies and at religious events (e.g.: “Way of the Cross / Peace March” in September 2024) or to broadcast live from in front of polling stations in European states, where there is a diaspora originating from the Republic of Moldova, actions of an anti-European propagandistic nature.

Subversive actions

The MCÎM manages over 1,200 parishes, monasteries, dozens of theological schools and a network of social NGOs, partially financed by grants coming through the Department of External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, but also from European organizations, the funds being used for purposes other than those declared.

According to officials of the security services of the Republic of Moldova, several dozen information notes dedicated to “exploiting the ecclesiastical factor” were sent to the Government and Parliament in Chisinau in 2024.

On October 14, 2024, the EU Council added EURASIA to the list of entities sanctioned for “destabilizing actions in the Republic of Moldova”, a measure reflected by the media in the former Soviet republic.

After Maia Sandu’s speech on April 17, 2025, the Government put into consultation a draft law that prohibits external financing of religious groups for political purposes and fines the involvement of clergy in electoral campaigns.

The Russian Church in Moldova functions as a “platform of moral legitimacy” for the Kremlin’s narratives. Access to rural communities, spiritual authority, and social-care network make the MCIM a multiplier of political messages that is difficult to counter with purely secular tools. In 2024, its involvement became more professional: written contracts, bank cards, communication “manuals” received on Telegram – a sign that Russian actors consider the religious vector essential in the electoral equation.

At the same time, internal resistance – priests leaving Moscow’s jurisdiction – shows that the MCÎM is not monolithic, although the process is still slowed down.

Gagauzia and Taraclia

In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in September 2025, Gagauzia and Taraclia have become the most visible pieces of the mechanism through which the Russian Federation is trying to maintain its political influence in the Republic of Moldova. Both regions, with distinct ethnic identities and traditionally skeptical of Chisinau’s pro-European orientation, are today connected to Moscow not only through cultural affinities, but also through a financial and logistical architecture that transforms them into true controlled voting basins.

The first step was to seize local and regional leadership positions. With the election of Evghenia Guțul as the Bashkan of Gagauzia in the 2023 elections, the network of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor found the ideal partner to establish a Russian-sponsored “social model” in Comrat. In April 2024, Guțul signed an agreement in Moscow with the state-owned bank Promsvyazbank and the NGO “Evrazia”, which is on the list of entities sanctioned by the EU for hybrid interference; the document paved the way for monthly payments of 2,000 Moldovan lei for about a quarter of Gagauzia’s population, money officially presented as “philanthropic donations”.

At the same time, ten Russian regions – from St. Petersburg to Tatarstan – have already concluded “interregional cooperation” protocols with the Gagauz autonomy, consolidating a parallel network of influence that bypasses the central government.

The scheme was replicated in 2024 in Taraclia, the compact Bulgarian district in the south, where Mayor Veaceslav Lupov facilitated the expansion of the “Eurasia program” to local pensioners and civil servants. Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War note that the payments, of about $100 per month, target up to 20 percent of each region’s population and create an economic dependency directly managed by Moscow.

Money for protests

Through MIR cards issued by Promsvyazbank, beneficiaries are registered in a unified database, which allows for their rapid mobilization for voting or protests, according to the scenarios described by the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova.

This social-financial mechanism is accompanied by a campaign of political legitimacy. In February 2024, a “congress of deputies” in Tiraspol officially asked for Russia’s help against “pressure from Chisinau and NATO.” The message was repeated almost identically in Comrat by the “Victory” group, Shor’s electoral vehicle, underlining the narrative that the southern regions could become, if necessary, hotbeds of contesting the election results.

On local social networks, television stations in Gagauzia and Taraclia broadcast talk shows sponsored by the Shor Foundation, where the 2025 elections are presented as a “last chance” to block EU accession.

According to the SIS report, ATMs in Bender and Ribnita, where MIR cards work unhindered, are being used to withdraw cash intended for paid activists. In Taraclia, agro-industrial halls are being transformed into warehouses for electoral materials imported from the Giurgiulesti–Vulcănești route. From here, minibuses with Gagauzian license plates deliver posters, banners and T-shirts to the central districts of the country, avoiding the control filters around Chisinau.

Just a few months before the official start of the parliamentary campaign, Chisinau is trying to break this cycle. In March 2025, Bashkana Evghenia Guțul was detained at Chisinau Airport by anti-corruption prosecutors, on charges of illegal financing of the “Victory” campaign.

Harsh reaction

The Kremlin’s reaction – which condemned the arrest as “political repression” – shows the importance of the Gagauz leader’s figure for Russian plans. Meanwhile, the National Bank froze 180 MIR cards issued in the names of residents of Gagauzia and Taraclia, and the EU extended the sanctions regime to the Evrazia structure and other local officials involved.

However, the social effects of the “Russian salary” are already being felt. In Gagauz villages, anti-European discourse is intertwined with the fear that “Brussels will stop Moscow’s money,” and in Taraclia, propaganda exploits the cultural connection with Bulgaria to insinuate that the EU will impose the union of Moldova with Romania. In these conditions, electoral experts warn that every vote obtained through economic loyalty could be converted into essential parliamentary mandates for a new pro-Russian majority in 2025.

The Gagauzia and Taraclia regions are complementary tools for the Russian Federation’s strategy: testing grounds for electoral-based “social assistance,” logistical corridors for opaque financing, and reservoirs of identity narratives designed to fracture the electorate. The success or failure of this tactic will depend on how quickly Chisinau, supported by its European partners, manages to break the circle of money coming through Promsvyazbank, offer credible economic alternatives, and impose absolute transparency on local campaign financing. The 2025 elections will not only be a test for Moldovan democracy, but also a silent referendum on the EU’s ability to counter, in real time, a hybrid influence model calibrated specifically for the vulnerable terrain of Moldova’s southern regions.

Transnistria Redoubt

This fall, on September 28, the Republic of Moldova will elect its future parliament under the pressure of the most sophisticated arsenal of influence that the Kremlin has ever mobilized in the Dniester. The political campaign has already begun in the laboratories of Tiraspol, where the separatist regime is preparing the electorate to become, once again, the maneuvering table for Russian interests.

The political signal was given as early as February 28, 2024, when the so-called “congress of deputies of all levels” of Transnistria officially asked the State Duma in Moscow for “protective measures” against Chisinau. The declaration, identical in tone to the annexation demands from the Ukrainian Donbas, was designed to legitimize possible interventions under the pretext of defending “Russian compatriots.”

Since then, the officials of the occupation regime in Tiraspol have not even tried to hide their intentions or the prepared scenario. If the pro-European forces remain in power after the elections, the region could demand recognition from Moscow, thus blocking the European path of the entire country, the media believe.

There are also means of military pressure, accessible to Tiraspol or Moscow. On the left bank of the Dniester River, there are approximately 1,500 soldiers from the Russian Task Force (GOTR), formally assigned to a “peacekeeping mission”. Although the contingent is aging and official rotations have been practically impossible since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the presence of the Russian flag on the Cobasna depot, where about 20,000 tons of Soviet ammunition are located, remains a factor of strategic intimidation. Kiev periodically reminds that the depot can be exploited as a pretext for a false flag operation or as a direct threat to the energy security of the region. The vast majority of soldiers in this occupation contingent are recruited locally, from among citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

Electoral phalanx

In March 2025, the GOTR and the Transnistrian militia organized a “repulsion of Ukrainian saboteurs” exercise, broadcast live on local television. The main message was that the troops in the region “are ready to intervene in the event of election-related unrest in Chisinau.”

The manipulation of the Transnistrian electorate, however, has a numerical stake as important as the military factor. Approximately 220,000 Moldovan citizens residing in the region have valid documents and, in previous elections, were transported to the right bank of the Dniester in an organized manner, in buses paid for by foundations close to Moscow. Investigations published in March 2025 show that in the presidential elections and the EU referendum in 2024, over 35 million euros were spent on buying votes, part of which came through Promsvyazbank and ATMs in Bender.

For September 2025, the same financial infrastructure is already recalibrated: MIR cards continue to be funded, and “electoral stipends” vary between 50 and 80 euros per voter, according to an SIS note quoted by the Chisinau press.

The energy crisis that began on January 1, 2025, when the flow of Russian gas through Ukraine was stopped, provided the Tiraspol regime with another weapon against Chisinau. Over 50,000 households were left without heat, and the Transnistrian authorities accused the Moldovan government of “economic sabotage,” although the problem was Gazprom’s refusal to find alternative routes. Chisinau offered humanitarian aid and energy from Romania, a proposal that Tiraspol rejected in order to maintain the narrative of a “Western siege.” In parallel, separatist leaders promised that “Russia will not allow Moldova to freeze Transnistria,” reviving the theme of Russian military protection for the region.

The propaganda war

Propaganda is making its way into the landscape with equal intensity. The public broadcaster in Tiraspol rebroadcasts daily talk shows on Rossiya-1 and TV Zvezda, and local Telegram networks distribute clips against European integration. In October 2024, the DFRLab laboratory identified over 40 Transnistrian channels participating in coordinated campaigns with anonymous pages from Gagauzia and Taraclia, a sign that the Kremlin’s information operation is synchronizing its messages across the entire Moldovan territory.

Smuggling remains the source of funding that fuels the parallel system in the region. The Transnistrian corridor, traditionally used for cigarettes and alcohol to the EU, has been adapted to transport cash destined for pro-Russian parties. According to the Customs Service of the Republic of Moldova, in 2024 over 14 million euros in cash were confiscated at the crossing points with Transnistria, part of the amounts being linked to the network of activists of the “Victory” bloc. SIS sources claim that the real flow is at least triple, and the network includes officials from the local border police and decision-makers from the Sheriff holding.

All these elements converge in a scenario of hybrid pressure: organized bought and transported votes, military depot used as a blackmail factor, energy crisis meant to stir up civil anger, and non-stop propaganda portraying the government in Chisinau as a “NATO agent.” For the Russian Federation, Transnistria is not just a military outpost, but a political and economic multiplier through which it can reverse the result of a decisive election.

Moldova, for its part, is trying to respond with anti-smuggling measures and a social package that includes energy compensation for the region’s residents, but the impact of these policies depends on the speed of delivery and Chisinau’s ability to convince the Transnistrian population that European support is more reliable than Russian. In the absence of a negotiated reintegration solution, the 2025 elections will demonstrate whether the Kremlin’s hybrid mechanism can transform Transnistria from a frozen conflict into a hot vote against Moldova’s European future.

Hybrid offensive

Moscow has been testing a whole hybrid toolkit in Moldova in recent years, and the 2025 parliamentary elections will be the moment when the Kremlin will try to combine all these tools into a single electoral maneuver. This time, the focus is no longer only on the traditional bastions – Transnistria, Gagauzia or Taraclia – but on other minorities dispersed throughout the rest of the country: Russians, Ukrainians, Roma and even emerging communities of economic migrants with dual citizenship.

Together, they account for almost 10% of the population according to provisional data from the 2024 census – 4.9% Ukrainians, 3.2% Russians and just under half a percent Roma – a sufficient electoral mass to decide the balance in a close election.

The first lever is “passportization”. In the last two years, Russian authorities have accelerated the processing of citizenship applications submitted by Russians and Ukrainians from the Republic of Moldova. The Ministry of Justice in Chisinau admits that it cannot cope with the volume, over 70% of applicants being citizens of the Russian Federation, and another 20% citizens of Ukraine.

A Russian passport automatically means access to the MIR payment system and the so-called “social measures” promised by Moscow: child allowances, energy compensation, scholarships. In 2025, these benefits will be converted into a “moral obligation” to vote for pro-Russian lists, especially in cities with a high density of Russian speakers – Bălţi, Tighina, Chişinău and areas in the north of the Moldovan Republic.

The second lever is the dependence on remittances. Even after Moldovan banks reduced direct transfers from Russia, in the first quarter of 2024 Moldovan residents received another $435 million from the Russian Federation, or about a quarter of all money sent home by migrant workers. An administrative order from Moscow could accelerate or freeze these flows, turning the subsistence economy of tens of thousands of families into a political pressure button. Warnings are already circulating on Telegram that the “Sandu government” could “confiscate” money coming from relatives in Russia – a message intended to stir up insecurity and push beneficiaries towards parties openly declared to be friendly to the Kremlin.

Parallel networks

In parallel, the network of Russian cultural organizations – cultural centers, “Russkiy Mir” centers, language circles – received instructions to mobilize their students to vote in the form of cultural excursions. The scholarship for Russian-speaking students, for example, already requires the signing of a “civic cooperation agreement” that obliges the participant to support “Russian strategic projects in the CIS space,” which implicitly includes pro-Kremlin Moldovan electoral campaigns. In 2024, almost a thousand Russian-speaking high school students and students benefited from these scholarships, with paid tickets to “Lomonosov” University or to summer camps in Sochi, according to the model already applied for young people in Gagauzia.

Roma communities, although numerically small, are vulnerable to vote-buying. In the rural districts of Cahul, Soroca, and Soldanesti, local police reports mention the distribution of food packages and 500-700 lei in exchange for an oath to photograph the ballot paper – a tactic that investigators link to intermediaries close to the former “SOR” bloc. As Roma often face the lack of updated identity documents, philanthropic foundations established in the Russian Federation have offered to pay the fees for issuing Moldovan passports, conditioning the aid on supporting lists of “the common people” at the polls.

The vote of the diaspora in Russia should not be neglected either. According to the OSW Observatory, in 2023 over 220,000 Moldovans were legally working in the Russian Federation.

In 2025 they will have polling stations in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large urban centers, and the logistics of transportation have long been taken over by the satellite NGOs of the Russian Embassy.

Above all these levers looms the symbolic military threat. The Russian Forces Task Force in Transnistria can at any time launch exercises to “defend minorities” on the Dniester. Even if the troops do not move from their barracks, the psychological effect on Russian-speaking minorities is strong: “Russia is here, it protects you, vote with those who guarantee peace.” The public station in Tiraspol rebroadcasts such messages daily, and the echo reaches mixed villages in the districts of Călăraşi, Hînceşti or Drochia, where the Russian or Ukrainian population, although numerically reduced, can tilt the result in the polling stations with low turnout.

The Kremlin’s stakes are not limited to separatist enclaves or formalized ethnic autonomies. The 2025 strategy targets the diaspora from the European Union, Great Britain, Russia, or other states, Russian-speaking urban minorities, Ukrainian communities in the north and west, and poor Roma groups in rural areas. Combining passporting, social packages paid in rubles, Russian-language propaganda, and direct vote-buying mechanisms, the Russian Federation can transform an electoral fragment of 8-10% into a pivot capable of deciding parliamentary majorities in Chisinau. If these plans are not countered with full transparency in campaign financing, European logistical support for vote supervision, and rapid countermeasures against MIR flows, any democratic outcome risks being confiscated by a geopolitical game from which minorities, in reality, gain nothing.