Since Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has significantly escalated disinformation targeting Moldova, aiming to undermine its pro‑European trajectory and stoke internal divisions. Key narratives include questioning the security benefits of EU membership, portraying Ukraine’s refugees as a burden, and framing Moldova’s leadership, particularly President Maia Sandu, as Western puppets. These campaigns leverage Russian state‑controlled media, covert social media operations, and local proxies in the breakaway regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia. Despite narrowly passing an EU accession referendum, Moldova remains highly polarized, revealing the potency of Kremlin disinformation and the urgent need for robust countermeasures.

BACKGROUND

Geopolitical Crossroads

Moldova sits at a pivotal crossroads between the European Union and the Russian sphere of influence, sharing borders with Romania (an EU and NATO member) to the west and war‑torn Ukraine to the east. This geography makes Chisinau both a gateway for Western support to Ukraine and a potential corridor for Moscow should it seek to open a new front toward Odesa. Economically, Moldova has historically relied on Gazprom for nearly all its natural gas needs, a dependency Moscow has weaponized—threatening to cut supplies during harsh winters in 2022 and again in early 2025—to extract political concessions and stoke domestic unrest. In response, the Sandu government has spearheaded EU‑backed energy diversification, unbundling pipelines from Gazprom control and linking Moldova’s grid to Romania, reducing the Kremlin’s leverage.

Breakaway Region: Transnistria

Transnistria, a narrow strip along the Dniester River, declared de facto independence following the 1992 conflict, which saw Russia’s 14th Guards Army intervene on behalf of separatists. Today, roughly 1,500 Russian troops remain stationed there under the guise of “peacekeepers,” maintaining an arsenal at Cobasna and emboldening Tiraspol’s refusal to reintegrate with Moldova. Kremlin‑linked propaganda outlets in Transnistria routinely amplify narratives that Brussels is indifferent to Moldovan security, portraying EU membership as a Trojan horse dragging the country into war. In early 2024, Transnistrian authorities even appealed directly to Moscow for “protection” after Chisinau imposed stricter customs controls, highlighting both the enclave’s economic vulnerability and ongoing politicization of Russian support. Analysts warn that this frozen conflict remains the most dangerous flashpoint for a wider Russian‑Ukrainian spillover.

Autonomous Gagauzia

Gagauzia, home to some 140,000 mainly Turkic‑speaking Orthodox Christians, secured autonomous status in 1994 but remains fully within Moldova’s legal framework. Unlike Transnistria’s unrecognized statehood, Gagauzia’s 35 % turnout referenda have repeatedly favored closer ties with Moscow, driven by economic dependency on Russian markets and a sense of cultural affinity. In March 2025, the region’s pro‑Russian leader, Eugenia Gutul, was placed under house arrest on corruption and electoral‑fraud charges, underscoring Chisinau’s determination to curb external influence—even as Gagauz politicians continue to leverage Kremlin‑backed narratives to sow skepticism about EU integration. Civil‑society experts warn that Gagauzia acts as a “Trojan horse,” fueling domestic polarization and limiting national resilience to hybrid threats.

Sandu’s 2020 Election and Kremlin Intensification

Maia Sandu’s December 2020 victory, on a staunchly pro‑European and anti‑corruption platform, marked a turning point in Moldovan politics—ousting the pro‑Russian Party of Socialists and challenging Moscow’s influence. In retaliation, Kremlin operatives escalated disinformation campaigns, cyber‑attacks, and vote‑buying schemes ahead of both the October 2024 presidential vote and the EU referendum, attempting to delegitimize Sandu as a “Western puppet”. The European Parliament formally condemned these provocations in mid‑2024, urging member states to bolster Chisinau’s counter‑disinformation capacities and sanction individuals undermining Moldova’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s intelligence confirmed intercepting Russian plans to “destroy” Moldova’s democratic institutions, a testament to the coordinated nature of hybrid threats emanating from Moscow. Chisinau’s subsequent reforms—in media literacy, cybersecurity, and legal restrictions on foreign‑funded NGOs—reflect an urgent effort to inoculate Moldova against further subversion.

THE CAMPAIGN UNFOLDS

Surge of Disinformation Post‑Invasion

Almost overnight after February 24, 2022, Kremlin-aligned outlets and affiliated proxies flooded Moldovan information channels with narratives framing the Ukrainian “special operation” as a defensive war against NATO expansion, and casting EU integration as a strategic blunder for Chisinau.
This rapid escalation marked a qualitative shift: whereas pre‑2022 operations were episodic and reactive, the post‑invasion campaign adopted a continuous, 24/7 rhythm—mirroring the pace of Russia’s broader hybrid warfare in Ukraine.

International Warnings and Diplomatic Alerts

In July 2024, at parallel events in Washington, both U.S. and Moldovan officials publicly accused Moscow of orchestrating disinformation to subvert Moldova’s democratic processes, specifically targeting the October 20 election that bundled a crucial EU‑membership referendum.
Senior U.S. State Department representatives went on record to describe Russia’s tactics as “remarkably sophisticated,” warning that Moscow leveraged its diplomatic networks and intelligence services to coordinate messaging across European capitals.
Moldovan delegates echoed these concerns before Congressional committees, detailing intercepted communications that linked Russian security services directly to local troll farms and deep‑state alumni in Transnistria.

State‑Media Amplification and Local Proxy Outlets

Russia’s flagship broadcasters—RT and Sputnik—doubled down on Romanian‑ and Russian‑language programming specifically tailored to Moldovan audiences, blending genuine news with manufactured “exposes” of EU malaise.
These narratives were rebroadcast by a network of local proxies—including KP Moldova (a branch of Komsomolskaya Pravda) and “Arguments & Facts Moldova”—which lent a veneer of grassroots credibility to Kremlin talking points.
In Transnistria and Gagauzia, state‑licensed channels openly partnered with Moscow’s information apparatus, creating mirror‑site news portals that imitated Chisinau’s major outlets but injected pro‑Russian commentary and voter‑suppression appeals.

Shadowy Digital Networks and Deepfake Operations

Beyond broadcast media, Russia deployed coordinated Telegram channels—later traced by DFRLab to automated networks in St. Petersburg—that peddled sensationalist rumors about refugee‑crime waves and EU “militarization” of Moldova.
On Facebook and YouTube, troll farms amplified these claims, while freshly minted “mirror politics” websites siphoned traffic from legitimate news portals, then redirected users to Kremlin‑friendly commentaries .
Deepfake videos of President Maia Sandu—purporting to show her mocking rural citizens or endorsing EU policies that allegedly “enslave” farmers—circulated widely, eroding trust in official communications and fueling conspiracy theories.

Financial Incentives and Vote‑Manipulation Schemes

Concurrent with overt messaging, covert funding networks emerged—most notably the “Evrazia” organization, financed by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor—which paid voters up to 1,000 lei each to either boycott the referendum or cast ballots against EU accession.
Moldovan police investigations uncovered mass vote‑buying rings in rural districts, where cash‑for‑votes leaflets were distributed alongside QR codes linking to illicit funding accounts in Moscow.
These schemes were bolstered by shadowy “political order” narratives on DisinfoLab‑tracked sites, claiming that Chisinau’s EU alignment was ordered by unseen Western masters—thus normalizing overt manipulation as “resistance” to foreign control.

PEAK BEFORE THE REFERENDUM

Coordinated Broadcast Blitz

Russian state broadcasters RT‑Moldova and Sputnik ramped up Romanian‑language programming claiming that a “Yes” vote would hand Moldova over to NATO war planners, effectively portraying Brussels as a direct security threat. Local proxy outlets—most notably KP Moldova and Arguments & Facts Moldova—echoed these messages as “homegrown” reporting, erasing the line between independent journalism and Kremlin talking points.

Energy Coercion and Economic Fear Tactics

Gazprom‑linked entities revived “energy blackmail” narratives, warning that EU alignment would trigger new gas‑cutoff threats and provoke harsh winter shortages—tapping into the collective memory of the 2022 supply disruptions. Meanwhile, political resolutions in Brussels explicitly flagged Russia’s use of economic coercion—sanctioned in an EU Parliamentary motion condemning “illegal funding” and “provocation” aimed at derailing Moldova’s European path.

Digital Subterfuge and Deepfakes

Cyber‑forensics teams traced hundreds of cloned profiles on Facebook and Telegram back to Russian proxy networks, which systematically spread rumors about NATO bases and EU‑imposed sanctions to fracture public consensus. In February 2024, deepfake footage surfaced on TikTok and Telegram falsely depicting President Maia Sandu denouncing Moldovan farmers—an effort to erode trust in official channels and destabilize rural support for the referendum.

Grassroots Pressure and Vote Manipulation

Investigations later revealed that the “Evrazia” network, financed by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, disbursed cash and food vouchers across rural Gagauzia to incentivize “No” votes and abstentions. Police reports documented QR codes distributed in affected villages, linking to offshore accounts in Russia that released payments only after recipients confirmed their pledge to oppose the referendum.

International Monitoring and Countermeasures

Moldova’s Supreme Security Council partnered with EUvsDisinfo and RFE/RL to flag and debunk over 50 high‑impact false narratives between December 2023 and March 2024, issuing weekly advisories to inoculate citizens against Kremlin talking points. On March 20, 2024, the EU’s European External Action Service formally condemned the “unprecedented interference” in Moldova’s sovereign decision, leading to targeted sanctions on key propagandists and funding networks. An Atlantic Council report highlighted that this referendum served as a testbed for Russia’s evolving hybrid‑warfare doctrine—seamlessly integrating legacy broadcast tactics with AI‑driven microtargeting and deepfakes. NPR journalists also noted that threats of violence at polling sites and targeted harassment campaigns further illustrated the Kremlin’s multi‑layered approach to disrupting the vote.

CHANNELS AND TACTICS

State Media & Local Proxies

Russian state‑controlled outlets like Sputnik and RT produce tailored content in both Romanian and Russian, framing EU integration as a Western imposition that threatens Moldova’s sovereignty and security. These segments are then rebroadcast by ostensibly “independent” local platforms in Transnistria and Gagauzia—such as regional branches of Komsomolskaya Pravda and Arguments & Facts—lending Kremlin talking points a veneer of grassroots legitimacy.
Local proxies often punctuate high‑level geopolitical claims with human‑interest stories (e.g., rural families allegedly forced off their land by EU regulations), making abstract fears feel immediate and personal. This localization tactic not only deepens emotional resonance but also bypasses journalistic scrutiny, as small outlets face less regulatory oversight than national channels.

Social‑Media Operations

As traditional outlets faced pushback, Moscow pivoted to social platforms—deploying covert troll farms and bot networks on Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, and YouTube to amplify fearmongering about refugee‑burden crises and energy cut‑off threats. BBC Monitoring notes that after initial reliance on broadcast media, Kremlin actors migrated their “hybrid war” tactics to social‑media ecosystems where algorithmic amplification ensures rapid, viral spread.
Analysts from RFE/RL detail how “mirror‑politics” websites—cloned designs of reputable news sites—siphoned readers from legitimate portals and redirected them to pro‑Kremlin commentaries, while deepfake videos portraying President Sandu mocking Moldovan farmers were seeded on TikTok to erode trust in official communications. Meta’s own takedown of coordinated inauthentic behavior ahead of the October 2024 vote—removing dozens of Facebook and Instagram assets—underscores both the scale of these networks and the challenges of digital platform enforcement.

Covert Funding & Deepfakes

Beyond pure messaging, the Kremlin leverages financial inducements: the OCCRP‑investigated ‘Evrazia’ organization, backed by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, systematically paid rural voters in Gagauzia and Transnistria up to 1,000 lei each to cast “No” ballots or abstain from the EU referendum. UK sanctions announced in April 2025 froze assets and travel of key Evrazia figures, reflecting growing Western resolve to disrupt illicit funding channels.
Simultaneously, deepfake technology has emerged as a force multiplier: Balkan Insight reported a doctored video falsely showing Sandu endorsing Western sanctions that would starve Moldovan households, prompting an urgent presidential refutation and legal inquiry. German Marshall Fund experts warn that such synthetic‑media attacks not only mislead voters but corrode the very foundations of shared evidence, making verification increasingly fraught

CASE STUDY: WAGNER‑TIED TRAINING

In mid‑October 2024, Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate stunned the public by unveiling a covert operation in which instructors linked to Russia’s Wagner mercenary group had trained young Moldovans in violent tactics designed to foment unrest immediately ahead of the EU‑membership referendum. Viorel Cernauteanu, head of the Inspectorate, detailed at a Chişinău press briefing that the scheme involved structured sessions on crowd control, sabotage techniques, and the use of rudimentary weapons—knowledge expressly weaponized to destabilize polling stations and public demonstrations.

Scope and Demographics

Authorities estimate that over 300 young people—predominantly men aged 18–25 from rural districts in Gagauzia, the north‑east, and around Transnistria—were funneled abroad for training between June and October 2024. Many participants were recruited under the false guise of “cultural exchange” programs, only to find themselves in remote camps in Russia, Bosnia, and Serbia where they received instruction in “mass‑riot facilitation” and improvised explosive deployment.

Training Itinerary and Tactics

Investigations revealed a rotating itinerary: initial indoctrination in Russia focused on ideological framing and basic physical drills, followed by advanced guerrilla modules in Wagner‑affiliated Balkan camps—particularly in Bosnia’s Una‑Sana Canton—where a Russian national, Aleksandr Bezrukavy, oversaw sessions on Molotov‑cocktail construction and urban ambush tactics. Test exercises reportedly included simulated checkpoint raids and “flash mob” protests taught to disperse quickly after vandalizing public property.

Operational Coordination and Funding

Evidence links the training network to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, whose “Evrazia” operation funded travel, accommodation, and stipends of up to 1,000 lei per recruit, effectively turning economic incentives into a weapon of influence. Logistics were managed through shadowy shell companies registered in Russia, with travel documents issued under cultural‑tourism cover and transport arranged via routes through Serbia and Bosnia to evade Moldovan border controls.

Government and International Response

Following the exposé, Chişinău detained four coordinators and issued an international arrest warrant for Alekandr Bezrukavy; Bosnia‑Herzegovina moved to expel him on charges of inciting unrest. The EU condemned the operation as “unprecedented interference” in Moldova’s sovereign decision, imposing asset freezes on key Wagner affiliates and Shor‑linked entities. Moldovan prosecutors have opened a dedicated hybrid‑threats unit to pursue remaining facilitators and strengthen legal tools against foreign‑sponsored subversion.

Critical Analysis and Future Implications

This Wagner‑tied training operation exemplifies Russia’s evolution from mass broadcast propaganda to kinetic‑digital hybrid warfare, merging boots‑on‑the‑ground tactics with AI‑amplified disinformation to achieve rapid, localized destabilization. By targeting youths—often disaffected by economic hardship—Moscow leverages social fracture points, ensuring that unrest can be ignited without overt troop deployments. The operation’s transnational nature underscores the necessity for Moldova and its partners to bolster cross‑border intelligence sharing, tighten cultural‑exchange screening, and pre‑emptively map out extremist training networks before critical democratic milestones. Without such measures, similar plots could surface in Romania, Ukraine, or the broader Black Sea region, where the Kremlin continues to test the thresholds of democratic resilience.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Media Restrictions and Information Security

Moldova has progressively outlawed Russian news outlets deemed vectors of Kremlin propaganda. Since June 2022, television broadcasters have been barred from airing news and analysis from RT, Sputnik, and other state‑controlled agencies—permitting only non‑political entertainment content. In October 2023, authorities extended this to the internet, blocking access to over 20 Russian media websites cited as part of an “information war” against Chişinău. These actions rest on the 2022 Informational Security Law, which empowered the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) to ban outlets “undermining national security”.

In December 2022, the Justice Ministry temporarily suspended six pro‑Russian TV channels for “incorrect information” about the war in Ukraine—an early test of Moldova’s willingness to curb broadcasted disinformation. Ahead of the March 2024 referendum, the SIS again banned seven predominantly Russian websites, including RIA Novosti, citing “national security risks” and pre‑emptively closing down channels identified in espionage‑style monitoring.

Legal and Regulatory Reforms

Chişinău has overhauled its legal framework to choke off foreign malign funding. In May 2024, the Justice Ministry petitioned the courts to restrict the pro‑Russian Șor Party (“Chance”), citing incomplete financial disclosures and violations of electoral-law provisions on foreign financing. Soon after, Parliament approved amendments to the NGO Law mandating stringent reporting for organizations receiving external funds for any “political” activities—echoing the Russian “foreign agents” model, but aimed at transparency rather than suppression.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Dorin Recean revealed that Russian agents had spent some €200 million on vote‑buying and illicit influence campaigns in 2024—roughly 1 percent of Moldova’s GDP—to rig the presidential election and EU referendum, prompting Parliament to toughen penalties for organized vote‑buying and illicit financing.

Institutional Strengthening and Intelligence Sharing

To coordinate these efforts, the SIS established a dedicated “hybrid‑threats” unit in late 2024, integrating counter‑disinformation, cyber‑security, and economic‑security specialists under one roof. The government also launched a media‑literacy campaign in partnership with local universities, training over 5,000 journalists and educators to spot deepfakes and troll‑farm tactics before critical votes.

Trilateral Initiative with Romania and Ukraine

Chişinău has actively sought regional solidarity. On July 5, 2024, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine signed a landmark agreement to exchange threat‑intelligence, best practices in strategic communication, and joint rapid‑response protocols for emerging disinformation crises. Building on that foundation, on March 30, 2025, their foreign ministers convened in Chişinău to reaffirm and deepen this trilateral cooperation, pledging real‑time data‑sharing on hybrid threats, coordinated media campaigns for resilience, and joint training exercises for STRATCOM personnel.

EU Condemnation and Sanctions

The European Union has publicly denounced Russia’s actions in Moldova as “unprecedented interference,” with an EEAS spokesperson warning that “we are witnessing an unprecedented hybrid attack on our information space”. In response, Brussels imposed targeted sanctions on Kremlin propagandists and network nodes implicated in the March 2024 referendum interference, while the European Parliament passed a resolution demanding asset freezes on individuals and entities undermining Moldova’s democratic processes.

French President Emmanuel Macron also condemned the “blatant destabilization attempts” by Moscow, pledging enhanced French support for Moldova’s information‑security capacities and promising to expand EU funding streams for counter‑disinformation.

UK and Other Western Actions

In April 2025, the United Kingdom sanctioned the pro‑Russian network “Evrazia,” freezing assets and travel of its leaders, including Ilan Shor’s associates—citing clear evidence of vote‑buying schemes ahead of both the presidential election and referendum. The U.S. State Department has similarly issued warnings to banks and fintech firms to block illicit flows tied to Moldovan vote‑manipulation, reinforcing a transatlantic front to choke off Kremlin funding channels.

Diplomatic Reprisals

Chişinău went further by expelling three Russian diplomats in late March 2025, accusing them of facilitating the escape of a pro‑Kremlin MP from a 12‑year sentence—an incident the government decried as “direct interference” in Moldova’s judicial sovereignty. Moscow’s subsequent retaliation remains muted, reflecting its calculation that overt diplomatic conflict could deepen Moldova’s Western alignment.

OUTLOOK

As Moldova advances along the EU accession path, analysts warn that Russian influence operations are likely to become more sophisticated and adaptive. Gone are the days of overt propaganda and clumsy misinformation—today’s campaigns increasingly rely on generative AI, manipulated video content, and cloned social-media personas to sow confusion and division at scale. These tools allow hostile actors to simulate trusted local voices, flood information channels with conflicting narratives, and generate deepfake content indistinguishable from reality. With public trust already strained by economic hardship, inflation, and lingering skepticism in historically pro-Russian regions like Gagauzia and Transnistria, the risk is not just short-term political turbulence, but a sustained corrosion of democratic confidence. Moscow has shown it is willing to invest heavily in microtargeting campaigns, financial inducements for vote manipulation, and psychological operations that tap into fears about identity, sovereignty, and geopolitical alignment.

In response, Moldova must move from defensive posture to long-term strategic resilience. This requires more than just banning disinformation outlets or expelling foreign agents—it means embedding media literacy into school curricula, strengthening independent journalism through sustainable funding, and institutionalizing fact-checking across government communication channels. Equally vital is sustained international support: EU financial packages should prioritize digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and electoral transparency, while NATO partners must continue intelligence sharing on hybrid threats. Moldova’s civil society, which played a crucial role in pushing back against 2024’s disinformation blitz, needs greater protection and capacity-building to withstand what is likely to be a persistent, well-resourced assault. The next phase of Moldova’s European integration will not be judged only by its diplomatic milestones, but by its ability to maintain social cohesion and democratic integrity in the face of continued information warfare.

SOURCES: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Reuters, European External Action Service, EUvsDisinfo, Digital Forensic Research Lab., Freedom Housela postura defensivă la reziliența strategică pe termen lung. Acest lucru necesită mai mult decât interzicerea mijloacelor de dezinformare sau expulzarea agenților străini—înseamnă încorporarea educației media în programele școlare, consolidarea jurnalismului independent prin finanțare durabilă și instituționalizarea verificării faptelor pe canalele de comunicare guvernamentale. La fel de important este sprijinul internațional susținut: pachetele financiare ale UE ar trebui să acorde prioritate infrastructurii digitale, securității cibernetice și transparenței electorale, în timp ce partenerii NATO trebuie să continue schimbul de informații privind amenințările hibride. Societatea civilă din Moldova, care a jucat un rol crucial în respingerea blitzului de dezinformare din 2024, are nevoie de o protecție mai mare și de consolidarea capacităților pentru a rezista la ceea ce este probabil un atac persistent, cu resurse bune. Următoarea fază a integrării europene a Republicii Moldova nu va fi judecată doar după reperele sale diplomatice, ci și după capacitatea sa de a menține coeziunea socială și integritatea democratică în fața războiului informațional continuu.

SURSE: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Reuters, European External Action Service, EUvsDisinfo, Digital Forensic Research Lab., Freedom House