Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi: It is essential for the pace of cooperation between Bucharest and Kyiv to not only remain in good standing but also to strengthen further

Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi: It is essential for the pace of cooperation between Bucharest and Kyiv to not only remain in good standing but also to strengthen further

Mr. Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi is a  Doctor of Political Sciences, Senior Specialist at the Hennady Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, which operates under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kiev. He answered our questions about the war, Ukrainian peace conditions and the strategic relations between Ukraine and Romania.

KP:. We passed the 600-day mark since the beginning of the illegal Russian military invasion. What is the current situation on the front lines? How much longer do you think it will take to fully liberate the territories occupied by the Russian Federation?

S.Z.: Overall, the situation on the front remains very tense. Russian forces continue to attack Ukrainian forces. However, Ukraine is putting up a strong resistance and conducting counteroffensive operations. In addition, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are launching attacks on the enemy’s rear positions, such as airfields, ammunition depots, seaports, fleet vessels, and so on. This may help in stopping and pushing back the enemy’s forces.

Currently, it is difficult to predict how long the combat operations will continue, especially in the context of the de-occupation of Ukrainian territories. However, the active phase, according to many forecasts, could last for at least a year. It is not ruled out that a very pessimistic scenario is possible, where the war could stretch over several years.

K.P.. Some Western media outlets believe that the current counteroffensive by the Ukrainian army is taking place under unequal conditions. What types of weaponry do the Ukrainian armed forces still require?

S.Z.: I believe that the Russian-Ukrainian war is, in general, an asymmetric conflict, given the differences in size, capabilities, and the number of personnel between Russia and Ukraine. This presents a significant challenge for Kyiv, which is trying to not only defend itself but also to counterattack in unequal conditions.

Ukraine requires various types of modern weaponry that, due to their significantly advanced technological characteristics, could compensate for the numerical composition of the mostly outdated enemy’s arsenal. Among other things, Kyiv needs artillery systems, long-range missile projectiles, air defense systems, next-generation aviation technology, modern armored vehicles and versatile unmanned aerial vehicles.

K.P.: What is the current role of Transnistria in the Russian war strategy, and how will Ukraine respond to this threat? How do you see the evolution of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine?

S.Z.: Transnistria remains an area of instability near the Ukrainian border. Its role as a Russian “enclave” has been reinforced during the Russian-Ukrainian war. This is because at any convenient moment for the Kremlin, the operational group of Russian forces in Transnistria could become active and strike Ukraine.

The situation forces Kyiv to maintain a contingent of around 10,000 troops near the border of the unrecognized republic, which are essential for combat operations. Transnistria also poses a potential threat to Chisinau.

It’s not ruled out that the problem could be resolved through military means. However, as stated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a press conference after the European Political Community summit held in Bulboaca, Ukraine might engage in military action on the territory of Transnistria but only at the request of the Moldovan government.

Regarding the state of Ukrainian-Moldovan relations, they are considered stable and neighborly. This is because, among other reasons, both countries share common challenges and are moving towards European Union membership.

K.P.: The tactic employed by Ukraine has forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to partially withdraw from the Crimean region. Can Kyiv ensure the security of maritime transport? How can Ukraine be assisted by Western partners in this regard?

S.Z.: Kyiv is attempting to ensure the security of maritime transport, including by striking at the military infrastructure of the occupied Russian-controlled Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. To some extent, they have been successful in this endeavor.

However, the situation is complex. In this context, it is crucial for Western partners to continue providing military assistance, such as aerial and naval drones, long-range missile projectiles, up-to-date intelligence/satellite data, and more. Additionally, political, diplomatic, economic, sanctions, and other forms of pressure on Moscow are equally important.

K.P.: What are the conditions under which Ukraine is prepared to engage in peace negotiations, considering that all Western partners have stated that Ukraine is the one to decide when and under what conditions these negotiations will be initiated?

S.Z.: Ukraine is prepared to engage in peace negotiations, and official statements from Kyiv have made this clear on multiple occasions. However, they insist that all points of the Ukrainian “peace formula” be met before negotiations can proceed. These points include: Implementation of the UN Charter and the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the world order; Withdrawal of Russian forces and cessation of hostilities; Justice, including holding a tribunal for those responsible for the aggression and compensation for damages; Release of all detainees and deported individuals; Security guarantees for Ukraine; Radiological and nuclear safety; Food security and other related issues.

It is also crucial that Russia renounces any territorial claims to Ukraine, which would entail amending the Russian Constitution and other laws to remove any affiliation of five Ukrainian regions with the Russian Federation.

K.P.: President Zelensky has made a series of visits to the United States, Canada, and NATO headquarters. How will the relations between Kyiv and its Western partners evolve?

S.Z.: Western partners have been supporting Ukraine and providing resources to counter Russian aggression. There is also considerable emphasis on post-war reconstruction in Ukraine and support for its European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Given that the collective West continues to keep Ukraine in its focus, there is hope that this attention will persist until Ukraine achieves full integration with the Western world. This ongoing support and engagement with Western partners are essential for Ukraine’s stability, security, and its path toward further integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

K.P.: President Zelensky recently made an official visit to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart, Klaus Iohannis. The two heads of state signed a Strategic Partnership, elevating the level of relations between the two countries. Also the governments of Romania and Ukraine hold a joint sesion in the ukrainian capital city. What are Kyiv’s expectations from this agreement? What more can Romania do to support Ukraine?

S.Z.: Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made a visit to Romania, where he had a meeting with his counterpart Klaus Iohannis. This was the first visit of a Ukrainian leader to Romania since the onset of the major war.

During President Zelensky’s visit to Romania, an agreement was reached to establish a training center for Ukrainian F-16 pilots. Bucharest is also expected to provide Ukraine with air defense systems and artillery. Additionally, the launch of a new corridor for the export of Ukrainian grain through Moldova to Romania was announced.

The fact that Iohannis and Zelensky declared that Romania and Ukraine have entered into a strategic partnership agreement is seen as a significant step that elevates the level of relations between the two countries to a qualitatively new level.

It is essential for the pace of cooperation between Bucharest and Kyiv to not only remain in good standing but also to strengthen further. This should be understood in the context of military cooperation as well as other potential areas of collaboration.

It is noteworthy that the Romanian leader expressed support for the Ukrainian “formula of peace” and stated that only Ukraine will determine when and how to conduct peace negotiations.

Furthermore, Klaus Iohannis expressed support for the commencement of negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the European Union by the end of the year. This is of great importance to all involved parties, as being part of a unified political and economic space can guarantee effective resistance to external aggressors, with Russia being such an aggressor. Romania understands this well.

Share our work
Ukraine: War, Peace and European Dreams

Ukraine: War, Peace and European Dreams

The Ukrainian army is advancing slowly on the southern front in an attempt to achieve more results before the fall sets in, while the Russian army has concentrated over 420,000 soldiers on the ground to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensive. “We must reclaim our land,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared in an interview with CNN.

Hopes in Kiev

Zelensky’s statement comes amid reports of Ukrainian forces advancing towards Tokmak, a significant railway junction in the south used by the Russian army to maintain the front in the region. “Ukraine will not back down, will not abandon its own territory. We will never do that,” Zelensky added, reiterating that the war would be long, as a frozen conflict does not mean peace.

Zelensky acknowledges the slowdown of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which he attributed to Russia’s aerial superiority and the slow delivery of Western arms. “Some things are on the way. Many people say the counteroffensive is too slow, but some things are on the way,” he insisted.

In this regard, he assured that he would once again discuss with American partners the need to supply Kiev with long-range ATACMS missiles, which are expected to be received as early as this fall.

In any case, the war will not have a happy ending, Zelensky said. “This is not a movie that lasts an hour and a half (…) There will be no ‘happy end.’ We have lost a lot of people,” the Ukrainian president stated.

Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar indicated that in the past week, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has managed to recapture 4.8 square kilometers of territory in the southwest of the Donetsk region and the neighboring Zaporizhia region. Maliar explained that with the recovery of this territory, Ukrainian forces attacking on these two segments of the front line have liberated a total of 256.5 square kilometers since Ukraine began its counteroffensive in early June.

Race Against the Weather

While senior American officials claim that Ukraine has between 30 and 45 days to continue its counteroffensive before worsening weather conditions, Kirilo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, has stated that adverse weather will not hinder Kiev from pursuing its plans. “Last autumn, combat actions did not cease. This year will be the same,” he asserted, promising that the offensive “in all directions will continue.”

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in its daily report on Monday, estimates that “cold and wet weather will impact but not stop” Kiev’s operations.

In turn, Russia is said to have concentrated around 420,000 troops in the occupied territories to thwart Kiev and launch its own offensive, according to Ukrainian sources. Moscow is thus attempting to “take revenge” and regain some of the territories liberated by Ukraine last year, such as extensive areas in the Kharkiv region, as indicated by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Furthermore, Russian forces aim to gain full control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east, one of the primary objectives of their military intervention in Ukraine, according to GUR.

Black Sea, Theater of War

Officials in Kiev have announced that Ukraine has recaptured two oil and gas drilling platforms from the Russians in the Black Sea, which had been under Moscow’s control since 2015 and were located close to the annexed Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

“Ukraine has taken control of ‘Vishki Boika’ (Boiko Towers),” announced the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s intelligence service (GUR) in a statement. During a “unique operation,” “clashes took place between Ukrainian special forces on board ships and a Russian Su-30 fighter jet,” the statement added, stating that “the Russian plane was damaged and had to retreat.”

During the operation, other “valuable trophies” were also captured, such as helicopter ammunition and a radar system capable of tracking the movement of ships in the Black Sea, GUR further reported.

The statement recalls that Russia had occupied these platforms since 2015 when it annexed Crimea in 2014, and Moscow had been using them for military purposes since the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia has not yet commented on this information, and the cited news agencies have not been able to independently verify GUR’s information. “For Ukraine, regaining control of the Boiko Towers has strategic importance, and as a result, Russia has lost the ability to use them for military purposes,” GUR emphasized in a video posted on Telegram.

“Russia is now deprived of the ability to fully control the waters of the Black Sea, and this means that Ukraine has taken significant steps toward the liberation of Crimea,” the GUR statement concludes. Before Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine extracted a significant portion of natural gas from the Black Sea, supplying gas not only to Crimea but also to mainland Ukrainian regions.

Foto: wikipedia
Foto: wikipedia

Billions for Ukraine

In 2024, Ukraine will need financial assistance from the United States in the range of $12 to $14 billion, as budgetary expenses remain high amid the Russian invasion, stated Ukrainian Finance Minister Serghei Marcenko on Monday.

Marcenko also expressed hope that the interim budget of the United States would be approved soon, allowing Ukraine to receive an additional $3.3 billion by the end of the year to cover the budget deficit. “There are no discussions yet, there is a lot of uncertainty, and we are not confident that this is guaranteed,” said Serghei Marcenko at a business forum held in Kiev.

Marcenko added that in 2024, the ministry he heads would like to receive funding from the United States for the state budget at a level similar to this year. “Not lower than this year: somewhere between $12 and $14 billion. That’s what we expect,” Serghei Marcenko stated.

Ukraine received nearly $10 billion in financial aid from the United States this year to cover the budget deficit, and Ukrainian authorities estimate that their needs will not diminish next year as the Ukrainian army makes slow progress in its counteroffensive.

Although U.S. President Joe Biden has requested emergency funds of $24 billion to respond to the war in Ukraine, the next tranche of American aid for Ukraine has faced political obstacles as the United States enters a cycle of presidential elections.

Ukraine’s new Defense Minister, Rustem Umerov, stated last week that he would request a budget increase for defense this year by 251 billion hryvnias ($6.8 billion), given that military expenses are rising day by day.

Finance Minister Serghei Marcenko mentioned that the Kiev government would discuss the Defense Minister’s request at the next meeting but appreciated that “I’m not sure we’ll be able to cover all the needs” mentioned by Rustem Umerov.

War for Peace

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated on Tuesday that a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine is not yet in sight, as Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine continues.

Although key actors have sometimes been brought together for discussions, Germany must not turn its back on the daily brutality of the war, Scholz emphasized during the “International Meeting of Religions and Cultures in Dialogue” forum in Berlin, an annual event organized by the lay Catholic movement Sant’Egidio.

“This requires effort and time,” the German Chancellor said about peace negotiations. “Time that we actually don’t have, because in the meantime, Russia continues to bomb, torture, and kill in Ukraine,” he added. As the basis for any peace, “the Russian leadership must understand that it is about the withdrawal of troops,” Olaf Scholz stressed: “Then there will be the possibility for discussions, and the Ukrainian government will participate, I am sure of that.”

Over 18 months since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the Chancellor rejected the “narratives” that a peace deal had already been negotiated between Ukraine and Russia in the spring of 2022 but had been sabotaged by the United States or the United Kingdom. “No, it’s not true,” Scholz firmly stated, thus refuting one of the “narratives” that Moscow has recently been pushing.

He stated that any “common understanding” that might have been found in the early days of the war “was destroyed because the Russian president used that time to move his troops around Ukraine after the failure of the attack on the capital Kiev and to begin the assault on eastern Ukraine.”

Scholz once again defended the delivery of German arms to Ukraine: “We will continue to support Ukraine in its right to self-defense as long as necessary.”

Foto: Facebook

Moscow Sets Conditions

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on Tuesday that the cancellation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decree prohibiting dialogue with Moscow should be the first step for negotiations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, according to the official Russian news agency TASS. The same idea was expressed during the day by Russian President Vladimir Putin at an economic forum in Vladivostok (Russia’s Far East), as reported by the Russian press. Lavrov opined that the longer Kiev postpones negotiations with Moscow, the more challenging it will be to negotiate later.

“This is our official position; I will say it again: against the backdrop of the ban on negotiations signed by (Ukrainian President Vladimir) Zelensky, this position should not raise any questions,” Sergei Lavrov said in an interview on Rossia-1 television.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree in October 2022 officially declaring the ‘impossibility’ of any negotiations between Kiev and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, effectively leaving the door open for discussions with Russia.

Zelensky promulgated the decree after the Kremlin declared the annexation of four Ukrainian regions occupied by the Russian army, which Moscow still only partially controls at present – Luhansk and Donetsk in the east, and Kherson and Zaporizhia in the south.

“He (Putin) does not know what dignity and honesty are. Therefore, we are willing to engage in dialogue with Russia, but with a different Russian president,” Zelensky stated at the time, as quoted by Reuters.

Putin’s Threat

Ukraine may begin peace negotiations only when it runs out of resources and will use any potential cessation of hostilities to rearm with the help of the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday.

The war has devastated areas in eastern and southern Ukraine, killed or injured hundreds of thousands, and triggered the most significant rupture in Russia’s relations with the West since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Speaking at an economic forum in Russia’s Pacific port city of Vladivostok, Putin stated that Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russian forces thus far has failed, and the Ukrainian army has suffered heavy losses.

“I have the impression that they want to bite as much as they can and then, when their resources are almost zero, seek a cessation of hostilities and start negotiations to replenish their resources and restore their fighting capacity,” Putin said.

The President added that many potential mediators have asked him if Russia is ready to cease fighting, but he has stated that Russia cannot stop as long as it faces a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

For any chance of discussions, Putin noted that Ukraine should first lift its self-imposed legal ban on peace talks and explain what it wants.

Tough Confrontation

Russia controls approximately 18% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, which it annexed in 2014, and territories in eastern and southern Ukraine seized in 2022.

Putin also stated that the West’s decision to supply Ukraine with cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions is a crime, but such deliveries, while potentially prolonging the war, will not change its ultimate outcome.

He also criticized the West’s decision to provide Ukraine with F-16 aircraft.

When asked if Russia needs to introduce a new mandatory mobilization, Putin stated that 1,000-1,500 Russians sign voluntary contracts daily to join the army.

In the last six or seven months, 270,000 people have signed voluntary contracts, Putin said—a slightly lower figure than the 280,000 announced by former President Dmitry Medvedev earlier this month.

Foto: Wikipedia

Illegal Annexations

The Kremlin insisted on Monday that negotiations with Ukraine are possible only if Kiev recognizes the reality created on the ground, referring to the Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia in September 2022.

“In any case, the regime in Kiev will have to discuss based on the recognition of the realities that emerged after it refused to resolve the issues peacefully in March (2022),” following the failed negotiations in Istanbul between Russia and Ukraine, held a month after the war began, said Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman for the Russian presidency.

At the same time, the Kremlin’s spokesperson stated that there are currently no prerequisites for a return to negotiations. “At present, there are no prerequisites for the resumption of the negotiation process,” Peskov stated.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not appear willing to negotiate. “Everyone wants this war to end, but it must end on fair and sustainable terms that reflect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Blinken said in an interview with ABC News.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in an interview with The Economist over the weekend, said he is emotionally prepared for a long-lasting war and believes that “this is not a favorable moment” for possible negotiations with Russia, as the counteroffensive continues, and Moscow sees Ukraine’s difficulties on the battlefield, according to Ukrainska Pravda.

European Dreams

Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated during a visit to Kiev that Ukraine’s place is in the European Union, and Kiev can count on us and our vision of EU expansion as a necessary geopolitical consequence of Russia’s war, as reported by German media.

“Ukraine already has candidate status. And now we are preparing to make a decision on opening discussions on EU accession,” Baerbock said.

According to her, Ukraine’s results regarding judicial reform and media legislation are already impressive, but there is still a long way to go in implementing anti-oligarch legislation and fighting corruption. The European Union itself must “work quickly to ensure that we are positioned adequately for more seats at the table,” explained the Berlin representative.

Furthermore, the German Foreign Minister referred to reports of Ukrainian children being deported to Russia, stating that those responsible for the crimes must be brought to justice. Germany supports organizations and authorities “that provide traumatized children with a safe and secure home,” she said.

“The first step toward peace is for Putin to let these children return home,” Baerbock added. The issue is to be addressed at the UN General Assembly.

Annalena Baerbock’s visit to Ukraine is the fourth since the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022. The German Foreign Minister arrived in Kiev by train from Poland as Ukrainian airspace remains closed.

Last May, Baerbock became the first member of the German executive to travel to Ukraine since the start of the war. On that occasion, she visited Bucha, near Kiev, the site of horrifying Russian troop atrocities against civilians. Annalena Baerbock also visited Ukraine in mid-September last year and in January of this year.

Share our work
Does a multipolar world begin at the Black Sea?

Does a multipolar world begin at the Black Sea?

The issue of the emerging multipolar world is a hot topic in global geopolitics. Hans Morgenthau believed that multipolar systems are less prone to war as they are more flexible in deterring conflict and limiting potentially dangerous states. For proponents of this configuration, flexibility in alignment was a virtue. On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer believed that bipolar systems (the United States vs. the USSR) were preferable as they were more stable, with the two major powers knowing that there was a natural counterbalance against any attempt to change the status quo.

Foto: Wikipedia

As we presented in the first part of the material dedicated to this highly relevant topic, the motive behind the formation of a multipolar world is the desire to coalesce a part of the world into a geopolitical and economic pole that competes with American unipolarity. The reasons behind the decisions of these entities or states to create a power pole capable of counterbalancing America’s and its allies’ dominance are complex and tied to the historical developments of the world after World War II.

For 45 years, the major victors of Germany and Japan, the USA and the USSR, led global affairs. However, subsequent historical developments have confirmed the rise of other states that are increasingly unwilling to accept the domination of the international stage by a single conductor. The beginning of this multipolar alternative is an organic process that has unfolded over the years but is also accompanied by its violent phases in which the global hegemon seeks to maintain influence and dismantle the competition that threatens the order it has established.

In the article “Decline Is a Choice,” published in 2009, American columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote: “For America today, decline is not a condition. Decline is a choice. Two decades after the birth of the unipolar world that emerged with the fall of the Soviet Union, America is in a position to decide whether to abdicate or to retain its dominance. Decline—or continued ascendancy—is in our hands.”

The article, a veritable crusade against the beginning of Obama’s presidency, predicted the changes that the new president would make during his term and especially criticized the lack of unipolar appetite exhibited by the new administration. In the mentioned article, America was referred to as the accidental hegemon, considering its history of isolationism and what Krauthammer labeled as a lack of instinctive imperial ambition. He also argued that America had saved Europe twice to defend and save the Western civilization to which it belonged, not because it projected itself as a hegemon.

The beginning of the multipolar world has several milestones, and China and Russia are the backbone of this construction. With the rise of Vladimir Putin in Russia and the beginning of recalibrating its new post-imperial status, there is also a strong economic growth in China, which retains its role as the world’s primary manufacturer but lays the foundation for its status as a global superpower, developing remarkable military capabilities and projecting its geopolitical influence around the globe. It should not be forgotten that, despite periods of calm and cooperation, China with the USSR, and later China with the Russian Federation, were ideological and military adversaries of the United States and the Euro-Atlantic pole. Both states shared the experience of communism, with China still being one of the few countries in the world that maintains the Communist Party as the sole party and communism as the only official state ideology.

However, the alternative pole could not coalesce without America’s weakness. Barack Obama is considered the American president who decided that the United States should not be the ‘world’s policeman,’ and starting with his second term, the Americans gradually withdrew from the role of global leadership or were not as prominent in pursuing their interests in the world. It was not a strategy of isolationism in the strict sense, but a strategy of withdrawal, which led to the United States being labeled as a ‘reluctant hegemon.’ The American public became more hesitant to expend American human and military resources in distant regions that were not as justifiable in terms of effort and tangible results. Many members of U.S. foreign policy and national security believed that the United States should end the ‘endless wars’ and pursue a strategy of restraint and reduced engagement. Such domestic political factors led U.S. presidents to reconsider the cost of maintaining the primacy of the United States.

The new approach created power vacuums in regions where America decided to reduce its geopolitical involvement and security commitments. The major powers, Russia and China, naturally sought to fill these voids, driven by an appetite to do so, and adopted offensive foreign policy positions, encouraged by the new reality.

The United States also called on its allies to assume more responsibility and resources for addressing their security concerns. Greater responsibility comes with greater economic and political burdens, and most U.S. allies were not prepared to shoulder these expenses. The European Union member states had to reassess their national security positions, sparking debates focused on strategic autonomy and the existence of a European army.

However, with Joe Biden’s presidency, America has reevaluated the new realities and quickly returned, at least in Europe, to the formula from NATO’s inception, adapted to the present circumstances: Russia out, USA in Europe; Germany down.

From the beginning of his term, Biden said, ‘The United States must regain the credibility and moral authority for which it was known in the world. It will take time to repair the devastating damage caused by the previous administration, but it is precisely what we will focus on.’

He also reaffirmed, in an online speech at the Munich Security Conference, the importance of the transatlantic partnership, promising that the United States would face common challenges together with its European allies, including the challenge posed by China. He also halted Trump’s plan to withdraw 12,000 American soldiers from the Federal Republic.

Foto: Facebook
Foto: Facebook

Multipolarity and Its Expressions

Multipolarity, in fact, signifies the emergence of other powers and regional blocs, such as India, Russia, the European Union, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa, which have their own interests, values, and agendas and cooperate or compete with each other in various fields for a common purpose.

Former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, between 1997-2002, stated a decade ago: ‘Twenty years after the end of the USSR, a global order is not being formed, but rather competition within the deregulated and still inadequately regulated global economy, a free space for everyone, between states, enterprises, financial actors, and various interest groups, both legal and illegal. Alliances are ad-hoc among rising or declining centers of power.’ (…) The United States faces the challenge of recognizing that its leadership in the world is now only relative, and that its power must be exercised differently. Half of America refuses to do so.

The motivations of states such as China, Russia, and others from what is generically called the ‘Global South’ to break free from American unipolarity are complex, but the ideology that unites them posits a series of arguments that, in their view, pertain to a historical process that can no longer be ignored.

A multipolar world is different from a unipolar world, in which one state dominates the international system, different from a bipolar world, in which two states or blocs of states compete for power and influence, and different from a tripolar world, in which three states or blocs of states dominate the international system.

The impact of globalization and technological innovation has increased interdependence and connectivity between states and non-state actors, such as businesses, civil society, and international organizations.

The theory of a multipolar world argues that the challenges and opportunities of global governance, trade, security, climate change, human rights, and development require more dialogue, negotiation, and compromise among the poles of power and other actors to resolve conflicts and achieve common goals.

As a result, seven key pillars of the multipolar world have been identified:

  1. Energy Distribution – The first pillar of the multipolar world revolves around energy distribution.
  2. Economic Interdependence, as economic relationships are not limited to a few dominant players but encompass a wide range of nations and regions. Multiple economic powers stimulate trade and investment links globally, creating a complex network of economic relationships that contribute to global prosperity and stability.
  3. Cultural Pluralism – Cultural pluralism involves power dispersed among diverse actors, with a multitude of cultures, languages, and ideologies coming to the forefront. This cultural mosaic promotes an inclusive environment and respect for diversity. As societies interact and exchange ideas, a richer global tapestry emerges, challenging traditional notions of homogeneity and promoting cultural dialogue.
  4. Diplomacy and Multilateralism – In a multipolar world, diplomacy and multilateralism play a crucial role in managing complex international relations.
  5. Technological Advancements – Technological progress is essential in shaping the multipolar world. Rapid innovation and the diffusion of technology empower a wider range of actors to engage in global affairs.
  6. Security and Cooperation – Security and cooperation form another vital pillar of the multipolar world. With power distributed among multiple actors, the balance of power becomes dynamic and requires constant reassessment. Nations seek to build alliances, partnerships, and coalitions based on shared interests and mutual security concerns. Collaboration on issues such as counterterrorism, climate change, and nuclear non-proliferation becomes imperative to maintain global stability.
  7. Adaptability and Flexibility – Ultimately, adaptability and flexibility are key pillars in the multipolar world. Nations must be open to adjusting their strategies, policies, and alliances to successfully navigate the complex landscape of the multipolar world.
Foto: Facebook
Foto: Facebook

BRICS

BRICS, which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is an acronym coined by economist Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001. Initially, it included only Brazil, Russia, India, and China (hence the original BRIC), with South Africa joining in 2010. O’Neill suggested that these four economies had the potential to dominate the global economy by 2050. Over the years, the economic power of these nations has inevitably translated into political power, leading to regular summits and concerted actions aimed at forming a global political and economic bloc.

The common declarations of BRICS articulate the general principles that underlie their cooperation. They emphasize respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, national unity, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. BRICS nations have committed to promoting peace, improving the global economic governance system, ensuring a fairer international order, and fostering sustainable development and inclusive growth. Each member state has its own reasons for supporting this project, initially driven by economic interests and later by the pursuit of global political power.

South Africa views its BRICS membership as an important vehicle for its foreign policy and an additional platform to increase its international influence.

Brazil sees BRICS as a platform to promote Brazil’s influence abroad and to build multilateral partnerships with other global powers, not just within the organization.

India considers the BRICS mechanism as a springboard for addressing development challenges in the Global South and, importantly, as a means to engage with China, a neighboring country with which it has numerous disputes, in an extended framework on issues of common interest.

For China, BRICS is a platform to expand its influence as a global power on the multilateral stage within the paradigm of multipolarity. Similarly, Russia, while committed to its own geopolitical projects aimed at restoring its position among the major BRICS powers, considers itself an advocate for reforming the global order, which has been dominated by the West, with the goal of making the international order fairer and challenging what it sees as Western hypocrisy and double standards.

What unites these states, despite their heterogeneity in terms of political regimes (from dictatorship, communism, democracy, authoritarianism, to monarchy), is two ideological motivations: anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism.

The proponents of multipolarity seek to include the multipolar spectrum as the basis of the current and future international system, consolidate BRICS as a global influencer, and attempt to de-dollarize a portion of the global economy, viewing the U.S. dollar as a principal instrument of American global dominance.

The Conflict in Ukraine and the Acceleration of Shaping the Multipolar World

America’s relations with Russia have been characterized as a unique “unipolar moment” in the history of the decade following the end of the Cold War. Subsequent evaluations have accused America of arrogance and narcissism in its handling of the relationship with the defeated party in the bipolar world. America’s governing elite failed to respect the interests of a weakened Russia and did not grasp Moscow’s potential for revenge. Representatives of the Clinton administration argued that NATO expansion was not an anti-Russia initiative and that there was no reason for Russia to fear it. However, the Russian political class perceived the opposite.

In her memoirs, Madeleine Albright confirmed that the decision to support expansion was made in June 1993, long before Russia took any aggressive actions against its neighbors. “We believed that NATO should remain at the center of the European security system,” she confessed. Furthermore, “it was correct for NATO to open its doors to new democracies, provided they met the same political and military standards as other members.”

As a result, the expansion of the most powerful military alliance still in operation after 1991, up to the borders of a Russia that had emerged from the ruins of the USSR, was interpreted as a hostile act by Moscow. NATO’s expansion, in what Moscow defined as Russia’s security buffer zone, and U.S.-led military interventions in the Balkans greatly dampened Russian enthusiasm for American values and created the perception that Russia would be increasingly hemmed in and encircled. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock Jr. stated regarding this matter: “The effect on Russian confidence in the United States was devastating.” Therefore, from Moscow’s perspective, Russia’s attack on Ukraine is seen as a consequence of distrust in America and the West, which are viewed as enemies that have not ceased to undermine the Russian nation and state.

With the Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory in the so-called special operation, the significance of the Kremlin’s decision goes beyond its stated motivations and extends to a conflict between American unipolarism and the multipolar alternative, with Russia relying on its allies. The reactions of a significant portion of the world’s nations to the conflict initiated by Russia have not leaned toward the majority condemnation as they did in the past but rather toward favorable neutrality.

At the United Nations General Assembly, approximately 40 countries (around 60% of the world’s population) refused to participate in condemning Russia. Concerning the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), they have taken different positions within the United Nations regarding the conflict in Ukraine. For example, in the vote to demand Russia’s cessation of its offensive against Ukraine on March 2, 2022, Brazil voted to condemn Russia, while the other BRICS members abstained. In the vote on March 24, 2022, to allow humanitarian access to the region, China and Brazil voted in favor of the resolution, while India and South Africa abstained.

This marks a return to a form of “non-alignment” by countries that do not necessarily agree with Moscow but do not want to be compelled to automatically support the Western-led America.

The current Russia-Ukraine conflict has not remained a local dispute between two former Soviet neighboring states but has expanded into an international issue due to the actions of the Washington-Brussels Axis. The involvement of the European Union in the conflict, through support with weapons, logistics, and funding for Ukraine, has had a direct impact on Europe, which bears the brunt of the consequences. The United States benefits economically from Russian sanctions. Without NATO support, Ukraine would have been defeated rapidly. However, Moscow’s goal seems to be not only the defeat of Ukraine but also wearing down Europe and increasing dissatisfaction among Europeans with the prolonged conflict.

If the war in Ukraine ends in a military impasse without a peace agreement or even a formal ceasefire (which seems increasingly likely), the EU and the US will maintain their sanctions against Russia for years if necessary. In practice, the world will witness a “mini Cold War” between, on one side, EU and NATO countries and their closest partners (such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea), and on the other side, Russia.

However, the West will continue to maintain its relations with China (no matter how difficult this compromise may be) even if Beijing continues its partnership with Russia.

Regarding whether the multipolar order begins at the Black Sea, it is expected that this clash between NATO and Russia will lead to a permanent reordering of the dynamics of geopolitical power in the 21st century through a ripple effect. This conflict is the litmus test of the current geopolitical confrontation, with Russia historically pivoting toward Asia and moving away from its orientation toward Europe being the great achievement of the multipolar project.

Although America, under Joe Biden’s mandate, is trying to maintain the continuity of the so-called “American century,” the data suggest that this war symbolizes a military stage in the creation of a multipolar world. This conflict, and especially its consequences, favor the rise of new emerging powers and strengthen the major players in the multipolar equation. Furthermore, China, whose global role is gaining prominence, through its non-alignment in sanctioning Russia and collaboration with Moscow, indicates that its actions are guided by long-term projects, with the same objective as Moscow: weakening the power of America and its allies.

While China is not openly involved in the Ukrainian conflict on anyone’s side, its use of economic instruments and discreet military aid acts as a form of “punishment” against its Western enemies or other allies of the United States.

Foto: Kremlin.ru

How viable is the multipolar world and how strong is American unipolarism?

Bekir Ilhan, an international relations analyst, in his article “ANALYSIS – The illusion of the multipolar world,” is skeptical about the prospects of creating a genuine multipolarity. He argues that Russia and China are not equal competitors to the United States because the economic and military power of Russia and China cannot match the reach and impact of America in the world. In Ukraine, he says, the Russian army, presented as the second-largest military power in terms of size, faced serious problems, despite substantial nuclear capabilities. China, on the other hand, even though its GDP surpasses that of the U.S., still has much to do to catch up with America, and its economic growth does not necessarily translate into equivalent military power. Furthermore, Ilhan sees China’s power projection capacity as limited for a potential global military power. At the same time, China has not yet developed a military doctrine that protects China’s global interests.

However, the argument of nuclear power in China and Russia remains essential, which will lead to “nuclear multipolarity,” certainly a significant factor in global geopolitical rivalry. The United States sees this as the most serious threat it will face by the 2030s. In this situation, the U.S. will have to deter two major nuclear powers simultaneously, Russia and China. This will be an unprecedented strategic balance that even surpasses the Cold War.

For the multipolar project, America’s return represents a significant obstacle because the Biden administration has departed from the withdrawal strategy pursued during the Obama and Trump eras and has become increasingly involved in global affairs. Biden’s speech, “America is back,” signaled a turnaround in American national security policy, and the unprecedented military aid provided by the U.S. to Ukraine against Russia strongly supports this shift.

Biden’s main concern has essentially been China, not the Russian Federation. Although there was fierce domestic political rivalry between him and his predecessor, Joe Biden did not deviate significantly from Trump’s approach to Beijing. Biden’s stance against China may not have been as bombastic as Trump’s, but it amplified the geopolitical and economic struggle with Beijing. He aimed to revitalize the cause of democracy worldwide and address the urgency of climate change, but it is possible that his and America’s ambitions may not find the desired followers in many parts of the world.

In his strategy of re-establishing America as a global leader, Joe Biden sought to rally U.S. allies to present a united front against a powerful and influential China on the world stage, determined to be a rule-setter rather than a rule-taker. However, America is the one setting the rules, which can only lead to conflict sooner or later.

The American President referred to Russia and China as two of the “biggest” issues in U.S. foreign policy. He called Russia “a country that wants to destroy our democracy.” China, on the other hand, is a threat to the U.S. because of its “great economic ambitions.” Joe Biden concluded: “We must act firmly but with diplomatic means.”

Critics of Biden challenge his hegemonic return policy as a misjudgment of geopolitical realities. Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, harshly assessed that Biden “has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue for the past four decades.” Biden supported many failed defense policies and rejected others that proved more successful, Gates wrote. He voted for the 2003 Iraq War but against the 1991 Gulf War. The latter, controversial decision led to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, arguably his greatest vulnerability in foreign policy, where he was seen as one of the most experienced American politicians with over 40 years of experience.

Returning to Bekir Ilhan’s article, he concludes by saying that the illusion of multipolarity stems from American strategic choices, not from the American system itself. The international system will remain unipolar, and unipolarity does not mean that the United States actually leads the world. Unipolarity means that no other major power matches the material capabilities of the United States. The United States has voluntarily stepped back from the role of the world’s policeman in recent years, giving rise to the illusion of multipolarity, which could be a trap for multipolar enthusiasm.

Share our work
Tamari Bibichadze: Romania can play a pivotal role in Georgia’s path towards EU accession

Tamari Bibichadze: Romania can play a pivotal role in Georgia’s path towards EU accession

Ms. Tamari Bibichadze is a member of the non-governmental organization YATA Georgia, one of the most important civil society platforms in the Republic of Georgia.

K.P.: How did the Russian invasion in Ukraine influence Georgian political life?

T.B.: The Russia-Ukraine war has had a significant impact on Georgia, and it is unsurprising that a large portion of society views the war’s outcomes as a turning point for Georgia’s future. The current polarization within the country has had a severe impact on Georgia’s foreign policy objectives and internal political situation, hindering the establishment of unified positions. Following the aggression by Russia, it is crucial to promptly identify opportunities and risks and address these issues rationally within Georgia.

First and foremost, it should be acknowledged that the Russia-Ukraine war has created a framework of opportunities that Ukraine and Moldova, two members of the associated trio, have successfully capitalized on. They have been granted candidate status while Georgia, despite demonstrating fairly positive indicators, was denied due to its internal political situation. This situation appears to foster a trend of growing “distance” from Europe, manifested in the country’s increasingly significant engagement with Russia. For instance, the visa regime with Russia was lifted on May 15, and in 2022, Russia became one of Georgia’s top trade partners, ranking in the top three for trade turnover in terms of both exports and imports. Concurrently, the number of Russian migrants has risen, with approximately 1.5 million crossing the border, resulting in over 2 billion GEL entering Georgia’s budget. Additionally, around 17,000 companies registered by Russians are operating in Georgia, with over 5,000 new businesses registered in the first three months of 2023 alone. Naturally, these developments increase risks, particularly the primary peril of pursuing an independent national policy. As dependence on Russia grows, the country becomes increasingly vulnerable to foreign political threats. Prime Minister Gharibashvili emphasized at the Qatar Economic Forum that severing economic ties with Russia would have catastrophic consequences for the country.

On the other hand, the Russia-Ukraine war has had a significant impact on Georgia’s domestic political landscape. An unprecedentedly high percentage of the Georgian population, 82%, supports Georgia’s accession to the European Union, with many believing that the government is not doing enough to achieve this goal. Recently, negative sentiment toward the ruling party has increased, despite their active pursuit of double-digit economic growth.

The Russia-Ukraine war has rekindled painful memories of the 2008 war and sparked concerns about the future among segments of society. Consequently, the ruling party has begun manipulating the discourse around peace. They assert that the West aims to open a second front in Georgia and argue for maintaining peace and stability. They have also called for sanctions. Prime Minister Gharibashvili, for example, deems it unreasonable to urge partners to cease trade, economic activities, and flights with Russia, citing the fact that the European Union engages in trade with Russia. However, the current situation does not align with this claim, as the European Union reduced its foreign trade with Russia by 64.4% in the first quarter of 2023. The war has also accentuated the preexisting democratic issues in Georgia, leading to several intense situations. One notable example is the Law on Foreign Agents, commonly known among a large portion of the Georgian population as the “Russian Law.” Its attempted adoption sparked significant protests and resulted in clashes between law enforcement agencies and civilians.

The most prominent development has been the strong support from the majority of society for Ukraine. Young people, especially Gen-Z, have become active participants and played a crucial role in opposing the Russian law. Georgia faces significant challenges, ranging from its distancing from the West to the growing dependence on Russia. However, the unity of the population and the activism of the youth provide hope for positive changes. It is also worth mentioning the President of Georgia, Salome Zurabishvili, who recently made commendable moves by pardoning Nika Gvaramia, the director of the “Mtavari Channel” and a prominent opposition journalist.

Foto: Facebook
Foto: Facebook

K.P.:What are the perspectives of Georgian -EU and Georgia-NATO relations?

T.B.: The Russia-Ukraine war has underscored the urgent need for European integration in Georgia. It serves as a reminder to Europe that the 2008 war was not an isolated incident, and Russia has shown a willingness to invade other states if given the opportunity. Consequently, the security concerns of Eastern European countries have become increasingly important for EU member states. Georgia perceives the European Union as its main partner in addressing security problems and advancing democratic and economic reforms, as demonstrated by the overwhelming support of 82% of the country’s population. In addition to the security aspects, Georgia recognizes the potential economic benefits and opportunities that closer integration with the European Union brings. Access to larger markets, foreign investment, and technological advancements are among the key drivers for seeking stronger economic ties with the EU.

The Russia-Ukraine war has also highlighted the importance of reconciliation and peace-building efforts in Georgia. The unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russia exerts decisive influence, present significant challenges. Georgia has actively pursued reconciliation, fostering dialogue, and seeking peaceful solutions to these conflicts. Furthermore, Georgia places great emphasis on security cooperation with NATO. While the issue of NATO membership lies in the relatively distant future, there is a growing sense of urgency to pursue it. Joining NATO would not only enhance Georgia’s defense capabilities but also deepen cooperation in areas such as defense reforms, military training, and interoperability.

However, the presence of Russian military bases in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia poses a significant obstacle to Georgia’s path to NATO membership. According to NATO procedures, a country is typically accepted if it has no territorial disputes. Resolving these conflicts and achieving territorial integrity are vital steps for Georgia’s NATO aspirations.

To further strengthen its position, Georgia engages in diplomatic efforts with both the EU and NATO. These include high-level visits, diplomatic negotiations, and active participation in multilateral forums. By actively seeking diplomatic engagement, Georgia aims to enhance its relationship with these institutions and solidify its commitment to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Lastly, public perception and awareness play a crucial role in Georgia’s integration efforts. Building public awareness and understanding fosters support for these integration processes and ensures the alignment of public opinion with the country’s strategic objectives. Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted the imperative for Georgia to pursue European integration, focusing on security cooperation with the EU and NATO. The unresolved conflicts and the presence of Russian military bases pose challenges, but Georgia remains committed to reconciliation efforts and the pursuit of its territorial integrity.

K.P.: Civil society in Georgia plays an important part in the Europeanization and democratization of Georgia. What can be done by the EU/West to help this process? Can Georgian civil society be a model for the region?

T.B.: Civil society in Georgia plays a vital role in the process of Europeanization and democratization of the country. It is a key driving force that compels the government to make decisions that benefit the nation. For instance, following the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, Georgia swiftly rallied in support of Ukraine, with society uniting and holding demonstrations. This solidarity was accompanied by unprecedented humanitarian aid, and Georgian volunteers even traveled to Ukraine to fight alongside them. A significant portion of Georgian society considers the war in Ukraine as their own.

Another achievement of civil society is the thwarting of the law on foreign agents. During critical moments, civil society consistently assumes a pivotal stance for the country. Over the past two years, they have achieved noteworthy successes, both small and large. To further strengthen civil society and safeguard them against undue pressure, the EU can provide financial and technical assistance. This assistance may encompass training courses, various programs, workshops, and mentoring initiatives aimed at enhancing their organizational and advocacy skills. Moreover, increased funding opportunities and grants from the European Union would enable Georgian civil organizations to effectively carry out their activities.

Facilitating information and knowledge exchange between Georgian civil society actors and their counterparts in the EU and other countries is crucial. This can be realized through study visits, conferences, and platforms that facilitate the sharing of best practices and experiences in promoting democracy and European values. Additionally, active engagement of the EU with civil society organizations in policy dialogue and decision-making processes, including regular consultations and involvement in formulating policies and reforms related to democratization, human rights, and European integration, is of utmost importance.

Regarding the civil society model of Georgia for the region, it should be acknowledged that Georgia has a long history of resilience against challenges. Despite being targeted by numerous empires in the past, the Georgian people have consistently demonstrated their resolve. Even today, civil society representatives effectively handle the challenges facing the country. Their continued activism will contribute to the achievement of desired goals. Georgia has made significant progress in developing an active and issue-oriented civil society, with civil organizations playing a crucial role in advocating democratic reforms, promoting human rights, and fostering social inclusion. The experiences, successes, and challenges of Georgian civil society can serve as valuable lessons for other countries in the region.

However, it is important to recognize that each country has its own unique context, and the development of civil society may vary. Economic reforms, for example, may have justified outcomes in some newly formed post-Soviet states while causing economic shocks in others. While successful mechanisms can be applied in a general context, it is essential to consider the uniqueness of each country’s historical examples.

In conclusion, by actively supporting Georgian civil society and fostering regional cooperation, the European Union and the West can contribute to the processes of Europeanization and democratization in Georgia. This collective effort has the potential to set a positive example for the region.

K.P.: What is the political and economic importance of the Black Sea for the Republic of Georgia in the 21 century?

T.B.: The Black Sea holds significant political and economic importance for Georgia. Firstly, it serves as a crucial link to the West, providing access to resources and opportunities. The Black Sea plays a vital role in Georgia’s economic development and international trade. It acts as a key transit corridor between Europe and Asia, facilitated by sea ports such as Batumi and Poti. These ports enable the transportation of various goods, including agricultural products, energy resources, and valuable commodities, contributing to Georgia’s economic growth and integration into global markets.

Additionally, the Black Sea grants Georgia access to major trade routes and markets, fostering trade flows and strengthening political-economic cooperation. Georgia becomes an important player in the region, connecting neighboring countries like Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, as well as other European countries and Asia. The Black Sea’s energy resources and infrastructure are also noteworthy. Georgia leverages its strategic location by actively participating in energy projects, ensuring energy security, and establishing itself as a reliable partner. The Black Sea region serves as a transit route for significant oil and gas pipelines, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. These connections allow the Caspian Sea region to access international markets while bypassing Russia, reducing Georgia’s dependence on a single supplier and enhancing its energy security.

Moreover, Georgia capitalizes on the Black Sea’s tourism potential. The coastal areas have become popular tourist destinations, thanks to infrastructure development projects that have made them more accessible and appealing. With its picturesque coastline and rich cultural attractions, Georgia attracts visitors from both regional and international markets. Tourism plays a crucial role in the country’s economy, contributing to job creation, infrastructure development, and foreign currency inflows.

The strategic significance of the Black Sea cannot be overlooked. Its proximity to major geopolitical actors and its potential as a transit corridor make it a vital maritime border for Georgia’s national security. Stability and security in the Black Sea region are essential not only for Georgia’s overall security and stability but also for the broader Euro-Atlantic community.

In conclusion, the Black Sea holds considerable political and economic importance for Georgia. It enables trade connections, ensures energy security, unlocks tourism potential, and holds strategic significance in terms of security and geostrategy. The development and effective management of Black Sea resources, as well as partnerships with regional and international actors, remain key priorities for Georgia’s political and economic development.

K.P.: A couple of weeks ago, Russia and Georgia reopened the air routes. What is the significance? Is this a sign of a geopolitical shift in Georgian foreign policy objectives?

T.B.: The abolition of the visa regime between Russia and Georgia has raised legitimate concerns and sparked questions about potential negative geopolitical consequences. On one hand, this move suggests a shift in Georgia’s goals and previously stated positions, aligning with Russia’s “do not provoke” policy. However, a significant number of Georgian citizens believe that Georgia’s aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration remain unchanged and criticize the government for this step.

The Western orientation of Georgia and the aspirations of the majority of its people are clearly expressed in the Constitution of Georgia, Chapter Eleven, Article 78, which states that constitutional bodies must take all measures within their power to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This provision serves as the driving force behind Georgia’s Western aspirations. In my view, the resumption of flights between Georgia and Russia can be seen as an implicit acceptance or normalization of the occupation, which contradicts our long-standing stance on territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Furthermore, this decision can be seen as a departure from Georgia’s broader foreign policy objectives, including the pursuit of European integration and NATO membership. However, the ruling party emphasizes the importance of economic opportunities and argues that prioritizing economic and tourism interests is crucial for the country’s development. Nonetheless, the ambiguity surrounding political principles and national security issues raises doubts about the consistency and stability of Georgia’s foreign policy.

Additionally, the decision to open air routes without clear progress on conflict resolution or significant concessions from Russia is concerning, as it indicates the potential for increased dependence on Russia.Moreover, there are questions about the impact on regional dynamics and the possibility of geopolitical realignment. It could be interpreted as Russia’s adaptive response to the developments in Ukraine or an opportunity for Russia to evade sanctions. The course of events at a similar pace will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the balance of power and Georgia’s relations with its Western partners.

In conclusion, the abolition of the visa regime between Russia and Georgia has elicited valid concerns and raised doubts about the potential negative consequences on Georgia’s foreign policy objectives. While some argue for the economic benefits, others view it as a departure from Georgia’s Western aspirations and a sign of increased dependence on Russia. The implications for regional dynamics and Georgia’s relations with its Western partners are subject to ongoing scrutiny and evaluation.

K.P.: In your opinion, what would be a solution to peacefully solve the separatist conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

T.B.: In my opinion, one potential solution to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia issue would be to resolve the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which would create an opportunity for negotiations without the interference of a hostile third state. It is crucial to have sustained and inclusive dialogue involving all parties to the conflict. Additionally, considering the possibility of granting wide autonomy, similar to the existing autonomy in Adjara, could be discussed.

Restoring trust is of utmost importance as it will help create a favorable environment for negotiations. Impartial international actors such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or other regional organizations should play a significant role in facilitating a peaceful resolution.

Promoting economic development and addressing socio-economic disparities in the conflict-affected regions can contribute to stability and reconciliation. Initiatives focused on economic growth should be pursued. However, initiating dialogue between the parties is essential, emphasizing that the confrontation between Abkhazians, Ossetians, and their Georgian counterparts is rooted in Russian propaganda and distorted historical narratives.

In the long term, a comprehensive approach that addresses socio-economic and political aspects is necessary. Efforts should be directed towards reconciliation and reintegration. This includes promoting mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect among different ethnic and cultural groups. Resolving the territorial dispute will be possible when Russia refrains from interfering in the internal politics of the country.

Foto: wikipedia
Foto: wikipedia

K.P.: Romania and Georgia have similar historic backgrounds up to a point. How can the relations be improved? How can Romania help Georgia in its quest for EU membership?

T.B.: To begin with, I would like to highlight the exceptional historical and cultural background shared by Georgia and Romania, which serves as a solid foundation for enhancing close relations and cooperation between the two nations. Both Georgia and Romania have experienced challenging battles for independence, facing various empires that sought to exert control. The shared desire for independence has shaped their identities and contributed to their distinctive cultural heritage. Georgia and Romania find common ground in their values, traditions, and practices. Notably, Romania’s membership in the European Union and NATO holds significant value for Georgia in its pursuit of EU integration. Romania can act as a strategic partner, offering knowledge and support based on its successful integration journey. Drawing inspiration from Romania’s example, Georgia can chart its own course towards European integration, benefitting from Romania’s guidance and cooperation. To strengthen relations between Romania and Georgia and to support Georgia’s EU aspirations, several steps can be taken:

Firstly, it is crucial to enhance bilateral cooperation in various fields, including trade, investment, culture, education, and tourism. Facilitating more youth exchange programs and fostering educational initiatives will empower the society and contribute to Georgia’s development.

Secondly, knowledge sharing plays a vital role. Romania’s extensive experience can be shared with Georgia, encompassing technical assistance, training programs, and the exchange of best practices in areas such as governance, rule of law, economic reforms, and harmonization of legislation with EU standards.

Support in areas like democratic governance, human rights, judicial reform, and anti-corruption measures is also essential. As Georgia’s closest partner, Romania can demonstrate a meaningful gesture by advocating for and highlighting Georgia’s achievements in EU institutions and among its member states.

Furthermore, Romania and Georgia can enhance regional cooperation within frameworks such as the Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, or the Three Seas Initiative. Collaborating with other countries in the region can facilitate joint projects, infrastructure development, and economic integration, all of which will further advance Georgia’s European integration goals.

In summary, by deepening bilateral cooperation, sharing experiences, supporting reforms, advocating for Georgia’s EU aspirations, promoting regional cooperation, and facilitating cultural and educational exchanges, Romania can play a pivotal role in Georgia’s path towards EU accession.

Share our work
Romania, ambitious geopolitical objectives in the Black Sea region

Romania, ambitious geopolitical objectives in the Black Sea region

President Klaus Iohannis stated that Romania will continue to stand by the Republic of Moldova, which has been heavily affected by war, providing financial assistance, expertise, and political support. Romania will also support Ukraine in a “comprehensive and multidimensional” manner as long as it is necessary. The leader in Bucharest has merely reaffirmed the foreign policy strategy of recent years implemented by Romanian diplomacy. He said, “We will continue to support Ukraine comprehensively and multidimensionally, for as long as it is necessary. At the same time, we will continue to be with the Republic of Moldova, which has been severely affected by war, through unprecedented financial assistance, expertise, and political support in building an irreversible European path and in constructing a safe and prosperous state for all its citizens.”

Romania’s support for the Republic of Moldova is practically one of the only objectives considered crucial by Romanian parliamentary political parties for Romania’s national security.

Foto: Facebook
Foto: Facebook

The current priority for Bucharest’s diplomacy is to obtain the political decision to open negotiations for EU accession with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

Since the outbreak of the war initiated by Russia, Romania’s solidarity with Ukraine has remained unwavering. Romania has received over 5.7 million Ukrainians, provided significant humanitarian aid, and facilitated the transit of over 22.5 million tons of Ukrainian agricultural products through its territory. These efforts are complemented by strong political support for Ukraine at the European Union and NATO levels, as well as Romania’s involvement in isolating Russia on the international stage.

The political elite in Bucharest is united in the belief that it is Romania’s duty to continue being a genuine provider of security and prosperity in the region, so that the Black Sea can become an area where peace and prosperity are no longer threatened.

Romania’s interest in strengthening the security format in the Black Sea basin has been highlighted by President Klaus Iohannis, who announced that at the Summit of the Three Seas Initiative (I3M) scheduled for September 6th in Bucharest, there are plans to expand the platform with a new participating state, Greece, and to grant the status of an associated participating state to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

Given the geopolitical context created by the war in Ukraine, the Three Seas Initiative can become a much more significant platform for consolidating regional and European resilience.

At the September 6, 2023 Summit in Bucharest, Romania aims to reaffirm the role of the Initiative in promoting economic growth and strategic interconnections. This includes strengthening and refining the tools of the Initiative and redefining its relationship with its geopolitically reconfigured neighborhood.

Romania is expected to deepen its bilateral relations with European partners, especially those with strategic relevance, such as Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, Poland, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Portugal, Belgium, Hungary, and the Baltic states.

Foto: presidency.ro
Foto: presidency.ro

The system of trilaterals, which has characterized part of Romania’s diplomatic efforts, should be consolidated and should not overlap with other initiatives. Trilaterals like Romania – Poland – Turkey, Romania – Republic of Moldova – Ukraine, or Romania – Poland – Spain address various security needs, and these regional options should not harm Romania’s interests in other areas, especially in the Black Sea basin.

An important aspect is Romania’s interest in ensuring access to energy resources that cannot be used for political purposes, following the Russian model. Romania should also continue to focus on the accelerated development of relations with partners in the South Caucasus, namely Azerbaijan and Georgia, given “the importance of this region in terms of energy and its role in the political, economic, and security configuration of the Black Sea.

Romania can indeed play a role in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, given the privileged bilateral relationships between Bucharest and the two capitals directly involved in the conflict, Baku and Yerevan. Even Romania’s good relations with Ankara can support this goal, even though Turkey may not view the involvement of other states in the stabilization of the region favorably. As a member of the European Union and NATO, Romania can provide unique expertise and participate in the deployment of a potential international peacekeeping force. Bucharest should support efforts to eliminate the harmful influence of the Russian Federation in the region, an influence that has led to the emergence of separatist conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

This remains the most vulnerable state in the Black Sea region, and Romania’s support is crucial for its survival as a viable entity.

Although the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, recently stated that the European Union should be prepared to accept new member states by 2030, it is challenging to believe that this ideal can be achieved due to the complex issues in the candidate countries: political, social, economic, and security challenges.

The six Western Balkan states – Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia – are at different stages in the process of EU accession.

Last year, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidate status, and Georgia is also waiting to receive this status.

Of course, all candidate states must resolve their bilateral conflicts before joining the European Union, and Romania can play an important role in ensuring that none of the past conflicts become a hindrance to EU or NATO membership, as the case may be.

The EU should also implement internal reforms to prepare for expansion, and in this process, Romania can play an active role.

Share our work